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MONTAIGNE AND THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

FOR nearly a century before Montaigne began to write his *Essais*, a conspiracy of men and events had been challenging the authority of Aristotle in various fields of knowledge. Under the constant assault of Platonists, humanists, reformers, and explorers the *dixit Aristoteles* of the Schoolmen had lost much of its ancient air of finality. The effect of these activities, of such capital importance for the history of ideas, is reflected in the strongly anti-Aristotelian utterances of Montaigne¹ and in the growth of the experimental method foreshadowed in more than one of the *Essais*. A more surprising result was the resistance of certain Aristotelian works to the general decline of the Peripatetic philosophy. Throughout the sixteenth century all the treatises were still widely read, if only for the purpose of refutation. But, contrary to the common tendency, the treatises on the so-called "practical sciences"—namely, the *Politics*, the *Rhetoric*, the *Poetics*, and the *Ethics*—acquired a greater measure of popularity and exerted a deeper influence over men's minds than at any previous time since their introduction to Western civilization in the thirteenth century. Abundant evidence is at hand to show that these treatises escaped the discredit accorded the other Aristotelian writings. Numerous Latin editions, often newly translated and provided with original commentaries, as well as excellent French translations, bear witness to the esteem which these works continued to enjoy and to their vital interest for an age absorbed with the arts of life and the art of living.

¹ Several of these have been brought together by Villey, *Sources, etc.*, I, 67; II, 168, 213 ff.

The *Poetics*, in particular, gradually attained a position of authority in the field of dramatic poetry hardly less absolute than that of the *Organon* among the Schoolmen. The *Ethics*, being less obviously related to literary history, has only recently been examined in this connection; but already it is clear that this treatise was one of the primary sources used in formulating the doctrine of the "perfect gentleman."² For one who was seeking, as was Montaigne, to discover the underlying motives of human conduct and to find a rational justification for moral action, it would be strange indeed had he failed to consult the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Certainly no other work of antiquity affords a more orderly and more concise treatment of the moral problems relevant to the secular ideal of the "compleat gentleman" of which Montaigne was undoubtedly the noblest representative and the foremost spokesman of his age.

In his indispensable guide to the sources of the *Essais*,³ the late M. Pierre Villey has shown with admirable thoroughness the successive stages of Montaigne's use of the Aristotelian treatises, and in his edition of the *Essais*⁴ has indicated, though not always with complete accuracy, the direct borrowings.⁵ It seems desirable to carry somewhat farther the investigations of M. Villey in order to show that Montaigne's direct borrowings from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which was his favorite Aristotelian work, were hardly more significant than his indirect borrowings through the medium of other writers, and also that the moral conclusions reached by Montaigne often correspond with remarkable exactitude to those expressed in the *Ethics*. In their

² The most substantial contribution to the study of this subject is that of Ruth Kelso, *The doctrine of the English gentleman in the sixteenth century* (Urbana, 1929). As a pioneer explorer in the field, Miss Kelso has necessarily limited her investigation largely to a special period, paying little attention to the original sources of the doctrine. Her work is further restricted to the English aspect of the subject. Cf. also W. F. DeMoss, *The influence of Aristotle's "Politics" and "Ethics" on Spenser* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918).

³ *Les sources et l'évolution des "Essais" de Montaigne* (2 vols.; Paris, 1908).

⁴ *Essais de Montaigne* (3 vols.; Paris: Alcan, 1922-23). Citations from the *Essais* in this article are quoted from this, the most easily available edition.

⁵ The few errors of reference in M. Villey's list of sources at the end of Vol. III are almost certainly typographical. However, his statement (I, xiv) that there are in the *Essais* eighteen borrowings from the *Nicomachean Ethics* is a more serious mistake, since his own list of sources contains twenty-four references to that work, to which I am able to add three more. M. Villey makes the same statement in *Sources*, I, 69: "Enfin en 1595 on trouve dix-huit emprunts à la *Morale à Nicomaque*"; and again, II, 520: "Une vingtaine d'emprunts à l'ouvrage d'Aristote (la *Morale*). ..." See below, n. 15, the complete list of these borrowings.

final form, which we shall assume to be the Bordeaux manuscript, it can be fairly maintained that the *Essais* contain all the essential principles of the ethical doctrine propounded by Aristotle. Hitherto, however, the close analogy between these two works has generally escaped the attention of critics. Among the more important writers on Montaigne only Faguet has touched upon the subject, and his brief statement that the Frenchman was *très peu aristotélique* seems calculated to apply rather to the style and method than to the underlying thought.⁶ In this purely external sense, it is true that Montaigne and Aristotle have nothing in common; in everything that depends upon temperament they stand at opposite poles. Perhaps this difference of temperament between the two men explains in part the relatively slight and tardy use of Aristotle in the composition of the *Essais*; certainly it makes the more remarkable the striking similarity of their ideas regarding human conduct.

M. Villey has shown that there is no definite evidence in the *Essais* of Montaigne's having read more of Aristotle than the *Politics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*.⁷ His references to other treatises seem to be at second hand.⁸ From the *Politics* he quotes directly but twice,⁹ while his direct borrowings from the *Ethics* number twenty-seven. These latter quotations first appear in the Bordeaux manuscript, and accordingly M. Villey concludes that Montaigne read the *Ethics* after 1588.¹⁰ It is therefore clear that the *Ethics* is the only Aristotelian work that can have impressed Montaigne deeply¹¹ and that his ac-

⁶ *Le seizième siècle* (Paris, 1893), p. 385.

⁷ Villey, *Sources*, I, 69.

⁸ With the doubtful exception of the *Problemata*, from which two important passages may be derived. Cf. Villey, *ibid.*

⁹ Villey (*ibid.*, I, 68) shows conclusively that Montaigne quoted from Louis LeRoy's translation of the *Politics* (Paris: Vascosan, 1568; 2d ed., 1576). Most of the quotations are from LeRoy's commentary rather than from the text.

¹⁰ *Sources*, I, 69.

¹¹ M. Villey (*ibid.*) hazards the conjecture that Montaigne read the *Ethics* in "une traduction latine ancienne, celle de Bernardus Felicianus. ..." There is little likelihood of our discovering any dependable evidence in favor of any one of the dozen or more Latin translations which Montaigne might very well have utilized; it is not impossible that he used more than one. Felicianus' translation contains also the medieval Greek commentary of Eustratius and others; it was first published at Venice in 1541, again at Paris in 1543, and finally at Venice in 1589. It is extremely unlikely that Montaigne used any one of the three—or four—French translations available, of which only the oldest, that made by Nicole Oresme in 1370, contains all ten books of the *Ethics*. This was printed in 1488, but its archaic style and inadequate rendering of Greek terms retained from the Latin original of Robert of Lincoln (translated from the Greek before 1245) would scarcely recommend it to one amply able to read a more competent later Latin version. The version by Claude

quaintance with it came toward the end of his life, after he had written many a jibe against the Peripatetics. If his reading of this work caused him to revise his earlier opinion of Aristotle, it did not induce him to suppress or alter any of these hostile references which, considered alone and uncorrelated with exactly contrary opinions, might lead to the conclusion that Montaigne was bitterly anti-Aristotelian. However, his sober estimate of Aristotle's work is expressed with abundant clarity in the 1580 edition, in "De l'institution des enfants," where he says that he is "de l'avis de Plutarque, qu'Aristote n'amusa pas tant son grand disciple à l'artifice de composer syllogismes, ou aux Principes de Geometrie, comme à l'instruire des bons preceptes touchant la vaillance, proïesse, la magnanimité et temperance et l'assurance de ne rien craindre. ...";¹² and again in "De la praesumption," in an addition made in the Bordeaux manuscript, where the Peripatetics are called *de toutes les sectes la plus civilisée*.¹³

The *Essais* contain direct citations from all ten books of the *Ethics* except the fifth. Eleven quotations are derived from Books iii and iv, containing Aristotle's catalogue of the virtues and vices. Nine of these, or a third of the total, are from Book iv, to which Montaigne was especially attracted because of the treatment of such subjects as liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, vanity, wit, flattery, and modesty. Book ii, wherein the law of the "golden mean" is explained, furnished three excerpts, as did likewise Book vii, which portrays the virtues of wisdom and prudence. Four excerpts can be traced to Book x, dealing with pleasure and pain and the beatific joys of the contemplative life. From Books viii and ix, which constitute an independent essay on friendship and have long enjoyed particular favor in France,¹⁴ Montaigne cites four passages. Books i and vi are represented by only

Grivel de Verdun-sur-Saône, *Dialogues des vertus morales, contenant les "Ethiques" de Aristote avec les vertus ajoutées par figures et exemples* (Paris, 1537), is in reality an abbreviated adaptation of the Latin version of Aretini (1430). The excellent translation directly from the Greek made by LePlessis (Paris: Vascosan, 1553) contains only the first five books. The French version referred to by M. Villey and attributed to P. de Phuyard (Paris, 1570) is almost certainly the same as that noted by Schwob, *Bibliographie d'Aristote*, item 2232, who attributes it to Pontus de Tyard. I have had no better success than M. Villey in locating this very rare work, which I have sought in all the principal libraries of France, Belgium, and Holland.

¹² *Essais*, I, 210.

¹³ *Ibid.*, II, 420.

¹⁴ During the nineteenth century these books were published separately in French translation at least five times.

one excerpt each. In the Bordeaux manuscript, these twenty-seven quotations from the *Ethics* have been fitted into fifteen different essays; six in Livre i, twelve in Livre ii, and nine in Livre iii.¹⁵

Like the other treatises of Aristotle in general, the *Ethics* contains few of those anecdotes and "exempla" with which Montaigne, after the fashion of his age, delighted to adorn his pages. Of necessity, therefore, his citations are chiefly in the form of a restatement of Aristotle's opinion concerning the subject under discussion. In "De l'amitié," for example, he writes: "Il n'est rien à quoy il semble que nature nous aye plus acheminé qu'à la société. Et dit Aristote que les bons législateurs ont eu plus de soing de l'amitié que de la justice."¹⁶ Citations of this sort are variously introduced by expressions such as the following: "Ce qu'Aristote recite"; "selon Aristote"; "au mot d'avis d'Aristote"; "Aristote estime"; "Aristote attribue," etc. This form of citation hardly differs from that employed by the Schoolmen, and there can be no doubt that Montaigne was in no way adverse to the use of Aristotle's name to lend authority to his opinions. The difference lies, of course, in the greater independence of judgment and the fresher observation of Montaigne. On the occasion of the first citation from the *Ethics* with which we meet in the *Essais*, Montaigne seems to express admiration for one who was, like himself, an advocate of the *libre examen*: "Aristote, qui remue toutes choses ...,"¹⁷ and he proceeds to quote at length the discussion in the *Ethics* of Solon's statement that no one can be called happy before death. Characteristically, it is Montaigne, not Aristotle, who settles the point by deciding, with apparently irrefutable logic, that man is therefore never happy, since he is happy only after he no longer exists.

¹⁵ The complete list follows: *Essais*, I, 17: "Aristote ..." (*Ethics* i. 10); 42: "Les Pythagoriciens ..." (*Ethics* ii. 6); 146: "Par coutume ..." (*Ethics* vii. 5); 146: "Celuy ..." (*Ethics* vii. 6); 174: "Ce qu'Aristote recite ..." (*Ethics* vi. 7); 237: "Et dit Aristote ..." (*Ethics* viii. 1); *Essais*, II, 67: "Se payer ..." (*Ethics* iv. 7); 76: "Joint cette autre considération ..." (*Ethics* ix. 7); 79: "non la vieillesse seulement ..." (*Ethics* iv. 6); 98: "Car, selon Aristote ..." (*Ethics* ix. 7); 229: "Parquoy Aristote ..." (*Ethics* vii. 1); 336: "Aristote attribue ..." (*Ethics* iv. 3); 393: "Aristote ..." (*Ethics* iv. 3); 393: "Evite comme deux extremes ..." (*Ethics* ii. 2); 420: "Les petits hommes ..." (*Ethics* iv. 3); 430: "Aristote estime ..." (*Ethics* iv. 8); 515: "La plus part de nos polices ..." (*Ethics* x. 9); 523: "Aristote dit ..." (*Ethics* iii. 8); *Essais*, III, 33: "Et les privez ..." (*Ethics* x. 7); 47: "C'est la besogne des Dieux ..." (*Ethics* x. 7); 86: "Je m'en vay pour moy ..." (*Ethics* iv. 9); 248: "Quand Thetis ..." (*Ethics* iv. 3); 249: "Mals j'ay encore plus fuy ..." (*Ethics* ix. 7); 385: "suivant Aristote ..." (*Ethics* iv. 7); 438: "Il en est qui ..." (*Ethics* ii. 7); 438: "que ne vivent-ils du leur ..." (*Ethics* iii. 11); 443: "Eudoxus ..." (*Ethics* x. 2).

¹⁶ *Essais*, I, 237; cf. *Ethics* viii. 1.

¹⁷ *Essais*, I, 17.

Two direct citations from the *Ethics* assume the *exemplum* form. In "De l'experience," in discussing the important problem of pleasure Montaigne cites from the tenth book of the *Ethics* the example of Eudoxus "qui en [du plaisir] établissoit le souverain bien, et ses compagnons, qui la montarent à si haut pris, la savourerent en sa plus gracieuse douceur par le moyen de la temperance, qui fut en eux singuliere et exemplaire."¹⁸ The contents of this passage make it clear that Montaigne derived it directly from the second chapter of Book x of the *Ethics*, where the opinion of Eudoxus is examined in detail, rather than from Diogenes Laertius' brief synopsis, as M. Villey has indicated.¹⁹ Another *exemplum* from the *Ethics* occurs in the essay "De la coustume," where it was transplanted bodily from the sixth chapter of Book vii: "Celui qu'on rencontra battant son pere, repondit que c'estoit la coustume de sa maison: que son pere avoit ainsi battu son ayeul; que son ayeul son bisayeul; et montrant son fils: Et cettuy-ci me battra quand il sera venu au terme de l'aage ou je suis!"²⁰

A much-quoted *exemplum* appears in the tenth chapter of Book iii of the *Ethics*. It relates of a certain man that he wished his throat might be longer than a crane's, in order that he might prolong his gustatory sensations. Cited by Aristotle as an example of intemperance or profligacy, the passage is found in several later writers of antiquity and in collections of *exempla* of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.²¹ Montaigne cites this *exemplum* in the essay "Sur des vers de Virgile": "Je ne scay qui, anciennement, desiroit le gosier allongé comme le col d'une gruë pour gouter plus longtemps ce qu'il avalloit."²² Since these lines, however, are already present in the 1588

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, III, 443.

¹⁹ Eudoxus is briefly mentioned in *Ethics* I, 12, but it is the long paragraph beginning *ibid.* x, 2 from which Montaigne borrowed. Doubtless it was this latter passage that Diogenes Laertius (viii, 88) transformed into the single sentence: "Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle, states that he [Eudoxus] declared pleasure to be the good." This does not explain the second and more important part of Montaigne's quotation, which is easily accounted for by the following: "Eudoxus's arguments owed their acceptance more to the excellence of the man's character than to their own merit. He had the reputation of being a man of exceptional temperance, and hence he was not suspected of upholding pleasure as the supreme good merely because he was a lover of pleasure, but people thought it must really be true. . . . He also said that the addition of pleasure to any good—for instance, just and temperate conduct—makes that good more desirable. . . ."

²⁰ *Essais*, I, 146.

²¹ Cf. J.-Th. Welter, *L'exemplum dans la littérature religieuse et didactique du moyen-âge* (Paris, 1927), p. 101.

²² *Essais*, III, 128.

edition, there is no likelihood that they were taken at first hand from the *Ethics*. Thus the citation cannot properly be enumerated among the direct borrowings.

When we compare the number of Montaigne's citations from the *Ethics* with his borrowings from Plato, Cicero, Seneca, or Plutarch, the total, it must be admitted, is not particularly impressive. It is, indeed, hardly more than sufficient to prove that he read the work thoroughly and found in it something applicable to his own use. On the sole evidence of these twenty-seven excerpts it would be folly to argue that the *Essais* contain a fair representation of the ethical system of Aristotle. That in the final analysis the *Essais* do somehow accomplish this must be due to other factors worthy of examination. It may be well in the first place to explore the *Essais* briefly for traces of indirect borrowings.

During the period of his reading of the *Ethics*, Montaigne culled more than one hundred passages from the writings of Plato and nearly two hundred from Cicero's philosophic tracts. Nevertheless, the name of Plato is in the *Essais* frequently coupled with that of Aristotle in a common condemnation of the arbitrary authority of the opinions of the ancients in the realm of science and moral philosophy. Even the oft-quoted Cicero does not escape this general denunciation in the essay "Du pédantisme," where Montaigne writes: "Nous sçavons dire: Cicero dit ainsi; voilà les mœurs de Platon; ce sont les mots mesmes d'Aristote. Mais nous, que disons nous, nous mesmes?"²³ Limiting our examination somewhat arbitrarily to Plato and Cicero, how shall we account for Montaigne's very obvious preference for their works above kindred works of Aristotle? Two plausible reasons may be adduced to explain this point; the first concerns the matter of style, the second has to do with the general identity of underlying ideas.

Certainly no modern student is misled by Montaigne's famous statement concerning his style in the essay "Des livres": "Je n'ay point d'autre sergent de bande à ranger mes pieces que la fortune. A mesme que mes resveries se presentent je les entasse; tantost elles se pressent en foule, tantost elles se trainent à la file."²⁴ Despite the apparent disorder and prolixity of his seemingly artless composition, the ultimate effect achieved is, in almost every essay, one of complete

²³ *Ibid.*, I, 175.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 106-7.

unity in the midst of abundance, of subtly restrained power over material, of careful attention to the selection of the exact word, of artfully employed images and metaphors. Evidently one so deeply sensitive to the poetry of words in his own composition could not have been insensible to stylistic beauty in other writers. Now, of all the philosophic writings of antiquity, probably none are so generally devoid of stylistic grace as the treatises of Aristotle in the form in which they have been transmitted to us. Always laconic, rarely relieved by imagery, and, as we now possess them, all too frequently strung together like notes for a lecture, even the *Ethics*, one of the most readable of the Aristotelian corpus, falls aesthetically far short of the humblest of Plato's dialogues and lacks the rhetorical ornamentation of Cicero's letters and philosophic tracts. Although Montaigne complains apologetically in the same essay, "Des livres," of the slow movement (*le trainant*) and the diffuseness of the Platonic dialogues,²⁵ his absorbing interest in the story of Socrates, in whose life he perceived *l'extremes degré de perfection et de difficulté*, led him to devote more and more time in his last years to Plato. That Montaigne found Plato more pleasant reading than Aristotle is merely to say that his experience was not different from that of most readers of these two masters of Greek thought.

For the reason of stylistic preference alone, therefore, it is likely that Montaigne would have turned more sympathetically and thus more often to Plato than to Aristotle, and the same inference would apply to Cicero, to Seneca, and to Plutarch, any one of whose works, considered as literary art, possesses a charm seldom perceptible in the terse and severe Aristotelian treatises. Now, if it is true, as M. Villey states,²⁶ that in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle follows closely in the footsteps of Plato, it is equally true that Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch in varying degree owe much to both Plato and Aristotle in their handling of moral problems. Thus it follows that Montaigne, by incorporating material from these philosophers into the complex mosaic of the *Essais*, frequently and unavoidably makes use of passages for which close parallels are found in the *Ethics*. This indirect

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

²⁶ *Sources*, II, 520: "L'éthique péripatéticienne, très directement issue de Socrate elle aussi, était voisine de celle de l'Académie, et Montaigne semble les confondre parfois dans un même éloge."

assimilation of similar or identical ideas is, as a matter of fact, a substitute for more extensive borrowings directly from this treatise.

Thus, for example, the *De finibus* of Cicero, frequently cited by Montaigne, contains, in Book v, a lengthy analysis of Peripatetic teleology and by this same token numerous reminiscences of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.²⁷ In Book v of the *Tusculan disputations* the question is raised whether virtue be sufficient for a happy life, and here again Cicero passes in review the ethical teachings of the Peripatetics. The treatise on *Friendship*, the *Academics*, and the *De officiis*—all three of them favorite sources of Montaigne during the last revision of his work—contain several passages closely parallel to the *Ethics* which have found their way into the *Essais*. Likewise, the *Republic* and the *Laws* of Plato, from which Aristotle derived many of the elements developed in the *Ethics*, furnished Montaigne with important passages of which several might be duplicated from the *Ethics*. The same is true of a number of Seneca's *Moral treatises*. The essay "De la colere" is derived in large part from Seneca's *De ira*, which expands the brief treatment of anger as a vice in the eighth chapter of Book iii of the *Ethics*. At the end of this essay, Montaigne quotes Aristotle to the effect that anger sometimes serves as an instrument to virtue and valor.²⁸ Since this sentence appears in the 1580 edition, we must infer that Montaigne derived the citation, not from the *Ethics*, which he had not yet read, but from Seneca's *De ira*, where the statement, quoted in full, is attributed to Aristotle. From Plutarch's *Moralia*, also, Montaigne borrowed both ideas and quotations which the

²⁷ A few brief indications of these points of contact must suffice. Cf. *Essais*, II, 406, "De meme que dans le langage ordinaire on n'appelle honorable que ce qui est glorieux dans l'opinion du peuple," with *De finibus* II, 15, "that alone is honorable which is accounted glorious by common report," and with *Ethics* IV, 3, "It is popular acclaim above all else which great men claim and deserve." Cf. *Essais*, III, 226, "Nous ne jouissons jamais mieux des fruits du genie, de la vertu et de toute superiorité, qu'en les partageant avec le prochain," with *De amicitia* xix, "The sharing of our virtues, our intellectual genius and our goods is best enjoyed with those who are our equals," and with *Ethics* IX, 9, "Man is a social being and designed by nature to share his social life with others who are his equals." Cf. *Essais*, III, 245, "L'action la plus juste n'est telle qu'autant qu'elle est volontaire," with *De officiis* I, 9, "A just act must be performed in complete freedom of will to be held just," and with *Ethics* V, 8, "If a man acts involuntarily he can not be said to act justly, or unjustly except accidentally. . . ." Cf. *Essais*, I, 199, "Aucune necessité ne le contraint à defendre des idees qu'on lui aurait imperieusement prescrites," with *Academica* II, 3, "We are not compelled by any necessity to defend theories which are laid upon us as injunctions . . . or as commands," and with *Ethics* V, 9, "An act of injustice must be voluntary and done from choice, not by command."

²⁸ *Essais*, II, 523.

Greek writer in turn had culled directly or indirectly from the *Ethics*. The scope of these indirectly derived Aristotelian elements in the *Essais* could be further extended to include several among the Renaissance writers from whom Montaigne borrowed habitually, notably Erasmus, Castiglione, and Jean Bodin.²⁹ To undertake to identify in the *Essais* and to number all the citations, the borrowings, and the allusions derived from these writers for which a parallel can be found in the *Ethics* would be little less than impossible and, indeed, quite useless. It is sufficient to point out that the extent to which the *Essais* reflect the ethical doctrine of Aristotle cannot fairly be estimated without due consideration of these affiliated sources that contributed so largely to the formation of Montaigne's moral philosophy.

These meticulous details of literal similarity are far from revealing, nor do they even suggest, the deep relationship between the ethical principles of Aristotle and those of Montaigne. To perceive the full extent of the ideational elements common to both, the mind must embrace the larger and more general aspects of the *Essais* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Here the stringent methods of *Quellengeschichte* have no proper application. No question of influence of one man upon the other is involved; we are free to observe two minds contending with identical problems and to watch them reach, independently and by vastly different methods, similar or identical points of view. Only the most striking of these ideational analogies need be mentioned here.

Perhaps the most celebrated and the most often quoted of Aristotle's rules of practical conduct is that known as the "golden mean," or the law of measure. First enunciated in the second chapter of Book ii of the *Ethics*, it recurs thereafter like a *leitmotiv*, being applied after the manner of a mathematical formula to the problem of vice and virtue. A long list of ancient philosophers and poets repeat in various forms this cardinal principle of civilized conduct, and the doctrine of the "perfect gentleman" developed during the Renaissance may be said to depend fundamentally upon it. The "golden mean" is essentially the Golden Rule of the *honnête homme*. Erasmus voices it in the *Colloquia*, Castiglione expatiates upon it, Charles V inscribes *ne quid nimis* on his seutecheon, and Montaigne returns to it many times in the *Essais*. To this law he pays special homage in the essay "De l'experi-

²⁹ Cf. Villey, *Sources*, Vol. I, *sub nomine*.

ence": "Moi, qui ay tant adoré et si universellement cet ἀριστον μέτρον du temps passé et ay pris pour la plus parfaicte et moyenne mesure. ..." ³⁰ In the first book Montaigne considers this principle at length in the essay "De la moderation," declaring at the outset: "Nous pouvons saisir la vertu de façon qu'elle en deviendra vicieuse. ... On peut et trop aimer la vertu et se porter excessivement en une action juste." ³¹ One may ask, indeed, if the central thesis of the *Essais* is not best expressed in this brief Aristotelian formula *rien trop* which appears on so many pages of Montaigne's work.

Again, when Montaigne considers the various virtues and vices—and in the *Essais* no one of the traditional virtues has been overlooked—no reader acquainted with the *Ethics* will fail to find therein something more than an echo of and a pendant to Aristotle's treatment of these qualities of the soul. Particularly is this true of magnanimity, which Aristotle is at great pains to examine in the third chapter of Book iv. This virtue seems to have held first place among the ideal qualities recommended to the "perfect gentleman," and to its discussion Montaigne returns repeatedly. It is in the *Ethics* that the Pythagorean principle of *nil admirari* is attributed to the magnanimous man, whence doubtless Horace converted it into the famous verses which Montaigne quotes in the "Apologie," declaring that *nil admirari* is the central teaching of Pyrrhonism. In the Bordeaux manuscript he inserted beneath these lines from Horace the statement: "Aristote attribue à magnanimité rien n'admirer." ³²

In like manner and for identical reasons, both Aristotle and Montaigne exalt the justice of equity above the formal interpretation of the law or legal justice. "The material of conduct is essentially irregular" reads the compressed statement on equity in Book v of the *Ethics*. The more expressive argument of Montaigne in the essay "De l'expérience" arrives at the same conclusion: "Qu'ont gagné nos législateurs à choisir cent mille especes et faicts particuliers, et y attacher cent mille loix? Ce nombre n'a aucune proportion avec l'infinie diversité des actions humaines." ³³

On the subject of friendship also, the *Essais* and the *Ethics* confirm each other. The essay "De l'amitié" is without doubt one of the finest tributes to this virtue in all literature. According to this essay the

³⁰ *Essais*, III, 431.

³¹ *Ibid.*, I, 254.

³² *Ibid.*, II, 336.

³³ *Ibid.*, III, 381.

characteristic of true friendship is the complete fusion of two personalities into one harmonious unity: "En l'amitié de quoy je parle [nos ames] se confondent l'une en l'autre, d'un melange si universel, qu'elles effacent et ne retrouvent plus la couture qui les a jointes."³⁴ If this recalls to mind the speech of Alcibiades in Plato's *Banquet*, it is none the less comparable to these lines in the fifth chapter of Book viii of the *Ethics*:

The good man in becoming dear to another becomes that other's good. Each party, therefore, both loves his own good and makes an equivalent return by wishing the other's good. . . . True friendship consists in equality and similarity, especially the similarity of those alike in virtue; for being true to themselves, they also remain true to each other, neither requesting nor rendering services that are morally degrading.

Elsewhere Montaigne concludes: "... ce seroit celuy qui recevroit le bienfaict qui obligerait son compaignon";³⁵ the Aristotelian equivalent reads: "Each party is eager to benefit the other . . . and they vie with each other in giving and not in receiving benefits."

The points of similarity thus far noted are, in a general sense, commonplaces of ethical thought and are not peculiar to the *Essais* and the *Ethics* alone. The principles involved had been discussed by numerous writers of antiquity and of the Middle Ages with whom Montaigne was familiar. It is not surprising, therefore, that in considering these matters afresh, Montaigne arrived at conclusions coinciding with the traditions of moral philosophy in general and with the *Nicomachean Ethics* in particular. Indeed, disagreement on any one of these points would be difficult to imagine. However, on two highly controversial problems of ethics, that concerning pleasure and pain and the psychological nature of virtue, Montaigne took a stand which seems decidedly original when compared with the prevalent attitude of Renaissance moralists. Here, again, the fact that his opinions agree fundamentally with those of Aristotle regarding these questions must be attributed to chance, although it can be shown that he confirmed his statements of earlier editions by his reading of the *Ethics*, from which a few appropriate passages were interpolated in the Bordeaux manuscript.

In general, those critics of Montaigne who have not, like Pascal and Emerson, stressed the element of skepticism in the *Essais*, have, like

³⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 242.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

Ste Beuve and Strowski, emphasized the epicurean trend of his later thought. The former judgment is very obviously based principally on the point of view assumed by Montaigne in the "Apologie" and shows the fallacy of judging the whole from the evidence of a single part, however important that part may be. The epicurean element, predominant in the third book, is so widely diffused throughout the entire work that it is impossible to escape the conclusion that this is the essential Montaigne. When we ask what it is that creates this flavor of epicureanism throughout the *Essais*, the answer seems to lie precisely in the consistently maintained attitude of the author toward the ethical problem of pleasure and pain. Even during his stoical period, this attitude is markedly epicurean and fully justifies M. Lanson's happy epithet, *le Stoïcisme d'un voluptueux*.³⁶ For in spite of an evident intellectual effort, Montaigne could never bring himself to an acceptance of stoical apathy or neutrality concerning pleasure and pain. He could not agree to any ethical doctrine that denies the exercise of the natural capacities of man, and very clearly pleasure and pain are included among these capacities: "La douleur, la volupté, l'amour, la haine sont les premières choses que sent un enfant; si, la raison survenant, elles s'appliquent à elle, cela c'est vertu."³⁷ Pleasure and pain are necessary and inevitable concomitants of every human action; pain warns us that the act is harmful just as pleasure assures us that it is natural and therefore good: "Nature a maternellement observé cela, que les actions qu'elle nous a enjoindes pour nostre besoing nous fussent aussi voluptueuses, et nous y convie non seulement par la raison mais aussi par l'appetit: c'est injustice de corrompre ses regles."³⁸ It is the excess of pleasure that we must avoid, for this can only bring pain as its resultant: "L'intemperance est peste de la volupté, et la temperance n'est pas son fleau: c'est son assaisonnement."³⁹ The mean between excess and deficiency of pleasure is determined by the judgment: "Je consulte d'un contentement avec moy, je ne l'escume pas; je le sonde et plie ma raison à le recueillir ... y a il quelque volupté qui me chatouille? je ne la laisse pas friponer aux sens, j'y associe mon ame, non pas pour s'y engager, mais pour s'y agreer, non pas pour s'y perdre, mais pour s'y trouver. ..." ⁴⁰ Thus conceived,

³⁶ Les "Essais" de Montaigne, étude et analyse (Paris, 1931), pp. 122-28.

³⁷ *Essais*, III, 444.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 439.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 443.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 445.

pleasure is the crowning of activity; it is added to action as its natural complement and as its climax.

The confirmation of this theory of pleasure and pain Montaigne found in the first place in the writings of the Epicurean philosophers and poets, particularly in Plutarch's *Moralia*, in Lucretius, and in Horace, and later, without doubt, in Diogenes Laertius.⁴¹ But there is an aspect of Montaigne's epicureanism which does not conform to the orthodox teaching of the school, which is in fact wholly at variance with this teaching, and should make us extremely cautious in defining what is in reality only a tendency as though it were an absolute acceptance of the doctrine.⁴² While it is correct to state that the Epicureans held pleasure to be the *summum bonum*, it is equally true that their ultimate pleasure consisted in the absence of pain, and their final word on the subject may be stated as an advice to the prudent to avoid pleasure in order to forestall possible pain. Montaigne shows no such scruples concerning *les voluptés*; he is willing to follow nature and the human law of the "golden mean": "J'estime pareille injustice prendre à contre cœur les voluptés naturelles que de les prendre trop à cœur."⁴³ It is clear that the asceticism which underlies orthodox epicureanism was wholly foreign to Montaigne's thought—a point often overlooked when the comparison is made. To discover a theory of pleasure analogous to his, it is necessary to go beyond the Epicureans to Aristotle, in whose *Ethics* the pleasure-pain problem is treated at length in Book vii and again in Book x.⁴⁴ Here one will find a striking corroboration of the author of the *Essais*.

⁴¹ M. Villey enumerates about thirty borrowings from Diogenes Laertius in the Bordeaux manuscript and shows that Montaigne made the acquaintance of the *Lives of eminent philosophers* after 1588. Among these borrowings are several from the fifth book containing the "Life of Aristotle" and a few from the tenth book, the "Life of Epicurus," which preserves practically all of the fragments of the latter's writings that have come down to us. Montaigne's drift toward epicureanism preceded his reading of Diogenes by several years, and his use of this writer's work was largely to confirm his earlier statements, just as he used the *Ethics*.

⁴² In the first edition of the essay "De la cruauté," composed about 1580, Montaigne notes the close similarity between the final doctrine of the Epicureans and that of the Stoics: "Car, à la vérité, en fermeté et rigueur d'opinions et de preceptes, la secte Epicurienne ne cede aucunement à la Stoïque . . ."; and in the Bordeaux manuscript he interpolated from Cicero's *Familiar letters* (xv. 19) a significant sentence vindicating the Epicureans: "Those whom we call lovers of pleasure are really lovers of honor and justice, and they love and practise all the virtues" (cf. *Essais*, II, 124).

⁴³ *Essais*, III, 437.

⁴⁴ As Aristotle considers it one of the central problems of ethics, it is naturally a recurrent theme from the first book throughout most of the treatise.

"It might be held," writes Aristotle in the tenth book, "that all men seek to obtain pleasure because all men desire life. Life is a form of activity, and each man exercises his activity upon those objects and with those faculties which he likes the most . . . and the pleasure of these activities perfects the activities, and therefore perfects life, which all men seek. . . . There is no pleasure without activity, and also no perfect activity without its pleasure." Pain is an evil, being an impediment to activity. Some pleasures are admittedly bad, but nevertheless a certain pleasure may be the *summum bonum*, which is indeed a particular kind of pleasure. Nor is pleasure to be avoided through fear of excess with its resultant pain, as with the Epicureans; on the contrary, such avoidance of pleasure is unnatural and harmful, for pleasure accompanies and consummates the activity of healthy exercise of thought or sense directed toward a good object. The important point is that the moral value of the activity being good, the pleasure attached to it will also be good.⁴⁵

After Montaigne had read the *Ethics* and had discovered therein this strong support to his own attitude toward pleasure, he inserted in the Bordeaux manuscript at least two brief quotations bearing on the subject. In the essay "De l'experience," in defense of the pleasures of the flesh, the 1588 edition reads: "Il en est qui en sont desgoutez." In the Bordeaux manuscript this has been amended to read: "Il en est qui d'une farouche stupidité, comme dict Aristote, en sont desgoutez."⁴⁶ This phrase he seems to have taken from the eleventh chapter of Book iii of the *Ethics*: "Men erring on the side of deficiency as regards pleasures, and taking less than a proper amount of enjoyment in them, scarcely occur; such insensibility is not human." In this passage the Greek *ἀναισθησία* was rendered into Latin by *insensibilitas*; the *farouche* is apparently Montaigne's addition. Again in the same essay we find the insertion in the Bordeaux manuscript of the following *exemplum*:⁴⁷ "Eudoxus, qui en [du plaisir] établissoit le souverain bien, et ses compagnons, qui la montarent à si haut pris, la savourerent en sa plus gracieuse douceur par le moyen de la temperance, qui fut en eux singuliere et exemplaire."⁴⁸ In the second chapter

⁴⁵ *Ethics* x. 4. I quote, with occasional slight changes, from Rackham's translation, in the "Loeb Classical Library" collection, the most easily available modern version.

⁴⁶ *Essais*, III, 438.

⁴⁷ On this passage cf. n. 19 above.

⁴⁸ *Essais*, III, 443.

of Book x, Aristotle states at some length the opinion of Eudoxus concerning pleasure:

That pleasure is the Good was held by Eudoxus. . . . His arguments owed their acceptance, however, more to the excellence of his character than to their own merit. He had the reputation of being a man of exceptional temperance. . . .

While these two borrowings can not be said to establish that Montaigne was aware of the close relationship of his pleasure-pain theory with that of Aristotle, it is clear that the two men were in fundamental agreement, and it may fairly be assumed that upon reading the *Ethics* Montaigne did not fail to perceive this fact.

Finally, on the subject of virtue the *Essais* seem to confirm the doctrine expressed in the *Ethics*. In the first place, both Montaigne and Aristotle consider virtue as a natural capacity of man's nature. "The virtues," wrote Aristotle in the second book, "are engendered in us neither by nature, nor yet in violation of nature; nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this capacity is brought to maturity by habit."⁴⁹ For Montaigne, virtue is not to be confused with natural instinct:

Il me semble que la vertu est chose autre et plus noble que les inclinations à la bonté qui naissent en nous. Les ames réglées d'elles mesmes et bien nées, elles suivent mesme train, et representent en leurs actions mesme visage que les vertueuses. Mais la vertu sonne je ne sçay quoy de plus grand et de plus actif que de se laisser, par une heureuse complexion, doucement et paisiblement conduire à la suite de la raison ... cette aisée, douce et panchante voie, par où se conduisent les pas reglez d'une bonne inclination de nature, n'est pas celle de la vraye vertu.⁵⁰

Nor will Montaigne admit that virtue is an exceptional state, like the Christian state of grace, to be reached with tense effort and under extraordinary circumstances. Virtue is a lasting, habitual way of behaving and does not consist in momentary flights toward a sublime or heroic activity:

... Un fait courageux ne doit pas conclurre un homme vaillant: celui qui le feroit bien à point, il le feroit toujours, et à toutes occasions. Si c'estoit une habitude de vertu, et non une saillie, elle rendroit un homme pareillement resolu à tous accidens. ...⁵¹

⁴⁹ *Ethics* II. 1.

⁵⁰ *Essais*, II, 123-24, "De la cruauté."

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9, "De l'inconstance de nos actions."

So important is this constancy in virtue that Montaigne repeats his stand in several passages, perhaps most concisely in the essay "De la vertu":

Je trouve par experience qu'il y a bien à dire entre les boutées et saillies de l'ame ou une resolute et constante habitude: et voy bien qu'il n'est rien que nous ne puissions, voire jusques à surpasser la divinité mesme. ... Mais c'est par secousse ... ce sont traits à la vérité; et est dur à croire que de ces conditions ainsin eslevées, on en puisse teindre et abreuver l'ame, en maniere qu'elles lui deviennent ordinaires et comme naturelles.⁸²

Aristotle makes the same point in a number of passages in the *Ethics*, especially in Book ii, where the nature of moral virtue is examined at considerable length. Here we find it stated that "acts done in conformity with the virtues are not done justly or temperately if they themselves are of a certain sort, but only if the agent is in a certain state of mind when he does them: first he must act with knowledge; secondly he must deliberately choose the act, and choose it for its own sake; and thirdly the act must spring from a fixed and permanent disposition of character."⁸³ We are born neither good nor bad by nature, but merely possess capacities for development in the direction of good or of evil. These capacities are developed by habituation to right or wrong action. In a word, our moral dispositions are formed as a result of the corresponding activities. It is incumbent on us to control the character of our activities, since on the quality of these depends the quality of our dispositions. The formation of good habits is therefore of supreme importance and is the proper definition of education. All this is contained implicitly in Aristotle's final definition of moral virtue as "a settled disposition of the mind as regards the choice of actions and feelings, consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us, this being determined by principle, that is, as the prudent man would determine it."⁸⁴

These points of contact between the *Essais* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* could easily be multiplied. Perhaps the foregoing examples are sufficient to indicate that Montaigne, the very flower of French humanism, corroborates and reaffirms the ethical teachings of the *souverain philosophe* on several fundamental points of principle, that

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 503, "De la vertu."

⁸³ *Ethics* II. 4.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* 6.

his moral "naturalism" conforms closely to the great tradition of Greek ethic, most concisely and completely set forth in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and, further, that this tradition acquires a new validity as it passes before the critically scrutinizing judgment of a versatile and temperate intellect. Such, indeed, was the effect of humanism at its best. The frequent disparagement of Aristotle which we find in the *Essais* may momentarily conceal the closeness of agreement that existed between these two minds; the scarcity of direct citations may further mislead us into believing that their differences were too great to admit of more abundant borrowings. Such evidence is, as we have seen, but superficial and belies an underlying harmony of ideas. It is difficult to believe that Montaigne, when in the course of his final revision of his work he came to know the moral treatise of the great Peripatetic, was not a little amazed to find how nearly he had come to the spirit of that masterpiece. For, in reality, both men were united in a common purpose—the achievement of the virtue of wisdom, "the activity of the intellect, the divinest part of us."⁶⁵ In his manner of living Montaigne sought constantly to practice the virtue of wisdom, the strenuous activity of contemplation, the θεωρητική that Aristotle declares finally to constitute perfect human happiness. Along with the *Essais*, Montaigne's life stands as his ultimate tribute to the ethical teachings of the *princeps philosophorum*.

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⁶⁵ *Ibid.* x. 7.

ÜBER DIE ANWENDUNG DER MOROLFSTROPHE
IM MITTELALTER UND IM DEUTSCHEN
LIED

IN DEM mittelalterlichen Gedicht *Salman und Morolf* finden wir einen neuen Strophenbau, der seither als die Morolfstrophe bekannt ist. Als Musterbeispiel kann die nachfolgende Strophe dienen:

Er nam ein wip von Endian,
eins heiden dochter lobesam.
durch si ward manig helt verlorn:
ez was ein ubel stunde
daz si an die welt wart ie geborn.¹

Die Morolfstrophe besteht demnach aus fünf Versen mit dem Reimschema *a a b c b*. Alle Reime, mit Ausnahme der Waise, sind stumpf. Die Verspaare haben vier Hebungen, während die Waise meistens nur drei aufweist. Es muss gleich hier bemerkt werden, dass Abänderungen in der Hebungenzahl, der Reimstellung, sowie Strophenerweiterungen öfters vorkommen. Doch möchte ich bemerken, dass vor allem das Gesetz des klingenden Ausgangs der Waise in dieser Hinsicht Beachtung verdient. Wir finden von den 781 in Betracht kommenden Strophen 148 in welchen die Waise stumpf ausgeht.² Alle diesbezüglichen Probleme sind von Vogt in seinem *Salman und Morolf* (S. lxxviii–cxii) eingehend erörtert worden.

Nur eine kurze Einführung in die Geschichte des Morolfgedichtes wird hier nötig sein. Es entstand ungefähr 1190. Der Urheber ist unbekannt. Wir besitzen zwei handschriftliche Überlieferungen und einen Druck des Gedichtes. Die Handschriften stammen erst aus dem 15. Jahrhundert. Nach Vogt besteht kein Zweifel darüber, dass diesen Überlieferungen ältere Quellen zu Grunde liegen. Wie die erhaltenen Handschriften ergeben, muss schon in den verlorengegangenen Manuskripten der Strophenbau der der uns bekannten Morolfstrophe gewesen sein. Die Heimat des Gedichtes ist wahrscheinlich das südliche Grenzgebiet der fränkischen Mundart. Das Gedicht zeigt allemanischen Einfluss auf den sonst fränkischen Dialekt.

¹ Friedrich Vogt, *Salman und Morolf* (Halle, 1880), S. 1, Strophe 2.

² *Ibid.*, S. lxxviii; ferner vgl. Merker-Stammeler, *Reallexikon der deutschen Literaturgeschichte* (Berlin, 1926–28), II, 411–12.

Als Spielmannsepos war *Salman und Morolf* einer weiten Verbreitung sicher, vor allem unter den breiten Schichten des Volkes. Schon die dialektische Verschiedenheit bezeugt, dass das Gedicht Verbreitung gefunden hatte. Um so wunderlicher bleibt die Tatsache bestehen, dass von keiner einzigen, reinen Morolfstrophe in mittelalterlichen Gedichten von irgend welcher Art Belege vorhanden sind. F. Kauffmann in seiner *Deutschen Metrik* behauptet zwar, dass "die fünfzeilige Strophe *a a b c b* des *Salman und Morolf* das ganze Mittelalter hindurch üblich geblieben sei."³ Er hält sich aber dann keineswegs an eine sichere, klare Definition der Morolfstrophe. Auch Gerhardt Pohl behauptet, von der Lindenschmid-Strophe sprechend, dass "es dieselbe Form ist, die bereits in der mittelhochdeutschen Lyrik fest ausgeprägt ist."⁴ Als Beispiel verweist er auf das Neidhartsche Lied in Moritz Haupt, Seite 3, Zeile 22 ff.⁵ Auch hier handelt es sich nicht um eine echte Morolfstrophe, ja nicht einmal um eine reine Lindenschmid-Strophe!⁶ Man darf eben nicht übersehen, dass nicht jede fünfzeilige Strophe eine Morolfstrophe darstellt.

Täuschend ist z. B. Neidharts Tanzlied:

So schoenen wir den anger nie gesahen,
do uns die sumerzit begunde nahen;
die boum den winter stounden val:
uberal sint die niuwes loubes worden
darunter singt vrou nahtigal.⁷

Dem Reimbau nach besteht hier wohl eine Morolfstrophe. Wir haben es aber in dem Reimpaare *a a* nicht mit vier sondern fünf Hebungen zu tun. Die Waise überschreitet das dreihebige Versmass. Man kann mit Sicherheit behaupten, dass Neidhart die Morolfstrophe gekannt hat. Er dichtete und sang in volkstümlicher Weise gerade im Entstehungsgebiet des *Salman und Morolf*. Neidhart verbleibt aber nicht bei dem starren Morolfsystem. Er gibt seinem Tanzlied einen volks-

³ *Deutsche Metrik* (Marburg, 1907), S. 79. Vgl. auch R. M. Meyer, *Grundlagen des mittelhochdeutschen Strophenbaus* (Strassburg, 1886), S. 82.

⁴ *Der Strophenbau im deutschen Volklied* ("Palaestra," Nr. 136 (Berlin, 1921)), S. 172.

⁵ *Neidhart von Reuenthal* (Leipzig, 1858).

⁶ Das Lindenschmidlied war ein äusserst bekanntes Volkslied des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts und erhielt sich auch noch im 17. Jahrhundert wie Kopp, "Ein Liederbuch aus dem Jahre 1650," *Z. f. d. Ph.*, XXXIX (1907), 213-14, nachweist. Auf die Bedeutung des Lindenschmid für das Volkslied für die Morolfstrophe werde ich später eingehen.

⁷ Erk und Böhme, *Deutscher Liederhort* (Leipzig, 1893), II, 711; von der Hagen, *Minnesinger* (Leipzig, 1838), III, 210; von der Hagen gibt folgende Verseinteilung (s. a. Haupt, S. 26, Zeile 23 ff.):

"die boum den winter stounden val:
uberal
sint die niuwes loubes worden."

tümlichen Anklang.⁸ Im Vergleich mit der vorigen Strophe ist Neidharts Lied in Haupt, Seite 16, Zeile 38 ff., wenig genau, da er die extrae Zeile verlängert, sodass man hier bestimmt von einem Sechszweiler sprechen kann.

Das Starre, Unbiegsame der Morolfstrophe wird durch die vier stumpfen Reime verursacht. Die Dichter des Mittelalters schritten denn auch zu einer Verfeinerung der Strophe. Die stumpfen Reime wurden entweder ganz und gar zu klingenden verlängert oder, was meistens der Fall ist, das zweite Reimpaar bekam klingenden Ausgang. Schon bei Neidhart finden wir folgendes (Haupt, S. 3, Zeile 22 ff.):

Der meie der ist riche:
der fueret sicherliche
den walt an sinder hende.
der ist nu niuwes loubes vol;
der winder hat ein ende.⁹

In *Minnesangs Frühling*, Seite 3, Zeile 12, kommt ein anderes, kurzes Lied vor, welches sich näher an die Morolfstrophe hält als das eben angeführte Neidhartsche:

Tougen minne diu ist guot,
si kan geben hohen muot.
der sol man sich vlizen.
swer nicht triuwen der nicht phliget,
dem sol man daz verwizen.¹⁰

Diese Beispiele erschöpfen aber auch gleich das Beweismaterial, das für ein Vorkommen der Morolfstrophe im Minnelied vorgebracht werden kann. Nach diesen Darstellungen kann ich wohl, zusammenfassend, behaupten, dass die Morolfstrophe nur im Epos Anwendung fand. Für die lyrische Dichtung war sie zu unbiegsam. Jedoch übertrug sie sich in diese in wenig geänderter Form, ohne dennoch eine zu

⁸ Man vergleiche ferner Schenk Ulrich von Winterstettens volkstümliche Weise (von der Hagen, I, 149, Lied VII, Strophe 6.

"Minne tuo minneklich:
ze liebe lieplich vuege mich,
ald' ich sten vröuden ane,
unt schrie: heia hei!
min sendez herze muoz en zwei,
und lebe in leidem wane."

Die vierte Zeile drückt deutlich den Liebesschmerz aus. Er ist ausserordentlich leidenschaftlich und bekräftigt das Volkstümliche stark. Vgl. auch von der Hagen, I, 136, Zeile 20; II, 165, Lied IV; II, 173, Lied IV.

⁹ Man beachte die verkürzte Hebungszahl.

¹⁰ Ferner, *Minnesangs Frühling*, S. 3, Zeile 7. Diese Liedform, volksmässig im Klang, hat grosse Ähnlichkeit mit der Morolfstrophe. Wir finden aber die sonstige Waise mit den b b Reimen verbunden. Siehe Karl Bartsch, *Deutsche Liederdichter des 12.-14. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1928), S. 362, Zeile 83 ff.; auch Haupt, *Die Lieder G. v. Neifens* (Leipzig, 1851), S. 52, Zeile 25.

weite, ausgedehnte Verbreitung zu erhalten. Dass sie aber gerade in der volkstümlichen mittelalterlichen Lyrik Anklang fand, gereichte ihr zum Vorteil. Jetzt, da sie Fuss gefasst hatte, dürfen wir ihre weitere Verbreitung in der erblühenden Volksdichtung erwarten. Hermann Paul stellt in seinem Grundriss fest, dass mittelalterliche Tonarten bis ins 17. Jahrhundert hinein verwendet worden seien.¹¹ Das bezieht sich auch auf die Morolfstrophe, wenn wir sie mit den Veränderungen annehmen, wie wir sie in *Minnesangs Frühling*, Seite 3, Zeile 12, gefunden haben. Ja, ich habe sie sogar noch im 18. Jahrhundert in einem historischen Volkslied vorgefunden. Näheres darüber werde ich später ausführen. Mit dem Reimschema *a st. a st. b kl. c kl. (oder st.) b kl.*, als Lindenschmidlied bekannt, kommt denn auch die Morolfstrophe unzählige Male im deutschen Lied des 14. bis 16. Jahrhunderts vor:

Es ist nit lang, dass es geschah,
dass man den Lindenschmid reiten sah
auf einem hohen Rosse,
er reit den Reinstrom auf und ab,
hat sein gar wohl genossen.¹²

Sie wurde so beliebt, dass sie in fast allen Liedergattungen angewandt wurde. Natürlich blieb der Reim nicht immer rein, noch das Versmass genau, doch kann man jederzeit den Ursprung des Strophenbaus erkennen.

Die Morolfstrophe, wie ich sie auch weiterhin nennen möchte, obwohl sie meistens unter dem Namen *Lindenschmid-Strophe* bekannt ist, verbreitete sich innerhalb des 14. und 16. Jahrhunderts über Deutschland, Österreich, der Schweiz und den Niederlanden. Die ältesten urkundlich erhaltenen Formen sind die im Kirchenlied und im historischen Volkslied. Den vorhandenen Urkunden nach kann ich folgende übersichtliche Tabelle vorlegen, welche sich auf eine Untersuchung von 235 Liedern stützt:¹³

Jahrhundert	Lieder	Jahrhundert	Lieder
14.....	3	16 (zweite Hälfte)...	58
15.....	50	17.....	1
16 (erste Hälfte)...	122	18.....	1

¹¹ Grundriss d. germanischen Philologie (2. Aufl.; Strassburg, 1905), II, 84.

¹² R. von Lillencron, *Die historischen Volkslieder der Deutschen* (Leipzig, 1865), II, 289.

¹³ Vgl. Fl. van Duyse, *Het oude Nederlandsche Lied* (Antwerpen, 1903-7), II, 1704; Lillencron, I, 60; II, 289; II, 273; III, 528 u.a.

Meine Untersuchung beruft sich auf folgende Quellen: R. von Lillencron, *Die historischen Volkslieder der Deutschen*; Erk und Böhme, *Deutscher Liederhort*; Wackernagel, *Das*

Es ist interessant den ausserordentlich raschen Aufschwung der Strophe in der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts zu beobachten. Aus anscheinend ganz geringen Anfängen im 14. Jahrhundert stieg die Morolfstrophe zu bedeutender Höhe. Es wird sich verlohnen das erhaltene Resultat näher zu betrachten und festzustellen, aus welchen Liedergattungen sich die oben erwähnte Zeiteinteilung der Lieder zusammenstellt.

Zwei von den drei Liedern des 14. Jahrhunderts können als geistliche Volkslieder bezeichnet werden; das andere ist ein historisches Volkslied.

Als erstes geistliche Volkslied möchte ich den alten Pilgergesang der Jakobsbrüder im 14. Jahrhundert anführen:

Wer das elent bawen wel,
der heb sich auf und sei mein gsel
wol auf sant Jacobs strassen!
Zwei par schüch der darf er wol,
ein schüssel bei der flaschen.

Dieses Lied wurde von den ziemlich weltlich gesinnten Jakobspilgern, Wallfahrern des 14. und 16. Jahrhunderts, auf ihren Zügen nach dem Grabe des Apostels Jakobus des Jüngeren zu Compostella gesungen. Wie Böhme bemerkt, war das Lied eine Art Bädeler des Mittelalters,¹⁴ da es den Weg zum Grabe angibt. Das Lied erfuhr später von protestantischer Seite aus Umbildungen.¹⁵

Das andere geistliche Volkslied ist ein altes Fastenlied des 14. Jahrhunderts: "O Jesu, du bist mild und gut." Böhme erwähnt, dass es dasselbe Lied sein könnte, dessen Anfang ("Christe, du bist mild und gut") in dem Spiele von Mariä Heimsuchung im 14. Jahrhundert und wieder in der Zerbster Prozession von 1507 vorkommt.¹⁶

Das historische Volkslied finden wir in Liliencron (I, 79) als "Van der instiginge der stad Luneborg":

Wille gi horen wo dar geschah
to Luneborg an einer nacht?
dar schach ein michel wunder,
alwo dar over de muren stegen
vel mer wen seven hundert

deutsche Kirchenlied (Leipzig, 1864-77); Böhme, *op. cit.*; Duyse, *op. cit.*; F. W. von Dittfurth, *Die historischen Volkslieder vom Ende des dreissigjährigen Krieges bis zum Beginn des siebenjährigen* (Heilbronn, 1877); Dittfurth, *Historische Volkslieder der Zeit 1750-1871*, I-II, Hefte 1-4; Dittfurth, *Deutsche Volks- und Gesellschaftslieder des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts* (Nördlingen, 1872).

¹⁴ S. 721-22.

¹⁵ Siehe Wackernagel, III, Lieder 582-89.

¹⁶ S. 655.

Es verherrlicht in 16 Strophen die Befreiung der Stadt Lüneburg von ihrem tyrannischen Herzog Magnus im Jahre 1371.

Liliencron veröffentlicht noch zwei andere historische Volkslieder angeblich aus dem 14. Jahrhundert: "Der Brand zu Catlenburg" (1346) und "Busse von Erxleben" (1372). Neuste Forschung beweist aber, dass beide Lieder nicht dem 14. sondern der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts angehören. Edward Schröder untersucht die erwähnten Gedichte.¹⁷ Seine Ergebnisse werfen neues Licht auf die Volksliedforschung und bezeugen, dass das älteste Lied, "Der Brand zu Catlenburg," nicht um 1346 sondern erst kurz nach 1521 entstanden sein musste. Schröder zieht die in Frage kommenden Archive zu Hilfe und findet, dass das Kloster im Jahre 1346 weder von einem Feuer heimgesucht, noch das Dorf Berka an den Bischof von Hildesheim verpfändet worden ist. Wohl aber berichten die Archive des Klosters einen Brand im Jahre 1521. Johannes Letzners Dasselsche Chronik, die einen Klosterbrand des Jahres 1346 berichtet, stützt sich auf ein gefälschtes Dokument dieses Jahres (siehe Schröder, S. 4-7).

Auch "Busse von Erxleben" entstand nach Schröder (S. 10-14) in der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts, fällt also ebenfalls in die Zeit, in der die Morolfstrophe die Lieblingsstrophe des historischen Volksliedes war. Dem Gedichte nach wurde der Held des Kampfes der Harzritter gegen die Bürger der Stadt Stendal, Busse von Erxleben, im Streit erschlagen. In Wirklichkeit überlebte er aber den Kampf noch volle 16 Jahre und war gerade während dieser Zeit ausserordentlich tätig.¹⁸ Schröder begründet seine Anschauung folgendermassen:

Habe ich recht, dass das Gedicht in einem so wichtigen Punkte gegen die historische Wahrheit verstösst, dann liegt auch hier kein Tageszeugnis vor, sondern die spätere Auffrischung einer historischen Erinnerung, wobei auf Grund einer höchst lebendigen, aber doch nicht tatsachengetreuen Tradition dem Busse von Erxleben eine überragende Rolle zugewiesen war, in der er aber nicht fliehen durfte, sondern fallen musste. . . .

Ich nehme also an, dass unser Gedicht erst im 16. frühestens aber im Ausgang des 15. Jahrhr. entstanden ist, als das Volkslied einen bedeutenden Aufschwung nahm. . . .

Man könnte nun wohl an das angegebene Datum unseres einzigen historischen Volksliedes des 14. Jahrhunderts zweifeln. Es ist mir aber

¹⁷ "Zur Kritik der ältesten historischen Volkslieder in niederdeutscher Sprache," *Jahrbuch des Vereins f. niederd. Sprachforschung*, LIV [1928], 1 ff.

¹⁸ Siehe S. W. Wohlbrück, *Geschichtliche Nachrichten von dem Geschlechte von Allvensleben*, I, 358-77.

mit den mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln unmöglich, Gegenteiliges festzustellen.

Es ist nicht überraschend, dass die Morolfstrophe zuerst in süddeutschen Liedern auftritt, da ja das Morolfepos selbst süddeutscher Herkunft ist. Von ausserordentlicher Wichtigkeit ist nur, dass unsere Strophe für das Jakobslied benützt worden ist. Dieser glückliche Zufall bleibt eben eine Tatsache, die selbst der kühnsten Forschung einen warmen Hauch echter Romantik verleiht, denn gerade ein Pilgergesang verbürgte die weiteste Verbreitung der Strophe. So wurde sie durch deutsche Gaue getragen und musste früher oder später im Volksmunde stärkeren Anklang finden und Wurzel fassen. Ein schlagender Beweis zu Gunsten dieser Auffassung besteht darin, dass das im 15. Jahrhundert gedichtete und gesungene niederdeutsche Lied vom "Henneke Knecht" (Erk und Böhme III, 384) im Ton des Jakobsliedes abgefasst worden war. Wir besitzen ausserdem ein westfälisches Hochzeitslied welches nach Böhme (S. 221) "aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach ursprünglich zur Fahrt beim Abholen der Braut bestimmt war." Es scheint mir, als wenn man getrost erwägen kann, dass man ein Lied in der Morolfstrophe, welches zur Brautabholung gesungen wurde, mit dem alten Pilgerlied in Beziehung bringen darf. So hat denn die Morolfstrophe durch das Jakobslied hier und da Wurzel gefasst. Wir brauchen uns nicht zu wundern, dass sie, einmal ins historische Volkslied übergegangen, noch weitere und noch volkläufigere Verbreitung fand.

Obwohl süddeutsch im Entstehen, so bürgerte sich doch unsere Strophe erst sicher in Niederdeutschland ein. Dieses beweist nicht nur der "Henneke Knecht," der noch lange lebte, als das Jakobslied schon vergessen war, sondern auch die starke Verbreitung in den niederdeutschen historischen Volksliedern. Nachdem wir die Morolfstrophe 1371 in Lüneburg gefunden haben, taucht sie 1402 im Stortbeckerlied und 1420 in der Umgegend von Angermünde auf. Überraschenderweise finden wir sie schon 1432 in der Nähe von Brüssel (obwohl sie in dem historischen Volkslied "Mecheln und Brüssel" [Liliencron, I, 346] arg verstümmelt erscheint), während wir erst 1439 ein süddeutsches historisches Volkslied in der Morolfstrophe finden (Liliencron, I, 374) und sie nicht vor 1489 in der Schweiz auftritt (Liliencron, II, 174).

So können wir, geographisch gesehen, eine Doppelentwicklung der Morolfstrophe verfolgen: erstens eine Verbreitung von Süddeutschland nördlich (Henneke Knecht) und Übernahme der Strophe ins historische Volkslied; zweitens eine Zurückbewegung *durch* das historische Volkslied.

Obwohl die Morolfstrophe jetzt schon in ganz Deutschland verbreitet war, so fehlte ihr doch ein Lied, welches zu grösserer Volkstümlichkeit bestimmt sein sollte als alle anderen Lieder. Dieses Lied fand sich bald. Der berühmte *Lindenschmid* (ca. 1490) erhob unsere Strophe während des nächsten halben Jahrhunderts zur Lieblingsstrophe des historischen Volksliedes. Wie gern man den Lindenschmid sang und welchen Einfluss er auf die Verbreitung seines Strophenbaus hatte, kann man daraus ersehen, dass beinahe 50 Prozent aller morolfstrophischen Volkslieder des 15. Jahrhundert *nach* dem Jahre 1490 erschienen.

Die erste Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts wurde die Blütezeit der Morolfstrophe. Wir finden sie nicht nur in den schon erwähnten Liedergattungen sondern auch in Gruppen wie Hoflieder, Tanzlieder, Lügenlieder usw. Noch beherrscht das historische Volkslied das Feld und hinterlässt seinen Einfluss, wie man vermuten könnte, auf das erzählende Volkslied und den Ständeliedern, welche fast nur aus Landsknechtsliedern, Reiter- und Jägerliedern bestehen. Im Jahre 1524 tritt aber ein Umschwung ein. Die Morolfstrophe wird für das Reformationslied:

Es get ein frischer sommer doher,
do werdt ir hören newe mâr,
der schimpf der will sich machen:
Wird über münch und paffen gen,
sie weinen oder lachen.

benützt und gleich Feuer verbreitet sich dieses Kampflied. 41 Kirchenlieder fand ich in der Morolfstrophe in der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts. Ja, dieses neue protestantische Kampflied verdrängte sogar den Lindenschmid an Beliebtheit. Ich fand 33 Lieder mit der Tonangabe "Es get" und nur 12 die auf den Lindenschmid gesungen werden sollten. Die Morolfstrophe verdankt also der Reformation ein gut Teil ihrer Beliebtheit.

In der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts ist es nun das Kirchen-

lied ganz und gar welches die meisten Morolfstrophenlieder aufweist. Ich fand wiederum 41 solcher Lieder in protestantischen sowie katholischen Gesangbüchern. Auffallend ist der Rückgang des historischen Volksliedes, von denen ich nur zehn neue finden konnte. Andere Liederarten verschwanden in gleichem Masse.

Der schnelle Verfall der Morolfstrophe in der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts ist bemerkenswert. Ich vermute, dass ihr plötzlicher, unerschütterlicher Aufstieg im Kirchenlied ihr ein neues Gleis gelegt hat. Die Strophe wurde jetzt mit dem Kirchenlied identifiziert und verlor dadurch ihren ursprünglichen Einfluss auf das historische Volkslied. Dieses griff zu anderen metrischen Formen. Nun erschöpfte sich aber auch langsam der zu Anfang der Reformation so dringend nötige Bedarf neuer Kirchenlieder und ehe man noch das Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts erreicht hatte, war auch der Untergang der Morolfstrophe besiegelt. Das Kirchenlied war erschöpft und das historische Volkslied hatte sich andere metrische Formen angeeignet. Doch dürfen wir nicht annehmen, dass die Morolfstrophe im 17. Jahrhundert schon vergessen worden war. Die alten Lieder wurden noch immer auf Fliegenden Blättern verbreitet und gesungen. Man findet Fliegende Blätter welche, z. B. den Lindenschmid enthalten, aus den Jahren 1646, 1651, 1663.¹⁹ Dass bekannte Lieder dieses Strophenbaus bis ins 19. Jahrhundert hinein noch gesungen wurden, bezeugt Böhme in seinem *Altdeutschen Liederbuch*, Seite 444, unter den Anmerkungen.

Sogar in Dittfurths *Deutsche Volks- und Gesellschaftslieder des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts* fand ich auf Seite 85 ein ganz neues Lied welches in der alten Morolfstrophe abgefasst worden war. Es behandelt die Schlacht bei Trier am 11. August 1765:

Düe Krequi, hör, wat wultu dohn?
Wultu verwarff'n dat grote Lohn,
En got Frantzosen bliefen?
So mostu hen na Trier gahn,
De Dütschen dar weg driefen.

Das Gedicht besteht aus zwölf solchen Strophen. Der Dichter sagt über das Lied: "Ehn Platdütsch Leed van der grülichen Schlacht darinnen mid Gades Hülpe die sträse Dütschen die hochmödigen Frantzosen hefft överwunnen, bie Trier im Jahr 1675 den ersten Tag

¹⁹ Vgl. Kopp, *loc. cit.*

des Austmahndes, uppesettet van enem ohlen ehrliken Dütschen. To singen na der Wiese: Henneke Knecht . . . Gedruckt to Dütschborg, im Jahre 1675." Schon die Tonangabe bezeugt, wie beliebt das alte niederdeutsche Henneke Knecht Spottlied des 15. Jahrhunderts gewesen war, welches den seefahrenden Bauernburschen, der lieber hätte hinterm Pfluge bleiben sollen, verlachte. Jener alte, ehrliche Deutsche hat es wohl oft gesungen—und nun dichtete er selbst im Henneke Knecht Ton, in der beliebten Morolfstrophe ein neues Lied.

Der Schwanengesang der Morolfstrophe erklingt, soweit ich ermitteln konnte, in einem Spottlied auf die Gegner Friedrich des Grossen, gedichtet im Jahre 1757:

Zwei Kaiser, drei König beisammen war'n,
Si wollten mitnander in fremde Land far'n,
Miteinander wollten's davon.
Ins Preussenland wollten sie fahren,
:/: Da bekommen sie Fritzen sein Kron :/:²⁰

Ein langes Leben war der Morolfstrophe beschieden. Als neue metrische Form berichtete sie von Abenteuern im Orient; ihre letzte Aufgabe war, spottend die Gegner des Preussenkönigs zu besingen. Die Morolfstrophe war, wie Meyer, Pohl und Kauffmann berichteten, eine Lieblingsstrophe in der deutschen Dichtung. Ich habe überzeugend festgestellt, dass die Anwendung dieser Strophe in der mittelalterlichen Dichtung nicht derart ausschlaggebend gewesen war, wie behauptet worden ist, dass sie, andererseits, nicht nur bis ins 16. Jahrhundert hinein benützt wurde, sondern dass sie sich, wenn auch nur in einzelnen Fällen, noch im Lied des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts befindet.

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²⁰ Ditfurth, *Deutsche Volks- und Gesellschaftslieder des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts*, S. 133. Ditfurth entnahm das Lied einem alten geschriebenen Liederbuch, in die Erbschaftsmasse der Familie Kretschmann zu Theres 1830 gehörig.

MILTON, LILBURNE, AND THE PEOPLE

THE purpose of this study is to clarify Milton's various attitudes toward his countrymen and their capacity for self-government by contrasting them with the beliefs of his contemporary, John Lilburne. In attempting such an analysis we do not intend to treat the development of Milton's conception of kingship, or his relations to Parliament, each of which topics deserves separate and thorough consideration. We cannot enter into the problem of Milton's relation to seventeenth-century political thought other than extreme democratic theory. Nor do we intend to use historical comparisons from the writings of other political theorists than Lilburne. Much as Harrington and Sydney, for example, merit attention in a discussion of Milton's politics, it is obvious that a discussion of the beliefs of these men not only would lead us far afield, but would confuse the issue of basic democratic factors with which we are immediately concerned. We have chosen Lilburne, therefore, because, as leader of the Levellers, he was spokesman of the most pronounced democratic faction (if we except the Diggers) which the Puritan Revolution produced. His pamphlets are, as it were, a sort of democratic yardstick by which we can measure Milton's confidence in the common people.

I. TO THE EXECUTION OF CHARLES I

Throughout his early pamphlets on church government Milton again and again manifests confidence in the native intelligence and moral worth of his countrymen. The Englishman is, he declares in *The reason of church government* (1642), naturally religious; with the patient nurture of the church, the English nation may become known to the world as leaders in piety and honesty.¹ In *An apology for Smectymnuus* (1642) Milton insists that there is nothing in church government beyond the intelligence of the meanest of his countrymen. To be capable of selecting a minister, for example, a man needs only to be able to read the Bible, to investigate the personal life of the minister in ques-

¹ *Prose works*, ed. Bohn, II, 470.

tion, and to lead a Christian life himself.² Thus Milton stoutly defends the "plain artisan" class of people; he, for one, prefers their unsophisticated judgment to the intellectual incompetence of their critics. "No, my matriculated confutant," he concludes, "there will not want in any congregation of this island . . . divers plain and solid men, that have learned by the experience of a good conscience, what it is to be well taught."³

Much the same sentiment underlies the patriotic fervor of the *Areopagitica*. Milton calls upon Parliament to consider the nature of the people whom they govern; the English are "a nation not slow or dull, but of a quick, ingenious, and piercing spirit; acute to invent, subtile and sinewy to discourse, not beneath the reach of any point the highest that human capacity can soar to."⁴ He beholds all England at work in the "reforming of reformation itself," all men striving to release truth, studiously pondering, inventing, helpful to each other. His hopes for the English people soar as he writes. With their natural intelligence, their quick pursuit of the principles of true freedom, they may yet, with statesman-like guidance, become a nation of greater men, partakers in the divinity of their Master.⁵ Then follow the famous lines: "Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks: methinks I see her as an eagle . . . purging and unscaling her long-abused sight at the fountain itself of heavenly radiance."⁶

Thus far, especially in his attacks on the prelates, Milton had given voice to the overwhelming sentiment of the English nation. For if the practice proposed in the *Areopagitica* did not follow governmental tradition, its spirit of free inquiry was an inheritance more deeply than ever imbedded in English hearts by the Reformation and by Laud's persecutions. There appeared as yet no great gulf between the desire of the middle and lower classes for political reformation and that of Milton. Their negative aims were identical, and Milton felt that the English had the capacity for following a true leader to the heights of

² *Ibid.*, III, 154.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 155-56 (italics mine).

⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 90.

⁵ Cf. the following lines (*ibid.*, p. 93): "Moses, the great prophet, may sit in heaven rejoicing to see . . . all the Lord's people . . . become prophets."

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

freedom; he sensed that he himself represented their aspirations. But such a sympathetic unity of purpose had now not long to exist. Already, by his advocacy of Independency in the *Areopagitica*, Milton had withdrawn from the state-church traditions of the English people, had leaped ahead of them into the freer air of a larger liberty. As yet, however, he was not aware how few of them were ready to follow him.

The angry reception of the divorce tracts was the first warning Milton had that the middle and lower classes were not ready to claim that full freedom to which he himself aspired. His reaction was one of resentment. It is true that neither in *Tetrachordon* nor in *Colasterion* (both of which he published in March, 1645) does Milton display any anger toward his countrymen generally. In these tracts he is bitterly at war with Herbert Palmer, with the licenser Caryl, and with William Pryne. But as the clamor against his divorce theories became more widespread, Milton wrote two sonnets⁷ revealing his dissatisfaction not merely with the Presbyterian ministers but with his countrymen as a whole:

I did but prompt the age to quit their clogs
By the known rules of ancient Liberty.
When straight a barbarous noise environs me
Of owls and cuckoos, asses, apes and dogs; . . .
But this is got of casting pearl to hogs,
That bawl for freedom in their senseless mood,
And still revolt when truth would make them free.
Licence they mean when they cry Liberty.⁸

Despite the failure of the middle and lower classes to grasp his idea of domestic liberty, Milton had by no means lost confidence in their capacity and desire for political reformation when he published *The tenure of kings and magistrates* four years later (February, 1649). Assuming, despite his undertone of distrust, that the people have the ability to achieve freedom, Milton proclaims on page after page their inherent right to depose the tyrant Charles. Kings are but the agents of the people, placed in eminence by them originally to secure a common justice.⁹ The people having elevated one above all for this pur-

⁷ Sonnets 11 and 12, "On the detraction which followed upon my writing certain treatises." I have adopted Hanford's suggestion that Sonnet 12, "I did but prompt, etc.," was written in 1645 or 1646. Masson (III, 460), places it between October, 1645, and January, 1646.

⁸ Smart, *The sonnets of Milton*, p. 65.

⁹ *Prose works*, II, 9.

pose,¹⁰ binding him under oath to obey the laws himself and to execute them impartially, they are bound to obey him only so long as he fulfils his obligations; once he breaks his oath, the power delegated to him automatically returns to the people, and they are disengaged of any further obedience to him.¹¹ "It follows, lastly," Milton continues, "that since the king or magistrate holds his authority of the people,¹² both originally and naturally for their good,¹³ . . . then may the people, as oft as they shall judge it for the best, either choose him or reject him, retain him or depose him, though no tyrant, merely by the liberty and right of freeborn men to be governed as seems to them best."¹⁴ Milton deplores the inconsistency of those who declare, as the English do, that they are a free people, and then admit that they do not have the power to remove their supreme magistrate or abolish his office. We are slaves indeed, he continues, as long as we conceive this kind of servitude to be liberty, as long as we lack the authority to govern ourselves, or to dispose of those whom we place in power. For such authority is "the root and source of all liberty."¹⁵ Granted that the people have such decision in the power of electing or removing

¹⁰ Milton's arguments in *The tenure* were anticipated in such a remarkable degree two years earlier in John Lilburne's *Regall tyrannie discovered* that we shall quote Lilburne here at some length. The full title of his treatise is as follows: "Regall Tyrannie discovered, or A Discourse, shewing that all lawfull (approbational) instituted power by God amongst men, is by common agreement, and mutual consent. Which power (in the hands of whomsoever) ought alwayes to be exercised for the good, benefit, and welfare of the Trusters, and never ought otherwise to be administered: Which, whensoever it is, it is justly resistable and revokeable: It being against the light of Nature and Reason, and the end wherefore God endowed Man with understanding, for any sort or generation of men to give so much power into the hands of any man or men whatsoever, as to enable them to destroy them, or to suffer such a kind of power to be exercised over them, by any man or men, that shall assume it unto himself, either by the sword, or any other kind of way" (from the title page of one of the original pamphlets, the eleventh in a bound collection of thirteen of Lilburne's pamphlets in Columbia University Library). On p. 99 of this pamphlet occur the following words: "For, first, I must shew and prove; That the people in generall are the originall sole legislators, and the true fountain, and earthly well-spring of all just power" (italics Lilburne's).

¹¹ *Prose works*, II, 10-11.

¹² Cf. *Regall tyrannie*, p. 38: "For the absolute Supream Power is the people in generall, made up of every individuall"; also p. 40: "Power is originally inherent in the People."

¹³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 37. Lilburne defends the theory that the "King be for the Kingdome, and not the Kingdome for the King."

¹⁴ *Prose works*, II, 14.

¹⁵ In showing that God himself would not deprive the people of their inalienable right to select their own governors, Milton uses much the same argument that Lilburne used in *Regall tyrannie*, p. 41: "So just was the righteous God, that he would not impose them [kings] upon the people of Israel against their own wills." Cf. *The tenure* in *Prose works*, II, 15: "When they desired a king . . . though their changing displeased him, yet he . . . would not be a hinderance to what they intended."

a supreme governor from office, though he be a just and righteous one, how much greater, then, is it their responsibility and just right to depose one who reigns tyrannically.

The philosophical foundation for Milton's thesis in *The tenure of kings and magistrates*—namely, that the power of government is inherent in the people—was his belief that man is born, not a being already in subjection and needing a master, as Hobbes¹⁶ and Filmer¹⁷ were to picture him, but a spirit made in God's image, endowed by him with free will, and therefore free from any earthly government to which he does not consent. That is, having a free will, man is free not only to choose between good and evil in his personal life, but free to choose what government he likes best, free to elect rulers for the common welfare. "All men naturally were born free, being the image and resemblance of God himself, and were, by privilege above all creatures born to command, and not to obey."¹⁸ Man has a free will either for moral or for political choice.

But it is well to analyze carefully what Milton means by free will applied to political action. For the distinguishing element of Milton's political philosophy, that which at once removes it from the extreme democratic feeling of the time and stamps it as peculiarly Puritan is this: He believed that the individual's right to free choice in politics hinges upon the correct use of his free will in his religious and moral life. "It usually happens," he writes in the *Defensio secunda*, "by the appointment, and as it were retributive justice, of the Deity, that that people which cannot govern themselves, and moderate their passions, but crouch under the slavery of their lusts, should be delivered up to the sway of those whom they abhor, and made to submit to an involuntary servitude."¹⁹ Of those who cannot submit to their own reason, he says, "It is not agreeable to the nature of things that such persons

¹⁶ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Oxford, 1909), p. 133: "And therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude; nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it. to another Man or other Assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to Own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their Sovereigne, shall do, and judge fit to be done."

¹⁷ Robert Filmer, *Patriarcha, or the natural power of kings*, printed with *Two treatises of government*, by John Locke (London, 1884), pp. 15-16: "I see not how the children of Adam or any man else can be free from subjection to their parents. And this subjection of children being the fountain of all regal authority, by the ordination of God himself; it follows, that civil power . . . in general is by divine institution."

¹⁸ *Prose works*, II, 8-9.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 298.

ever should be free."²⁰ If, therefore, a man of his own free will chooses good and not evil, then he should, as a virtuous man, have a voice in the government; if on the other hand, he rejects the good, thereby becoming a slave to his passions, he has no right whatever to either a vote or an office; he has lost his birthright of helping to determine the kind of government under which he shall live. Always, of course, there remains the possibility that a man who has chosen evil will by the help of God free himself from his inward tyranny; until that time, however, his political free will is abrogated.

Like Milton, Lilburne believed in the natural freedom of man. In *The free-man's freedom vindicated* (1646), he states the underlying principle of his political faith:

God . . . gave man (his meer creature) the sovereignty (under himself) over all the rest of his Creatures . . . , and indued him with a rationall soule, or understanding, and thereby created him after his own image . . . the first of which was *Adam*, a male. . . . Woman cal'd *Eve*, which two are the earthly, originall fountain, as begetters and bringers forth of all and every particular and individuall man and woman . . . who are, and were by nature all equall and alike in power, digny [*sic*], authority, and majesty, none of them having (by nature) any authority, dominion or majesteriall power, one over or above another, neither have they, or can they exercise any, but meerey by institution, or donation, that is to say, by mutual agreement or consent. . . . And unnaturall, irrationall, sinfull, wicked, unjust, divelish, and tyrannicall it is, for any man whatsoever, spirituall or temporall, Cleargyman or Layman, to appropriate and assume unto himselfe, a power, authority and jurisdiction, to rule, govern, or raign, over any sort of men in the world, without their free consent.²¹

From this rather remarkable statement, which Lilburne a year later inserted almost verbatim in *Regall tyrannie discovered*, we may understand how closely Milton's thought in *The tenure of kings and magistrates* parallels that of his contemporary. Their views on the natural freedom of man are identical: The spirit of man was made in God's image; therefore man was and is endowed with natural worth and dignity, and is not to be subjected to any one of his fellows without a delegation of the power inherent in himself. Lilburne never receded from this belief; he never in theory struck away this political birthright because the people had chosen to be slaves from within; politically, no matter how sinful, they still retained the liberty of choosing

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Cf. *Vox plebes* (1646), p. 4.

their own government. But Milton, as we know, if not expressly in *The tenure*, always made the right of political self-government contingent upon a man's ability to govern himself.²² Lilburne consistently opposed the dissolution or purging of the Long Parliament unless it was by an agreement of the "well-affected" people, whereby a new and more representative Parliament would have been summoned; he likewise declared that the King's trial was illegal unless carried out by representatives of the people.²³ But Milton repeatedly denied the democratic principle he proposes in *The tenure* by justifying the execution of Charles.

In passing we may note in Lilburne's basic proposition two democratic suggestions in which Milton would not have concurred; both of which, in fact, he repudiated in his *Christian doctrine*. Adam and Eve are, Lilburne says, the progenitors of all men and women. These men and women "are, and were by nature, all equall and alike in power, digny [*sic*], authority and majesty."²⁴ Whether or not Lilburne would have carried this statement to its logical political conclusion, he here puts women equal to men in majesty and worth; he makes them politically equal in authority. Lilburne further implies that all men at birth are equal in divine resemblance. But Milton consistently placed woman under the government of man, she being by nature inferior to him; and we remember his proneness to believe that the innate spiritual capacity of one man is greater than that of another: "For, as will be shown hereafter, there are some remnants of the divine image left in man, the union of which in one individual renders him more fit and disposed for the kingdom of God than another."²⁵

Why, one may ask, if Milton believed that only spiritual freemen should be political freemen, does he champion the political birthright of the English people, knowing that many of them are sinners? This

²² See *Defensio secunda* (1654) in *Prose works*, I, 297-99.

²³ *Legal fundamental liberties* (2d ed.), p. 62: "For I would fain know in Law, where Col. Tho. PRIDE was authorized to chuse the People of England a Parliament; or to purge away at his pleasure by his sword three quarters of four of the House of Commons." Cf. *ibid.* (1st ed.), p. 43: "And therefore I pressed again and again . . . that they should stay his tryall till a new and equal free Representative upon the Agreement of the well affected people, that had not fought against their Liberties, Rights and Freedoms, could be chosen and sit, and then either try him thereby, or else by their Judges sitting in the Court called Kings Bench."

²⁴ *Free-man's freedom vindicated*, p. 11.

²⁵ *Christian doctrine* (1655-60?) in *Prose works*, IV, 59.

question, applied to *The tenure*, may be answered partly by recalling the circumstances under which the pamphlet was written and printed; it was written, Masson thinks, partly during the King's trial and partly after his execution.²⁶ We know that it appeared just two weeks after the execution and four days after the appearance of *Eikon basilike*. The Presbyterian ministers, who, since Pride's Purge of December 7, 1648, had increasingly championed the King's cause against the army, gave voice to their protests in two important pamphlets which appeared shortly before the execution.²⁷ It was in answer to such defenses of the King that Milton wrote *The tenure*, as he himself explains in *Defensio secunda*:

But when, at length, some presbyterian ministers, who had formerly been the most bitter enemies to Charles . . . did all in their power to prevent his execution . . . and when they dared to affirm, that the doctrine of the protestants . . . was abhorrent to such an atrocious proceeding against kings; I thought that it became me to oppose such a glaring falsehood. . . . That book . . . was written rather to reconcile the minds of the people to the event, than to discuss the legitimacy of that particular sentence.²⁸

These last words are significant of Milton's real attitude toward the people at the time of the King's execution. He did not know how the people themselves felt about it, despite the clamor of the Presbyterian ministers in and about London. Though he feared in his heart that the cry of the people would be against the act, he still hoped for their approbation: "But God, as we have cause to trust, will put other thoughts into the people . . . will incline them to hearken . . . to the voice of our supreme magistracy, calling us to liberty, and the flourishing deeds of a reformed commonwealth."²⁹ For the past seven years the English people had been passing through a fruitful period, Milton thought, of true spiritual reformation. Might not many of them have freed themselves during this time from inner tyranny and now be prepared to take an active part in the government? Hence the conflicting tone in *The tenure* concerning the people, apparent, for example, in the following sentences:

The power of kings and magistrates is . . . committed to them in trust from the people to the common good of them all, in whom the power yet re-

²⁶ IV, 65, n. 1.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

²⁸ *Prose works*, I, 260.

²⁹ *The tenure* in *Prose Works*, II, 33.

mains fundamentally, and cannot be taken from them, without a violation of their natural birthright.³⁰

Most men . . . through sloth or inconstancy, and weakness of spirit, either fainting ere their own pretences, though never so just, be half attained, or through an inbred falsehood and wickedness, betray, oftentimes to destruction with themselves, men of noblest temper joined with them.³¹

In the first of the sentences Milton appears unmistakably the democrat; but in the second he shows how his belief in the people is qualified by his distrust of their moral constancy.

Thus, even at the time of his writing, Milton was caught between a motive and a growing opinion; the motive was to attempt to swing the minds of the people into an approval of the execution, joined with a hope that his previous faith in the spiritual reformation of the English people would be justified by their realization of a new political liberty; his growing opinion conflicting with this hope and motive was his fear that the Presbyterian ministers against whom he directed his pamphlet represented the preponderant sentiment of the people. Despite his faith that the nation is still capable of spiritual growth and notwithstanding his argument for their right of self-government, Milton's fear is stronger than his hope. He confesses in the following lines that he has little hope of convincing the whole nation that the tyrannicide was just: "But who in particular is a tyrant . . . I leave to magistrates, at least to the *uprighter sort* of them, and of *the people*, though in number *less by many*, in whom faction least hath prevailed above the law of nature and right reason."³²

Retracing briefly our six years' history of Milton's references to the people, we find that his confidence in them, which at first extended even to the "plain artisan," and reached an enthusiastic faith in the *Areopagitica*, gradually thereafter lessened as he found himself diverging from the masses in his religious and political liberalism. Contributory to his change of attitude was the reception of his divorce pamphlets, which had heightened his conviction that "none can love freedom heartily but good men." We find in *The tenure* at once his real conviction that the power of government is inherent in the people, his hope that the people would use the tyrannicide as a step toward further political liberty, and his underlying conviction that after all the peo-

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³² *Prose works*, II, 7 (italics mine).

ple are yet too sinful to have a voice in the government. How little his hope was realized we know. With the overwhelming approval of the *Eikon basilike*, Milton's fears were to deepen into a certainty.

II. FROM 1649 TO THE RESTORATION

The *Eikonoklastes* (1649) was a futile effort to nullify the English love of kingship, a love strengthened by Charles's execution and fanned into a flame by the *Eikon basilike*. In *Eikonoklastes* Milton breaks forth in bitter denunciation of the ignorant multitude's failure to look upon the tyrannicide as an act of justice whereby they were released from the bondage of tyranny. "The people," he exclaims, "exorbitant and excessive in all their motions . . . with a besotted and degenerate baseness of spirit . . . are ready to fall flat, and give adoration to the image and memory of this man."³³ Deploing the inconsistency of "an ingrateful and perverse" generation, Milton declares that the people first prayed to be delivered from their King, and now cry as loudly against those men who have destroyed the tyrant for them. He is glad that virtue yet remains in these few to resist the superstitious ignorance of the masses; it is a "high honor done us from God, and a special mark of his favour."

This appeal to God as a final arbiter, and the reading of God's express wishes into the political actions of his earthly saints, are often as pronounced in Milton's pamphlets as they are in Cromwell's speeches. In *The tenure* Milton gives credit for the Parliamentary victory to "God and a good cause." It is God who has delivered Charles into the hands of the Independents. Furthermore, since it is God's intention to execute judgment upon evildoers, if ordinary measures fail to bring them to punishment, then any unusual method, such as the army has used in trying and condemning Charles, is the express carrying-out of God's will and therefore legal.³⁴ Milton even denies that anyone has the right to resist such extraordinary measures to bring the King to justice. In *Observations on the articles of peace with the Irish rebels* (1649) he calls the King's trial and execution "that impartial and noble piece of justice, wherein the hand of God appeared so evidently on our side."³⁵

We need hardly point out the radical inconsistency of this interpretation of God's will as determining changes in government with the

³³ *Ibid.*, I, 313.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 8.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

principal thesis of *The tenure*, or its divergence from Lilburne's main theory. In *The tenure* Milton repeatedly asserts the right of the people to determine their own kind of government, even as he was to do again in *A defence of the English people*. He recalls that God himself did not deny this privilege to the people of Israel; though God was fully aware of the disastrous consequences of kingship, he looked upon their wishes in the matter as part of an inalienable right which he did not wish to repudiate. Yet Milton, when the cry was raised that Charles was beheaded without the consent of the people and against their express wishes, denies them the right which he had hitherto declared theirs only; he declares that God may change the government of a people against their will, that God has actually acted through the pious minority in opposition to the will of the "mad multitude." In 1649, when the tide turned to a commonwealth government through the "effectual might" of Cromwell's sword, it was by favor of "God and the parliament"; but in 1660, when the pendulum was to swing the other way through sheer pressure from the nation, it was not to be in his mind God's will that would return England to bondage, but the servile adoration of the people. For Milton, England under God rightfully did not possess free will in 1649; but in 1660, their free will intact, they were to choose evil and suffer thralldom as a consequence. Such was Milton's reasoning; theocrat that he was, it was his peculiarly Puritan habit to reason politically from God downward to humanity rather than from humanity to God.

Lilburne, on the other hand, founded his active political philosophy not so much upon abstract justice or the will of God as upon the will of the people as expressed in positive law or agreement among themselves. In the fall of 1648, when disagreements between the Presbyterian Parliament and the Independent army made some kind of break inevitable, Lilburne and his followers stoutly opposed any military coercion of a legally representative body such as the Long Parliament was. The substance of his plan, as he states it in the second edition of *Legal fundamental liberties*, was to call a new Parliament by an *Agreement of the people*. Just how this *Agreement* was to be drawn up and ratified by the voters Lilburne explains in the following manner (p. 34):

1. That some persons be chosen by the Army to represent the whole Body: And that the well-affected in every County (if it may be) chuse some persons to represent them: And those to meet at the Head-Quarters.

2. That those persons ought not to exercise any Legislative power, but onely to draw up the foundations of a just Government, and to propound them to the well-affected people in every County to be agreed to: Which Agreement ought to be above Law; and therefore the bounds, limits, and extent of the peoples Legislative Deputies in Parliament, contained in the Agreement to be drawn up into a formall contract, to be mutually signed by the well-affected people and their said Deputies upon the dayes of their Election respectively.

3. To prevent present confusion, the Parliament (if it be possible) may not be by force immediately dissolved; but that the day of its dissolution be inserted in that Agreement, by vertue whereof it shall be dissolved.

Although this plan (according to Lilburne) was approved by Cromwell and Ireton,³⁶ the Levellers and the army officers could not agree upon the content of the *Agreement* itself, "our principall difference lying at his [Ireton's] desire in the too strict restraining *Liberty of Conscience* and in keeping a power in the Parliament to punish where no visible law is transgressed."³⁷ After this disagreement Colonel Harrison in a conversation with Lilburne explained the necessity of immediate action to prevent a treaty between Parliament and the King; whereupon Lilburne proposed that a committee of sixteen be selected by the army, the Parliament, the Independents, and the Levellers, to draw up the *Agreement* at once without waiting to call the representatives specified in sections 1 and 2 of the proposition quoted above.³⁸ He and his followers still resisted any purging "without giving some good security to the Nation for the future settlement of their Liberties and Freedoms, especially in frequent, free, and successive Representatives."³⁹ According to Lilburne's story, Ireton absolutely agreed to the plan of placing the *Agreement* in the hands of the sixteen men selected, no appeal to be made from their decision.⁴⁰ When, however, the *Agreement* had been drawn up by the committee and presented to the Council of Officers, they began to debate its provisions and pass upon them. Seeing this traitorous action, Lilburne says, "I took my leave of them."⁴¹ With his associates, Walwyn, Price, and Overton, he published the *Agreement* as framed by the committee of sixteen, in order that all might know the difference between it and the one finally agreed upon by the officers. But the purpose of the Levellers was defeated; there was no agreement of the people that Parliament should

³⁶ *Legal fundamental liberties* (2d ed.), pp. 34-35.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 35 (italics Lilburne's).

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 36. ³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 35 (italics Lilburne's).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 37. ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

be dissolved and new representatives called; the army purged the Long Parliament without any civil authority, and the period of military domination began.

Nor did Lilburne's championship of the people as the sole ultimate legislative power, as the only authority whereby a change of government could be effected, cease with the execution of the King. *Legal fundamental liberties* was not written until five months after the King's death, when Lilburne was a prisoner in the Tower as a Commonwealth offender. During these five months he had repeatedly denied the legality of the Rump's authority; he declares that "those company of men at *Westminster*, that gave Commission to the High Court of Justice, to try and behead the King; etc. were no more a Parliament by Law, nor a Representative of the people, by the rules of Justice and Reason . . . [than] a company of armed Theeves."⁴² The Lords and King having been forced aside, no new government can legally be set up except "by an agreement mutually made amongst the free people of England."⁴³

We have explained Lilburne's position at some length for the purpose of showing how fundamentally Milton differed from this extreme democrat in his political thinking. They strove for the same basic human privileges; they both appeal often to "the light of reason," and "the law of nature," i.e., to their innate sense of absolute justice and truth; they reason from the common premise that man is originally a free political agent. But in the struggle for the realization of justice, Lilburne, unlike Milton, felt the necessity of coming to terms with traditional methods. He was aware, too, that English law had set many more precedents for fundamental freedoms and privileges than was commonly supposed; he quotes from Sir Edward Coke, *Magna Charta*, the *Petition of Right*, Sir Andrew Horne, the laws of Edward III, the statutes of Richard II, Henry VI, etc. Milton, on the other hand, scorning tradition, facing forward, his spirit aflame with a reforming Christianity questing for ultimate truth, visualized no constitutional obstacles. Imperiously he bade his countrymen forthwith bridge the chasm between the old world and the new. Theologian and classicist that he was, Milton knew relatively little about English law; it was "norman gibbrish" to him. Whereas Milton,

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

then, would have taken a short-cut to liberty by means of an enlightened arbitrary power, Lilburne would have built his government, however slowly, from the people upward. And he would have founded his revolutionary program in part upon those governmental precedents, English customs, and written laws for which Milton had such profound contempt.

The most pronounced difference between the two men lies, however, in their attitude toward the middle and lower classes of people. Lilburne was in his day probably the most popular man in all England; great throngs attended the trials wherein he pleaded for his liberty, and when he was acquitted of treason to the Commonwealth in October, 1649, the tumultuous cheers in the Guild Hall continued for a half-hour.⁴⁴ Lilburne had rubbed shoulders with all types of people, both in the army and among the London populace; the enthusiasm with which they greeted his proclamations of their privileges only increased his confidence in them. But Milton, by nature a social and spiritual aristocrat, had never mingled with the people of ordinary occupations. How little he knew of carpenters, mechanics, innkeepers, millers, lawyers, or country squires! His lifelong isolation from the masses served only to increase his distrust of their ignorant clamorings, his distaste for their sinful manners. *Eikonoklastes*, written during the year of Milton's greatest contempt for the multitude, at a time when Lilburne's faith was greatest, ends in the following manner:

.... An inconstant, irrational, and image-doting rabble; that like a credulous and hapless herd hold out both their ears to be stigmatized and bored through. The rest, whom perhaps ignorance hath for the time misled may find the grace and good guidance, to be-think themselves and recover.⁴⁵

A defence of the English people (1651), in which Milton attempts both to justify the change in government in the minds of Europeans and to crystallize sentiment for the Commonwealth, has much the same argument and much the same conflict of thought which we found in *The tenure*. Although Milton repeatedly asserts his basic principle that the people have a right to choose their own government when they will, he then proceeds to justify in no uncertain terms a violation

⁴⁴ See *The trial of Lieut. Collonell John Lilburne*, p. 151.

⁴⁵ *Prose works*, I, 496.

of this principle by an admitted minority of the people. "The king is for the people, and consequently the people superior to him."⁴⁶ Replying to Salmasius' argument from the law of nature, Milton arrives at the same conclusion: "You see, the closer we keep to nature, the more evidently does the people's power appear to be above that of the prince."⁴⁷

This is a purely democratic principle, and the foundation of the argument for which the *Defence* is justly remembered. But when Milton applies the principle to the revolution of 1649, he denies that the will of all the people, or even the will of all the "well-affected" people, should be considered. When Salmasius asks, "Was it the people that cut off part of the house of commons, forcing some away?" Milton replies: "Yes, I say, it was the people. For whatever the better and sounder part of the senate did, in which the true power of the people resided, why may not the people be said to have done it?"⁴⁸ Notwithstanding, therefore, his declarations of the inherent power of the people to determine their government, majorities in actual practice for Milton counted as nothing. When Salmasius calls the common people "blind and brutish, ignorant in the art of governing," Milton agrees with him concerning the masses of the poor: "It is true . . . of the rabble." He then defends the "middle sort" of the common people, "amongst whom the prudent men, and the most skilful in affairs, are generally found; others are most commonly diverted either by luxury and plenty, or by want and poverty, from virtue, and the study of laws and government."⁴⁹ It is evident from this that Milton would have disregarded not only the will of the many poor, but the will of the few rich and noble. In a word, he would have reserved the power to a large minority of the people, the upper middle class, men like himself, wherein lay the strength of the Puritan cause. It is this class of men Milton thinks of when he writes, "But where men are equals, as in all governments very many are, they ought to have an equal interest in the government, and hold it by turns."⁵⁰

By 1654, when Cromwell's personal rule, together with the legislative efforts of the Rump and the Barebones Parliament, had failed to satisfy not only Englishmen of the lower and upper classes, but such men as Milton himself most admired, he was ready to voice his dis-

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 111. ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 151. ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 143. ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 155. ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

content with Oliver and his virtuous few. He advises Cromwell and his associates, in that last exhortation in *Defensio secunda*, to repeal old laws, to refrain from prohibiting "innocent freedoms," to permit greater freedom of discussion, to refrain from questionable means of increasing the revenue, to direct their energies more to the redressing of grievances than to the increasing of naval and military armaments, to avoid imitation of royalist vanities.⁶¹ Part of this advice is inserted in his address to the people beginning, "For it is of no little consequence, O citizens, by what principles you are governed." But a careful reading of the passage reveals that Milton directed it only to the party in power; he is disappointed with the chosen few. "War has made many great whom peace makes small."⁶²

It is to Englishmen of all classes, however, especially to the masses of the poor, that Milton speaks in the last fearful passages. If their complaint is that Cromwell and his associates are tyrants, they will find that no man is free from tyranny until he has struck down the tyrant of his own ungoverned passions. Tyrants may come and go, but until that tyranny within is removed there will be no real freedom. And it is quite evident that in his opinion the masses have not yet achieved this inner liberty. Were they allowed to vote, they would elect to Parliament "the vilest miscreants from our taverns and our brothels" rather than men of virtue and wisdom. To Milton it is self-evident that bad men would elect bad men to office. Because, therefore, the ignorant and sinful masses would elect unprincipled politicians to office, they should have no voice in the government; they have lost their political liberty by being unable to govern themselves. "You, therefore," Milton continues, "who wish to remain free, either instantly be wise, or, as soon as possible, cease to be fools. . . . Unless you spare no pains to effect this, you must be judged unfit, both by God and mankind, to be entrusted with the possession of liberty and the administration of the government; but will rather, like a nation in a state of pupillage, want some active and courageous guardian to undertake the management of your affairs."⁶³

Thus the same man who, in his earliest pamphlets, believed the humblest person capable of choosing his minister, does not now think

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 294-96.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 295.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 299.

him fit to select his political representative. Milton would have placed a character qualification on the suffrage; and there is no evidence that he would have eliminated, as the Levellers wished to do, the property qualification. He did not believe, it is true, that government by an "active and courageous guardian" was the ideal way; he hoped, he expected, the time to come when the nation would no longer be "in a state of pupillage," but would be fitted to govern itself.⁵⁴ Perfection of character, and through it political liberty, might come in time.

Five years after the appearance of *Defensio secunda*, when the Commonwealth was toppling, Milton published *The ready and easy way*, a tract which showed more clearly than ever his profound distrust of the common people. After arguing for his perpetual Parliament, he declares point blank against "a licentious and unbridled democracy." To give full power to the people tends to destroy rather than to uplift them. It is a fact, too, that no assemblies in the past have been so despotic and unreasonable as those elected by the people.⁵⁵ It is necessary, Milton concludes, to keep a balance of authority between the multitude and the few chosen statesmen.⁵⁶ Again he denies the principle of majority rule: "Most voices ought not always to prevail, where main matters are in question."⁵⁷

Evidently writing in hurry and anger, Milton then makes his most drastic denial of the people's will. He declares that the majority of the people "have both in reason, and the trial of just battle, lost the right of their election what the government shall be."⁵⁸ As for those who have not lost the right to choose their government, he continues, can anyone be certain that the most men of this minority want the King back again? But even if these few do want the King to return, Milton refuses even them the right of choosing: "Which if the greater part value not, but will degenerately forego, is it just or reasonable, that

⁵⁴ *The ready and easy way* in *Prose works*, II, 127. The relation of Milton's plan (*ibid.*, p. 136) for a widespread system of education, "not in grammar only, but in all liberal arts and exercises," to this statement is obvious.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

⁵⁶ From his study of Greek and Roman government, Milton evidently believed that Aristotle's theory of the frequent transition of democracies into tyrannies was just as applicable to England as it has been to Greece and Rome. Cf. the *Politics*, V, v ("Everyman's library" ed., 1928), p. 153.

⁵⁷ *Prose works*, II, 112.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

most voices against the main end of government should enslave the less number that would be free?"⁵⁹ It is more just, in his opinion, that a few should compel the many to partake of liberty than for the many to compel the few to give it up. The right of the few, Milton concludes, to maintain their freedom against the whole nation, if need be, is inviolable.

Milton's distrust of the masses continued to the end of his days. *Paradise lost* is essentially undemocratic in tone. One finds there praise of proportioned, not mathematical equality; one is aware that Milton's theme is justification of God's judgment, not sympathy for man's sinful actions in the face of inexorable environmental determinants. What we may think of as his final estimate is found in *Paradise regained* in the words of Christ (III, 49-59):

And what the people but a herd confus'd,
A miscellaneous rabble, who extol
Things vulgar, and well weigh'd, scarce worth the praise,
They praise and they admire they know not what;
And know not whom, but as one leads the other;
And what delight to be by such extoll'd,
To live upon thir tongues and be thir talk,
Of whom to be disprais'd were no small praise?

Concluding our analysis of Milton's attitude toward the people, we must not fail to state again that Milton, much as he distrusted the democratic methods of the Levellers, was one with them in many of the reforms they hoped to achieve.⁶⁰ In order to show wherein Milton strongly supported the ends of the extreme democrats, although differing fundamentally from them in the vehicle of reform, we quote the entire thirty articles of the third *Agreement of the people*, published in May, 1649, by Lilburne, Walwyn, Prince, and Overton:

1. The supreme authority of this nation to be a representative of four hundred.
2. That two hundred be an house, and the major voice concluding to the nation.
3. All public officers to be capable of subjection, those of salary not to be members.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 132-33.

⁶⁰ On March 26, 1649, Milton was instructed to answer Lilburne's *New chains discovered*, but did not obey orders.

4. No members of one representative to be chosen of the next.
5. This parliament to end the first Wednesday in August, 1649.
6. If this omit to order it, that the people proceed to elections.
7. A new representative to be the next day after this is dissolved.
8. The next and future parliaments, each to stand for one whole year.
9. The power to be without the consent of any.
10. They not to make laws to compel in matters of religion.
11. None to be compelled to fight by sea or land against his conscience.
12. None to be questioned concerning the wars, but in pursuance to authority.
13. All privileges of any person from courts of justice to be null.
14. Not to give judgment against any, where no law was provided before.
15. Not to depend longer upon the uncertain inclination of parliament.
16. None to be punished for refusing to answer against themselves.
17. No appeal after six months after the end of representatives.
18. None to be exempted for beyond sea trade where others are free.
19. No excise or custom to be above four months after next parliament.
20. Men's persons not to be imprisoned for debt, nor their estates free.
21. Men's lives not to be taken away but for murder, or the like.
22. Men upon trials for life, liberty, etc., to have witnesses heard.
23. Tithes not to continue longer than the next representative.
24. Every parish to choose their own minister, and to force none to pay.
25. Conviction for life, liberty, etc., to be by twelve neighbors sworn.
26. None to be exempted from offices for his religion only.
27. The people in all counties to choose all their public officers.
28. Future representatives to justify all debts, arrears, etc.
29. No forces to be raised but by the representatives in being.
30. This agreement not to be nullled, no estates levelled, nor all things common.⁶¹

That for which Milton fought hardest and longest, religious toleration, is inherent in this *Agreement*. Article 10 forbids the Parliament to require people to attend any church or take any religious oath; article 23 prohibits the continuation of tithes; article 26 provides that there shall be no discrimination against officeseekers merely for the sake of their religion. How near all this was to Milton's heart we need not say. But there is more. In 1660 Milton, despite his recommendation of a perpetual senate elected by approximately a fourth of the voting population, provided in his proposed Commonwealth for a popular assembly in each county; that is, an assembly elected by those who

⁶¹ Bulstrode Whitelock, *Memorials of the English affairs from the beginning of the reign of Charles I.*, etc. (Oxford, 1853), III, 25-26.

could meet the usual property qualification. Article 27 of the *Agreement* would accomplish the same end. In the *Defensio secunda* Milton complains against military domination and questionable methods of taxation. Articles 9, 12, 19, and 29 would have guaranteed the people against both forms of tyranny. Hence we conclude that Milton would have arrived as quickly as the Levellers, perhaps even more quickly, at the feet of the goddess Liberty. Unlike the Levellers, however, he would have placed liberty above democracy; he never for a moment believed that the greatest liberty to the greatest number can come only through democratic methods; he would have driven straight to his goal, despising and rejecting the will of the multitude.

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ANGLICAN APOLOGETICS AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS, 1699-1745

I. INTRODUCTION

THE historians who have undertaken to chronicle the fortunes of the theory of progress during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have rightly given a principal place, in their explanations of the success of the idea, to influences deriving their strength from the main movement of the Enlightenment itself.¹ Thus it is clear that the faith of men like Bacon, Glanvill, Perrault, and Fontenelle in the reality and desirability of progress in natural philosophy and the arts was in large part a by-product of the zeal of those enthusiasts of the new science for forms of inquiry into nature which they could not but think superior, in potential as well as in actual accomplishment, to those which had prevailed in the world before. And the case is not less plain with many of the most distinguished prophets of the doctrine of human perfectibility after 1700, especially in France: from the Abbé de Saint-Pierre to Condorcet, the diffusion of the progressivist myth was chiefly the work of "philosophers," of men who desired, for one reason or another, a radical reform of the political, social, and religious order, and who seized upon the idea of the continual necessary improvement of the world in general as justification at once of their criticisms of the present and of their hopes for the future.

All this is true and important. Yet it is by no means the whole of the story, and in particular it leaves out of account the significant contributions made to the formulation and dissemination of progressivist ways of thinking, particularly in England, by writers whose ruling motive was not the advancement of science, and still less the emancipation of the human mind from inherited "prejudices," but the defense of revealed religion against its many enemies among the partisans of enlightenment.

¹ See, e.g., J.-J. Thonissen, *Quelques considérations sur la théorie du progrès indéfini* (Paris and Tournai, 1860); Robert Flint, *The philosophy of history in France and Germany* (Edinburgh and London, 1874); Jules Delvalle, *Essai sur l'histoire de l'idée de progrès jusqu'à la fin du XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1910); J. B. Bury, *The idea of progress, an inquiry into its origin and growth* (London, 1920); A. O. Lovejoy, "The supposed primitivism of Rousseau's *Discourse on inequality*," *Modern philology*, XXI (1923), 173-75; C. L. Becker, "The uses of posterity," in his *The heavenly city of the eighteenth-century philosophers* (New Haven, 1932).

Such writers there were even in the seventeenth century—orthodox divines who found in the “modernist” dogma of continuous intellectual improvement what seemed to them an irrefutable answer to the insistence of atheists upon the eternity of the world. “If the world were without beginning,” wrote one of them, “it would have had no age of childhood and ignorance, but being always old, and instructed by infinite study and experience, it would have always known what it successively learnt in the school of the last three thousand years, since the memorials of profane histories are transmitted to us.”² But however important such scattered pronouncements may have been in lending respectability to the already current assumption of progress in the arts and sciences, they are historically of far less significance than the efforts of a somewhat later group of apologists, writing between 1699 and 1745, to vindicate the beneficence of God’s providence and especially to combat deism by reinterpreting the history of revelation itself, and consequently of the whole spiritual and moral experience of mankind, in terms of a continuous and necessary movement from worse to better. It is with these conservative Anglican exponents of the idea of the progressive religious education of the human race that we shall be concerned in this study.³

The idea in itself, indeed, was not a new one. To discover precedents for the kind of religious progressivism these divines were intent on preaching, it was only necessary, as some of them were in part aware,⁴ to turn back to the Fathers and to certain of the great theologians of the medieval church.⁵ Thus Tertullian, as early as the beginning of the

² William Bates, *Treatise on the existence of God* (1676), in *Works* (London, 1815), I, 29. Cf. also Thomas Burnet, *The sacred theory of the earth* (1684) (London, 1759), I, 50–55; Richard Bentley, *Eight sermons preach’d at the Honourable Robert Boyle’s lectures . . . 1692* (5th ed.; Cambridge, 1724), pp. 231–32; and William Wotton, *Reflections upon ancient and modern learning* (2d ed.; London, 1697), pp. v–vi, xvii.

³ I am indebted for valuable suggestions and criticisms to my friends Arthur O. Lovejoy and Andrew C. Smita, S.J. Further material on the interrelations of primitivism and the idea of progress in both ancient and modern thought may be expected from the *Documentary history of primitivism* now in preparation under the editorship of A. O. Lovejoy, George Boas, Gilbert Chinard, and the writer, with the assistance of the American Council of Learned Societies.

⁴ See below, pp. 284 and 291, n. 35, and sec. iv, n. 35.

⁵ Some of the relevant texts are assembled in F. Laurent, *Etudes sur l’histoire de l’humanité*, IV (2d ed.; Brussels, 1863), 545–66; VIII (Brussels, n.d.), 286–92, 295–303. Cf. also Robert Flint, *The philosophy of history in France and Germany*, pp. 37–41; R. H. Murray, *Erasmus & Luther* (London, 1920), pp. 424–35; and Etienne Gilson, *L’esprit de la philosophie médiévale* (2^e série; Paris, 1932), pp. 181–201.

third century, had likened the history of religion to a gradual process of education, with stages of growth comparable to those of an individual's life from infancy to maturity; just as everything in nature, he declared, reaches its perfection by successive steps, so the divine truth, though in itself one and unchanging, is communicated to men progressively in time and is adapted in each stage to their capacities and needs:

Nothing is without stages of growth: all things await their season. . . . Look how creation itself advances little by little to fructification. First comes the grain, and from the grain arises the shoot, and from the shoot struggles out the shrub: thereafter boughs and leaves gather strength, and the whole that we call a tree expands: then follows the swelling of the germen, and from the germen bursts the flower, and from the flower the fruit opens: that fruit itself, rude for a while, and unshapely, little by little, keeping the straight course of its development, is trained to the mellowness of its flavour. So, too, righteousness—for the God of righteousness and of creation is the same—was first in a rudimentary state, having a natural fear of God: from that stage it advanced, through the Law and the Prophets, to infancy; from that stage it passed, through the Gospel, to the fervour of youth: now, through the Paraclete, it is settling into maturity.⁶

That, in spite of the suggestion of Montanism in the last clause of this passage, there was nothing heretical in Tertullian's central conception of stages in religion is shown by the frequent recurrence of similar ideas, in various contexts, in the works of prominent orthodox leaders of the early church. Of these, not the least influential in helping to fix the theme in the tradition of Christian thought was Augustine himself.⁷ "Recta eruditio," he wrote in the *De civitate dei*, "per quosdam articulos temporum tanquam ætatum profecit. . . ." ⁸ And in his controversial writings he fell back more than once on this idea of growth in the apprehension of religious truth as a means of undermin-

⁶ *De virginibus velandis*, cap. 1; translation of the "Ante-Nicene Christian library," XVIII (Edinburgh, 1870), 155-56. The original is as follows (Migne, *PL*, II, 938): "Nihil sine ætate, et omnia tempus expectant. . . . Aspicie ipsam creaturam paulatim ad fructum promoveri. Granum est primo, et de grano frutex oritur, et de frutice arbuscula entitur: deinde rami et frondes invalescunt, et totum arboris nomen expanditur, inde germinis tumor et flos de germine solvitur, et de flore fructus aperitur; is quoque rudis aliquandiu et informis, paulatim ætatem suam dirigens eruditur in mansuetudinem saporis. Sic et iustitia (nam idem Deus iustitiæ et creaturæ) primo fuit in rudimentis, natura Deum metuens: dehinc per Legem et Prophetas promovit in infantiam: dehinc per evangelium efferbuit in juventutem: nunc per Paracletum componitur in maturitatem."

⁷ In addition to the texts referred to below, see *In Psalmum 54*, Ennaratio 22, 2-9 (Migne, *PL*, XXXVI, 643).

⁸ X. xiv (Migne, *PL*, XLI, 292).

ing the objections of heretics and pagans. Was it argued, for example, that the rejection by Christ of the ancient Jewish sacrifices implied that these had never had divine sanction since that only can rightfully be altered which never should have been established? The answer, Augustine thought, was simple: humanity has changed, and in changing has become more mature, and a good teacher does not give the same lesson to advanced pupils as to beginners.⁹ Or was it asked why Christ had not appeared earlier than he did, and why, if the Gospel is so necessary to men, its benefits had not been made available to the whole world from the beginning? Clearly a similar reply would serve: what is appropriate to infancy is not appropriate to youth; the rules which are given to adolescence will be bad for maturity; and to insist that there should be the same law for humanity, from the first man to the end of the world, is to forget that humanity has not always been of the same age.¹⁰ In the propagation of these ideas the authority of Augustine was reinforced by that of several other Fathers of the church, notably Cyril of Alexandria and Vincent of Lerins. The history of the dispensations of religion, suggested Cyril, is analogous to the history of the human arts and sciences: in the beginning these are "defective and imperfect, but by little and gradual Additions they come at last to their complete pitch."¹¹ And Vincent's view was much the same; although the main theme of his *Commonitorium* was the necessity of maintaining as the true faith of the church those things which had been believed everywhere and always and by all men—"teneamus quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est"¹²—he took care nevertheless to show that this did not preclude the possibility of progress:

But some one will say perhaps, Shall there, then, be no progress in Christ's Church? Certainly; all possible progress. For what being is there, so envious of men, so full of hatred to God, who would seek to forbid it? Yet on condition that it be real progress, not alteration of the faith. For progress requires that the subject be enlarged in itself, alteration, that it be transformed into something else. The intelligence, then, the knowledge, the wisdom, as well of individuals as of all, as well of one man as of the whole Church, ought, in the

⁹ *Epistolae* cxxxviii. 2, 4, 5, 6.

¹⁰ *De diversis quaestionibus* lxxxiii, q. 44 (Migne, *PL*, XL, 28).

¹¹ *Contra Julianum*, lib. IV (Migne, *PG*, LXXVI, 694-96). I use the translation by John Edwards, *A complete history* (London, 1699), II, 615. See below, p. 284, n. 5.

¹² Cap. II.

course of ages and centuries, to increase and make much and vigorous progress; but yet only in its own kind; that is to say, in the same doctrine, in the same sense, and in the same meaning.

The growth of religion in the soul must be analogous to the growth of the body, which, though in process of years it is developed and attains its full age, yet remains still the same. . . .

In like manner, it behooves Christian doctrine to follow the same laws of progress, so as to be consolidated by years, enlarged by time, refined by age, and yet, withal, to continue uncorrupt and unadulterate. . . .¹³

From the Fathers the idea of the beneficent effects of time on religious understanding descended to the theological writers of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It was enunciated with unusual definiteness, for example, by Hugh of St. Victor. The faith is always one, he declared; but men's comprehension of it differs from individual to individual and is subject to increase from age to age. "Crevit itaque per tempora fides in omnibus, ut major esset, sed mutata non est, ut alia esset."¹⁴ A gradual movement from imperfection toward perfection, indeed, seemed to him to be characteristic of the creation as a whole: "a modico universa incipiunt; ac deinde paulatim per incrementa ordine ad perfectionem evadunt."¹⁵ From the operation of this law not even the order of angels is exempt; and as for man, it is not to the Fall that we must attribute the necessity he is under of making his way toward perfection by gradual steps, for even if Adam had remained obedient, it is clear that human enlightenment would have been increased by subsequent dispensations.¹⁶ How congenial, again, this same general type of thinking was to the greatest of the scholastics may be seen in several passages of the *Summa theologica*. Dealing in one of these with the question "whether human law should be changed in any way," Thomas invoked, in answer to the partisans of immutability, the very same principle which was to inspire the scientific progressivists of the seventeenth century:

It seems natural to human reason [he wrote] to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence, in speculative sciences, we see that the teaching of the early philosophers was imperfect, and that it was afterwards

¹³ *Ibid.*, cap. xxiii; translation of "A select library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers," 2d ser., XI (New York, 1894), 147-48.

¹⁴ *De sacramentis* I. x. 6 (Migne, *PL*, CLXXVI, 339).

¹⁵ *De sacramentis* I. vi. 26 (Migne, *PL*, CLXXVI, 279).

¹⁶ *Summa sententiarum* II. vi (Migne, CLXXVI, 88); *De sacramentis* I. vi. 14, 26 (Migne, CLXXVI, 271, 279).

perfected by those who succeeded them. So also in practical matters: for those who first endeavoured to discover something useful for the human community, not being able by themselves to take everything into consideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient in many ways; and these were changed by subsequent lawgivers who made institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in respect of the common weal.¹⁷

This principle could not of course be applied to religion without qualification: "as regards the substance of the articles of faith," it could not be admitted that these "received any increase as time went on,"¹⁸ nor could it be supposed that the Gospel once revealed would ever be superseded by any essentially new dispensation.¹⁹ But within these limits Thomas was as explicit as any of the Fathers in recognizing that, while divine truth itself remains immutable, there could be, and in the past there had been, a progressive improvement in its comprehension by men. To the objection that since "the doctrine of faith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us by God," and since "there can be no lack of knowledge in God," therefore "knowledge of matters of faith was perfect from the beginning, and did not increase as time went on," he replied by making two distinctions:

Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First, on the part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in knowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that takes place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the learner; thus the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does not deliver it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for he would not be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the disciple's capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this way that men made progress in the knowledge of faith as time went on. Hence the Apostle (Gal. iii. 24) compares the state of the Old Testament to childhood.

And again:

Two causes are requisite before actual generation can take place, an agent, namely, and matter. In the order of the active cause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way nature makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is not brought to perfection, except by something perfect already in existence. On the other hand, in the order of the material cause, the imperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is the active cause,

¹⁷ *Prima secundae*, quaest. xcvi, art. 1; Dominican translation (London, 1915), p. 77.

¹⁸ *Secunda secundae*, quaest. i, art. 7; Dominican translation (New York, 1917), p. 17.

¹⁹ *Prima secundae*, quaest. cvi, art. 4; Dominican translation, pp. 287-90.

having perfect knowledge from all eternity; while man is likened to matter in receiving the influx of God's action. Hence, among men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from imperfection to perfection. . . .²⁰

In still another passage he applied the same principle to the solution of a problem which had already engaged Augustine—why, if the Gospel is necessary to the salvation of men's souls, was it not revealed at the beginning of the world? For several reasons, Thomas answered, one of which is that the very perfection of the New Law precludes any such possibility:

A second reason may be taken from the perfection of the New Law. Because a thing is not brought to perfection at once from the outset, but through an orderly succession of time; thus one is at first a boy, and then a man. And this reason is stated by the Apostle (Gal. iii, 24, 25): *The Law was our pedagogue in Christ that we might be justified by faith. But after the faith is come, we are no longer under a pedagogue.*²¹

There was ample authority, then, in such pre-Reformation texts as these, for a religious apologetic based definitely, though not without qualifications of various sorts, on the conception of historical progress. Yet in spite of the fact that familiarity with the patristic and scholastic writings was fairly common among at least the more erudite of English divines through the two hundred years following the breach with Rome, this conception seems to have had but little attraction for the Protestant mind of this period, and it was especially out of harmony with the dominant trends in English religious thought during the seventeenth century. For whether one considers the persistence among many devout churchmen of the old theory of universal decline,²² or the idealization of primitive Christianity characteristic of various Protestant groups, or the bibliolatry of the Puritans, or the concentration of the latitudinarians on the beliefs and practices common to the different ages and sects of the church, or the increasingly vocal hostility of the deists to all religious doctrines or institutions or moral codes that could not be shown to be literally universal among

²⁰ *Secunda secundae*, quaest. 1, art. 7; Dominican translation, pp. 16-18.

²¹ *Prima secundae*, quaest. cvi, art. 3; Dominican translation, p. 286. Other texts of Thomas somewhat similar in tendency to this are cited by F. Marin-Sola, *L'évolution homogène du dogme catholique* (2^e éd.; Paris, 1924), I, 269 n., 277 n.; II, 136-41.

²² As preached, e.g., by Godfrey Goodman in his *The fall of man, or the corruption of nature proved by the light of our naturall reason* (London, 1616). Cf. also Sir Walter Raleigh, *History of the world* (1614), Part I, Book I, chap. v, sec. 5; and George Herbert, "Decay," *English works*, ed. G. H. Palmer (Boston and New York, 1905), III, 115.

mankind—it is clear that the temper of this century was unfavorable in a peculiar degree to the acceptance of a philosophy of man's spiritual history which assigned a positive value to succession in time. Of the primitivism that resulted from this attitude, some of the most striking expressions, curiously enough, came from writers whose outlook, when it was a question not of religious truth but of scientific knowledge, was strongly progressivistic. A typical example was Joseph Glanvill's explanation, in *The vanity of dogmatizing*, "why we may embrace what is new in Philosophy, while we reject them in Theologie":

It will be necessary to add, that I intend not the former discourse, in favour of any new-broach'd conceit in *Divinity*; For I own no Opinion there, which cannot plead the prescription of above sixteen hundred. There's nothing I have more sadly resented, then the *phrenetick* whimsies with which our Age abounds, and therefore am not likely to Patron them. In *Theology*, I put as great a difference between our *New Lights*, and *Ancient Truths*; as between the *Sun*, and an unconcocted evanid *Meteor*. Though I confess, that in *Philosophy* I'm a *Seeker*; yet cannot believe, that a *Sceptick* in *Philosophy* must be one in *Divinity*. *Gospel-Light* began in it[s] *Zenith*; and, as some say the *Sun*, was created in its *Meridian* strength and lustre. But the beginnings of *Philosophy* were in a *Crepusculous obscurity*; and it's yet scarce past the *Dawn*. *Divine Truths* were most pure in their source; and *Time* could not perfect what *Eternity* began: our *Divinity*, like the Grand-father of *Humanity*, was born in the fulness of *time*, and in the strength of its manly vigour: But *Philosophy* and *Arts* commenced *Embryo's*, and are completed by *Times* gradual accomplishments.²³

So, too, Sir Matthew Hale; though something of a progressivist in his view of the arts and sciences, he yet could write, in a passage replying to those who would infer the recent origin of the human race from the imperfect character of the early religion of heathen peoples, that "since Truth is more ancient than Errour, it seems, that if there were any Religion that was Primitive in the World, it was the true Religion and true Worship of the true God, and not Idolatry, or worshipping of Men or Idols, or the Works of Nature: and consequently, . . . that Mankind had an Existence in the World much antecedent to such Idolatrous Worship, wherein the true God was for many Ages and

²³ (London, 1661), pp. 186–87. Cf. also "The antiquity of our faith stated and cleared," *Some discourses, sermons, and remains* (London, 1681), p. 400: "Natural Truths are more and more discover'd by time: For many go to and fro, and Science shall be encreased. But those divine verities are most perfect in their fountain and original."

Generations truly worshipped; and that partly by the subtilty of the Enemy of Mankind, partly by the apostacy and corruption of Humane Nature, and partly by the gradual decay of that true and ancient Tradition of the true Worship of the true God, Idolatry and Superstition prevailed and obtained in the World."²⁴

It was, therefore, a somewhat revolutionary departure to assert once more, as did the early eighteenth-century divines with whom we are concerned, that what chiefly distinguishes man's religious knowledge is precisely the fact that it is "not brought to perfection at once from the outset, but through an orderly succession of time." And yet the reappearance toward 1700 of such a doctrine, amplified in various ways beyond any of its earlier expressions, is not hard to understand.

The explanation is to be found mainly, no doubt, in the situation in which the more active adherents of religious orthodoxy felt themselves placed at the close of the seventeenth century and in the early years of the eighteenth. Never before, it seemed, had the traditional faith of the church been threatened by a larger and more dangerous accumulation of enemies. Never had freethinking in all its forms been more prevalent or the revolt against historical Christianity so open and so aggressive.²⁵ More than ever, therefore, it appeared the duty of the friends of religion to consolidate their forces and to equip themselves with whatever dialectical weapons, old or new, would best enable them to carry on a successful defensive warfare against their foes. And there were special reasons, inherent in the nature of the freethinking movement itself, why, in seeking out such weapons, at least some of these apologists should have come to see a peculiar value in the idea that the spiritual history of mankind is necessarily subject to a law of progressive growth and change. For among the new or revived heresies with which they were confronted at this moment, not the least insistent were those which centered their objections to belief in a divine Providence or to acceptance of Christianity as a true revelation precisely on the arbitrary and inequitable temporal distribution of moral good and religious enlightenment which the church's doctrine seemed to imply. It was during these years that, thanks to Bayle and

²⁴ *The primitive origination of mankind* (London, 1677), p. 160.

²⁵ A clear idea of the situation as it presented itself to a contemporary divine may be had from William Nicholls' *A conference with a theist* (London, 1696-99).

others, the problem of evil, involving as one of its aspects the question of the justice of the Fall, once more took on an urgent form. Above all, it was during these years that deism, the steady growth of which had long been noted with alarm, at length became an open menace; and the essence of deism, it was now more than ever clear, lay in its radical assertion, against Christianity, of the principle that any religion necessary for salvation must be one that has always and everywhere been known to men. On this point nothing could be plainer and more dangerous, once the major premise was granted, than the reasoning of one of Charles Blount's friends in a publication of 1695:

That Rule which is necessary to our future Happiness, ought to be generally made known to all men.

But no Rule of Revealed Religion was, or ever could be made known to all men.

Therefore no Revealed Religion is necessary to future Happiness.

The Major is thus prov'd:

Our Future Happiness depends upon our obeying, or endeavouring to fulfil the known Will of God.

But that Rule which is not generally known, cannot be generally obey'd.

Therefore that Rule which is not generally known, cannot be the Rule of our Happiness.

Now the Minor of the first Syllogism is matter of Fact, and uncontrovertible, that no Religion supernatural has been conveyed to all the World. . . .²⁶

Clearly it behooved Christians, in the face of attacks like this, not to neglect any arguments by which they might vindicate the partial, temporally changing, and seemingly often unjust dispensations of revealed religion. And what arguments, it would seem natural for at least some of them to ask, could be more suitable to their needs than those drawn from the analogy of individual growth and the necessary gradual movement of all things from imperfection toward perfection which had already done duty, against objections of much the same sort, in the writings of the Fathers and of the theologians of the Middle Ages?

The appeal of such arguments at this particular time was greatly

²⁶ A. W., "To Charls Blount Esq; Of natural religion, as opposed to divine revelation," *The miscellaneous works of Charles Blount* (London, 1695), p. 198. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 210: "It has been demanded of me, Whether I should be convinc'd of my Opinion, and admit of supernatural Religion, in case the Gospel (i.e.) a supernatural Religion had been promulgated to all the World? I answer'd, I should; and was contented that the whole stress of the Dispute should be terminated in that one Point."

enhanced, moreover, as a result of the increasingly widespread success in the English intellectual world of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries of the "modernist" propaganda of the preceding hundred years. Thanks to writers like George Hakewill, whose influence was more than ever potent in 1700 and after,²⁷ the hold on men's minds of the ancient dogma of the world's perpetual decay had at last been decisively weakened if not altogether destroyed. And it had been succeeded, in the thinking of a growing number of persons, clergy as well as laymen, by the newly popular doctrine, to the diffusion of which many writers from Bacon onward had contributed, of a necessary progress, in past and future alike, in the realm of natural philosophy and the practical arts. Given the peculiar apologetic needs of the time, the atmosphere was thus unusually favorable to a revival of the old idea of development in religion and its enlargement into a comprehensive progressivist philosophy of man's spiritual and moral history; and it was hardly a coincidence that the divines who were responsible for this revival between 1699 and 1745 were all men who brought to their reflections on the difficulties presented by deism and the other forms of freethought a marked enthusiasm for the ideas of Hakewill and of the seventeenth-century apostles of intellectual advance.

II. JOHN EDWARDS

The pioneer of the movement was John Edwards,¹ a Calvinistic divine of the Church of England who had attained by the last years of the seventeenth century a position of some influence among the more conservative members of the religious public. In 1699, as the climax of a series of learned works designed to confute atheism and other varieties of freethinking,² Edwards published, in two volumes, *Πολυτοικίλος Σοφία*. *A compleat history or survey of all the dispensations and methods of religion, from the beginning of the world to the consumma-*

²⁷ See, e.g., Sir Thomas Pope Blount, *Essays on several subjects* (London, 1691), pp. 89-141 (various unacknowledged borrowings from Hakewill); John Ray, *Three physico-theological discourses* (2d ed.; London, 1693), pp. 278-83; Edward Syngé, *A gentleman's religion*, Part I (London, 1698), pp. 22-23; William Derham, *Physico-theology* (originally the Boyle lectures for 1711-12) (8th ed.; Dublin, 1727), pp. 176 n., 208 n., 279 n., 280 n., 283 n., 297 n., 298 n.

¹ 1637-1716. See the article in the *DNB*.

² E.g., *Some thoughts concerning the several causes and occasions of atheism* (1695) and *A demonstration of the existence and providence of God, from the contemplation of the visible structure of the greater and lesser world* (1696).

tion of all things; as represented in the Old and New Testament. His object was to show "the several Reasons and Designs of those different Administrations" and hence "the Wisdom and Goodness of God in the Government of his Church, through all the Ages of it";³ and he considered that this aim could best be accomplished by a demonstration that God, in making known his will to men, has proceeded, and will continue to proceed in the future, not arbitrarily, but by regular and progressive steps.

There is [he wrote] a gradual Subordination of these several Oeconomies, and upon the Cessation and Extinction of one that is inferiour, a more Sublime and Perfect one arises in its Room: and it is God's Will and Pleasure that these divers Administrations shall take place in their Order, and that one shall not anticipate the other. It seems good to the All-wise Creator to reveal the knowledge of himself by degrees, to discover his will as it were by parcels. God dispenseth not all his Favours together, not all at once: but the manifestations of his Will grow greater and greater successively.⁴

That this was not an entirely new way of interpreting the religious history of mankind Edwards was fully aware, and in endeavoring to persuade his readers of the soundness of his view he did not fail to point out that it had behind it the authority of certain of the Fathers, notably of that great judge of "the Nature and Genius of Christianity," Vincent of Lerins. It was the opinion of Vincent, he observed, that the "Understanding, Knowledg, and Wisdom of single Persons, as well as of whole Bodies, of every individual as well as of Churches in general, shall hugely increase, and be exceedingly advanced, according to the gradual Successions of Times and Ages."⁵ But Edwards was too much a man of the later seventeenth century to rest his appeal on authority alone; and although the idea of progress in religion undoubtedly derived much of its validity for him from the fact that it had formed part of the most ancient of theological traditions, it is significant that he chose to present it to his public primarily as an inference from the assumption of progress in the arts and sciences which had come to be so widely accepted in his own time, and by no one more completely than by himself.

It is true, he admitted, that there are still Englishmen, as there have

³ Title-page. ⁴ I, 397.

⁵ II, 610-11. For a quotation to a somewhat similar effect from Cyril of Alexandria see II, 614-15. Cf. above, p. 276.

formerly been Jews, Greeks, Romans, and even some Fathers of the church, who look upon the course of the sciences and practical arts as one not of steady improvement but rather of progressive decline:

... they tell us that Knowledge and Arts were once very bright and gay, and shone forth with a Lustre worthy of Mens eyes, but in these latter times they are over-run with scum and crust, and are miserably absorpt into Darkness and Barbarity. To raise the Reputation of the past Ages, and to depress that of the present, they cry out that we live in the dregs of Time, in Natures Declension, in the old Age and Dotage of the World.

But such notions as these, he insisted, "savour more of Prejudice than Truth, and are the Product of Imagination rather than Reason";⁶ and to show their falsity he proceeded to review at some length the many useful inventions discovered in the last few centuries which had been wholly unknown in former times and the marvelous improvements of the moderns in "those Arts which were but then imperfectly begun."⁷ It was a type of argument which had often been employed by "modernist" writers during the preceding hundred and fifty years,⁸ and Edwards, who had read Hakewill's *Apologie*⁹ and at least part of Perault's *Parallèle*,¹⁰ had little difficulty in marshaling an impressive array of evidences to support his contention that not degeneration but progress is the ruling principle of man's intellectual life. He spoke of the mariner's compass, thanks to which "unspeakable Advantages have accrued to Mankind"; of gunpowder, whereby we have "a more compendious and speedy, a more thrifty and frugal way of killing our Enemies"; of the art of printing, so serviceable in bringing on the Reformation; of improvements in clocks and watches; of the introduction into general use of "that so Pleasant and Profitable Commodity of *Sugar*"; of modern advances in agriculture and the care of bees; of recent developments in architecture and painting, "which last is in some respects much better and more exact than it was of old, as Monsieur *Perault* hath shew'd"; of the important discoveries of the past century in physiology, especially that of the circulation of the blood; of the multiplication of observations and experiments in medicine, which have led to many new cures and have "marvellously promoted" both

⁶ II, 620. ⁷ II, 621.

⁸ Many examples are given in H. Gillot, *La querelle des anciens & des modernes en France* (Paris, 1914) and in Bury, *The idea of progress*.

⁹ See II, 618, 634. ¹⁰ See II, 627.

the health and long life of man; of new discoveries in astronomy, whereby the "late Ages have been more knowing in the Heavens than those that went before";¹¹ of advances in mathematics, in chemistry—which is "all New; there was no such thing known to the Generations of Old"—and, thanks to the invention of new instruments, in all branches of natural and mechanical philosophy; of great improvements, finally, in "*Writing and the Style of Authors of all kinds.*"¹² Could anyone in view of all this, he demanded, still maintain the old thesis of universal decay? "We see the contrary, the World is upon the thriving Hand; it doth not go back and decline, as to the Knowledge of the Arts and Sciences, but is still impregnating, and is still teeming with them."¹³ And since from what has been already we may infer what shall be afterward, it is hardly to be doubted that the future will see yet further advances in all useful and polite forms of secular learning.¹⁴ But if this is so—if steady progress from one generation to another has been and is likely to continue to be the law of human knowledge—why, he asked, should we assume that God has proceeded otherwise in his communication of divine truths to men? "Can there be any Reason given why God should not prosper *Religion* as well as *Arts*? Why we may not look for increase of knowledg in the Church, as well as in matters that relate only to Nature? Why there may not be a Perfection of Understanding in the one, as well as in the other?"¹⁵

The logic of this analogy should have led Edwards to picture the whole course of man's religious and moral history from the beginning—or at least from after the Fall—as a gradual ascent. And this, indeed, was what he evidently intended to suggest. It is characteristic of the Creator, he declared more than once, that in all his works, and hence necessarily in his conduct of revelation, he ever shows himself to be a God of order and method, proceeding by gradual steps and degrees "from things more imperfect to those that are perfecter" and always reserving the most perfect things until the last.¹⁶ It was so in the

¹¹ It is a curious fact that in spite of his great enthusiasm for "modern" improvements Edwards remained unconvinced of the truth of the Copernican hypothesis. See II, 630, and cf. *A demonstration of the existence and providence of God* (London, 1696), pp. 26–50.

¹² II, 622–34.

¹³ II, 654.

¹⁴ See II, 615, 621, 637.

¹⁵ II, 615. See also II, 622, 634.

¹⁶ I, 379, 395–96. Cf. II, 612: "It is reasonable to believe that there shall be a better State of Religion, because this is founded on the constant Method of God in the World. We find that it is his Way and Course to proceed in a gradual manner, and that not only

original formation of the world: "Trees and Plants and all Vegetatives were created before Beasts that have a sensitive Life; and at last he came to what was perfectest, Man, who hath a reasonable Soul, and is the most excellent of all God's Works in this lower World. . . ." ¹⁷ And it was so, too, Edwards intimated, in the succession of religious dispensations that began with Adam and culminated in Christ: "Still all along one Administration *exceeded* another, till at last *Christianity* arrived, which was the *Highest* of all." ¹⁸

The effect of such passages as this, however, was somewhat obscured in his treatment of the early ages of the world by the presence in his thinking of another, much older, and sharply opposing strain of historical theory. In spite of his "modernism" he was unable to rid his mind entirely of the traditional belief in the Golden Age with its necessary implication of an ensuing decline, and he found it equally difficult to decide just where to fit this belief into the biblical scheme of things. The allusions to a Golden Age in the pagan poets, he declared in one passage, were merely the reflection of "some broken Notions and Traditions . . . of Man's first Estate in Paradise"; ¹⁹ after the expulsion from Eden men became "more irrational by far than the whole Herd of Brutes." ²⁰ Of all the solutions of the old problem of reconciling Genesis with classical legend which had been suggested by earlier universal historians, this was, from Edwards' special point of view, probably the most satisfactory, since it allowed him, should he so desire, to date the upward movement of mankind from the time of Adam himself. But he had another solution, likewise supported by excellent precedents, in reserve; and not more than fifty pages farther on in his book we are introduced to a second Golden Age, followed by a second decline, in the period immediately before the Flood. If the antediluvians enjoyed longer lives than their descendants, the reason, he explained, was in great part that the "Fruits of the Earth came up more kindly before the Deluge than afterwards," that the eating of flesh—here again he cites parallels in the poets—had not yet come into fashion, and that a "quiet and contented way of living" still prevailed among men. "In

in things of Nature (as at the Creation of all ranks of Beings) but in those of Religion. . . . Wherefore it is reasonable to conclude that it will be thus in *Christianity*, that as it hath had already its different Steps, Measures and Gradations, so there is a greater yet to come, and that it shall arrive to the Height of its Glory in this World."

¹⁷ I, 396.

¹⁸ I, 397.

¹⁹ I, 69.

²⁰ I, 79.

those Golden Times there was more Simplicity and Honesty, Men were satisfied with a little, and could live at a cheap rate. But afterwards the World was disorder'd, Mens Desires and Wishes grew immoderate and extravagant, and their Days were worn out with Troubles and Vexations."²¹

There was to be one more lapse into degeneracy, at the very end of Edward's book; but in the meantime, and especially from the point where his narrative reached the advent of Christianity, the pattern of his thought was determined almost exclusively by his conception of a gradual and more or less continuous advance in men's understanding of the truth revealed to them by God. The stages of this advance he likened—using the old analogy which had done duty for so many theorists of progress from the Fathers to his own time—to the natural stages in the growth of an individual man. So Christianity had had its infancy in the days of the primitive church, and it had now reached the period of its youth, with the result that at present there prevails "a more settled Knowledge of Religion" than in any former time.²²

Who sees not what a vast difference there is between these and the former Times, in point of Divine Knowledge? How little was there of it heretofore, among those who ought to have had a large Stock of it? . . .

But we, by the Divine Blessing, are free'd from that Ignorance and Bondage; which we owe to the *Reformation*, whereby that Darkness was dispell'd, and that Vassallage removed. And now we are no longer tied up in the dark, we both see and walk, and we daily make progress in Divine Learning. . . . Thus humane Minds are enlightened, and enfranchised. The Elastick Power is restored to them; they act without Restraint, and fill the Earth with Knowledge and Truth.²³

But just as youth is succeeded by the maturity of manhood, so the future—Edwards predicted—will bring still greater improvements in the knowledge and practice of Christian truth. The culmination of this gradual movement upward will be the millennium, a period which will precede rather than follow the Second Coming, the General Resurrection, and the Final Judgment—here Edwards asserts his independence of the main earlier theological tradition²⁴—and which, indeed,

²¹ I, 131-32. ²² II, 606. ²³ II, 635-37.

²⁴ Cf. I, vi: "as to the Last Oeconomy, I have been very curious in the Distribution of its several Parts: though I have, I confess, dissented therein from most Writers." Elsewhere he characterizes as a heresy the belief that during the millennium Christ will literally come and reign with his saints on earth (see II, 653-54). Cf. also II, 727, 767-68.

will be separated from life as we know it now by nothing more catastrophic than the downfall of the Church of Rome and of Mohametan-ism and the conversion of the Jews and of all the heathen nations to Christianity.²⁵ Although Edwards is unable to set any precise date for the coming of those happy days which are to endure on earth for a thousand years, he is clearly of opinion that the dawn of the millennium is probably not far off. Both the arts and the sciences and also true religion, he reminds his readers, have followed the course of the sun, arising in the east and slowly traveling westward. But the end of that journey is now almost in sight. The Gospel "hath crossed the *Western Ocean*: The *Americans* hear of Christ." And presently we shall see it spread "even to the utmost Parts of this *Western Hemisphere*, and so in its direct way step into the *East* again, and visit the *Islands* in the *Eastern Seas*, and then land on the Continent among the *Tartars*, *Indians*, *Chinoises*, *Persians*, &c. and so finish its Circuit, by returning to the Place where it set out first of all."²⁶ When this happens it will be a plain indication that we have come to the last age designed for this world.

Of the millennial age itself Edwards gave a description which mingled in a curious way the language and imagery of biblical prophecy with some of the distinctive preoccupations of the Enlightenment. It will be a reign of "Universal Righteousness"—not, to be sure, an entirely sinless state since "as long as Men are on this side of Heaven, Corruptions will adhere to them"—but a state in which religious knowledge will be greatly increased and more widely diffused, in which the practice of Christianity will be restored to its original purity and simplicity, in which there will be a "continual Striving to excel one another in laudable and vertuous Actions," in which "Religion and Piety shall be Fashionable, and Goodness and Holiness shall be esteemed most Honourable."²⁷ At the same time it will be an age "eminent for the Natural as well as the Moral and Religious Emendation of all Things"²⁸—an age, in short, in which enlightened and comfort-loving Englishmen of the generation of Edwards himself might be content to live. Existence will be easier than it has ever been before, at least since the Fall: the soil will be more fertile and the products of the earth more plentiful and wholesome; the "outward Conveniences,

²⁵ See II, 674-721.²⁶ II, 690-91.²⁷ II, 722-30.²⁸ II, 745.

Comforts, and Refreshments" of life will be greatly increased; men will cease to make war on each other; there will be perfect freedom of travel by land and sea, aided, in all probability, by the use of a common language for all the world. In that age, too, natural philosophy will be improved to the utmost of its possibilities, and "a *Vertuoso* shall be no Rarity." And because of this, as well as because of the cessation of wars, the earth will be crowded with inhabitants, all of whom may be expected to excel their ancestors in good health and lively spirits, in physical beauty, and in length of life.²⁹

Such will be, according to Edwards, the glorious manhood of the human race. But the limits of the meliorism which had carried him up to this point had now been reached; and influenced at once by the biblical eschatology and by the analogy of the individual's life which he had adopted as his guiding idea, he could foresee, beyond the static perfection of the millennium, only another decline. It was with reluctance that he brought himself to contemplate this final triumph in the world of the principle of degeneration. "But the uncontrollable Wisdom and Providence of Heaven leads us to it, and therefore we must be obsequious to their Conduct. I proceed then to the *Fourth* and *Last Part* of the *Evangelical Dispensation*, namely that which immediately preceedeth the Coming of Christ to Judgment. . . . I call this the *Old Age of Christianity*, for now it miserably Declineth and grows Weak and Decrepid. Now the World degenerates again, and in a short time it becomes very Wicked and Impious. . . . The worst State of it will be towards its End."³⁰ And he concludes by describing in his most eloquent style the general conflagration which will bring the drama of human history to a close.³¹

Neither this melancholy ending, however, nor the strain of primitivism earlier in the book, could have obscured for Edwards' readers the main thesis which he designed his treatise to prove. As he set it forth, this thesis involved not only the contention, adumbrated long before in the Fathers and scholastics but by none of them developed so fully or applied so consistently to the future as well as the past, that the manifestations of God's will "grow greater and greater successively"; it also involved, as an important corollary, the clear recognition—like-wise anticipated in patristic and medieval thought³²—that each stage

²⁹ II, 726-27, 736-37, 742-48. ³⁰ II, 760-65. ³¹ II, 772-73. ³² See above, pp. 275-77.

in the development of man's religious understanding and moral excellence has a character of its own, determined by and relative to the general state of human knowledge and experience at the time. Why this must be so Edwards did not explain, contenting himself with the assertion that, just as it is characteristic of God's method in the world that he "proceeds from imperfect to perfect things . . . from lesser to greater Discoveries,"³³ so it is his habit in his relations with men to act "according to the Nature of things, according to the Capacities and Faculties of Mankind, according to the Condition and Frame of Men." Hence it is that "his dealings with them are different and various, his Administrations and Methods are not alike." But they are always "most suitable and agreeable" to the circumstances existing at any given time.

He prescribes Laws not according to what he is able to do, but according to our Ability to hear and receive them. Hence it is that tho *True Religion* be but One, yet it hath had *Different Discoveries* and Manifestations, according to the *Different States* and Conditions of Men in the several Ages of the World. This argues not any Changeableness in God, but his great Wisdom, and Care of his Church: as a Prudent Master of a Family gives different Orders and Rules according to the diversity of Persons and Times he hath to do with.³⁴

Edwards was not blind to the dangerous construction that might be put on this doctrine, and more than once, as in this passage, he paused to reassure his readers that the conception of a progressive revelation of God's will, diversified according to time and place, is entirely consistent with belief in the immutability of God and of the essential dogmas of our religion. The substance of revelation has been from the beginning, and will remain to the end, always the same.³⁵ But we must not expect men to be able to understand it all at once or to have the same conception of it at one time that they have at another. In religion as in other forms of human knowledge we must be content at the start with crude and imperfect glimpses of the truth, but we can look confidently forward to ever fuller illumination as our

³³ I, 397.

³⁴ I, 383-84. Cf. I, 146-47.

³⁵ Cf. II, 611, where, after quoting the celebrated dictum of Vincent of Lerins on progress in Christianity, he adds: "But, as he explains himself, this Proficiency shall be in the same kind, in the same Persuasion, in the same Sense and Judgment, so that the Christian Faith shall still remain the same as to its Substance, tho it shall be much better explain'd and known than it is now . . . saith he, *Christianity is consolidated by Years, it is enlarged by Time, it is sublimed by Age, but still it continues incorrupt and intire.*" See also II, 635.

capacities increase and the generations go on. The religious education of mankind, in short, resembles that of an individual in being unfolded gradually through successive stages, each one of which reflects the circumstances and needs of the race at the time and consequently differs from all the others, each one of which surpasses in its degree of enlightenment the preceding stage and is surpassed in turn by the stage that follows.

In thus emphasizing what he called in the concluding paragraph of his book "the Curious and Admirable Variety which is to be discerned in the Divine Providence,"³⁶ Edwards was animated not merely by a general desire to vindicate the "transcendent Wisdom and Goodness" of God but also by a more specific concern to provide an antidote to certain ways of thinking about Christianity widely prevalent in his time. In particular, he hoped, by demonstrating that the divine plan with respect to religion as well as the sciences and useful arts involves a progressive adaptation of truth to man's understanding, to show the falsity of those conceptions of religion that exalted its earlier manifestations over its later ones or that insisted on the necessary uniformity through all times and places of any revelation deserving to be called divine. "We cannot," he wrote in one place, "frame right thoughts concerning the Nature and Model of it [Christianity], unless we carefully observe the several Degrees and various Modifications of it before mention'd: for tho there be the same *general Dispensation*, yet there is an Alteration as to the particular Scenes of it." And he proceeded to take to task those "sober and well meaning Persons," fairly numerous in orthodox Protestant circles in the seventeenth century, who, forgetting this, "perswade themselves that there ought to be as to every particular the same Face of Administrations at present that there was at first, and thence they look to the primitive State of the Church, and examine every thing by that." But this is absurd, he thinks, for "there hath been a Change of things in the Christian Church."³⁷ These same assumptions, however, were being put, when Edwards wrote, to much more dangerous uses than this; and it is clear that one of the chief advantages he saw in the idea of a progressive revelation was that it could be used to silence the favorite objection of the deists to belief in the divine origin of Christianity—the objection,

³⁶ II, 774.

³⁷ II, 607-8.

namely, that a religion so far from universal as that, a religion communicated so late in time, could not be from God. The fact of the late coming of Christ ceases to be a difficulty, he urged, reviving an argument at least as old as Augustine, if we consider that it is the method of the Deity to proceed gradually in all things, moving from the imperfect to the perfect, "from lesser to greater Discoveries," and that he must needs do this in his revelations to men since it is also his method to adapt his dispensations to the circumstances of his creatures at any particular time. "Perswade your selves of this, that Christ would have actually appeared sooner . . . if the World had been fit to receive him before."³⁸

III. WILLIAM WORTHINGTON

In spite of the increasing acuteness of the deistic controversy during the early part of the eighteenth century and of the growing popularity of progressivist ideas in secular literature, Edwards would seem to have had no immediate successors in the vein of apologetic he had opened up, and it was apparently not until the middle of the 1740's that the idea of progress was again put to significant uses in the interpretation and defense of revealed religion.

Of the few works published during the interval in which the conception of a progressive unfolding of religious truth played any part, the most important was probably the widely read Temple lectures of Thomas Sherlock, *The use and intent of prophecy in the several ages of the world* (1725).¹ Sherlock's object was to vindicate the prophecies of the Old Testament against the attacks of deists² by showing that they constitute a connected chain, "reaching through several thousand Years, . . . yet manifestly subservient to one and the same Administration of Providence, from Beginning to End";³ that each prophecy was "relative to the State of Religion in the World" at the time it was given;⁴ that with the succession of ages prophecies tended to become "clearer and more distinct" and "more nearly relating to God's great Dispensation of Mercy and Goodness towards Mankind, manifested

³⁸ I, 383. Cf. I, 395-97.

¹ A fourth edition, "corrected and enlarged," appeared in 1744; a sixth edition in 1755. My references are to the first edition.

² He mentions specifically Anthony Collins' *A discourse of the grounds and reasons of the Christian religion* (London, 1724).

³ Preface.

⁴ P. 121. Cf. also pp. 119-20, 158.

by the Revelation of his Son";⁵ and that there is visible, through the whole series of Old Testament prophecies, "a gradual working of Providence towards the Redemption of the World from the Curse of the Fall."⁶ Although Sherlock's perspective was limited to the period before the coming of Christ, and although the elements of progressivism in his thought were rather suggested here and there than fully or systematically expressed, it is evident that the conception of the religious history of mankind encouraged by his book was not greatly different from that which Edwards had sought to disseminate a quarter of a century before. And the resemblance was accentuated by a passage in his fourth lecture in which, apropos of the prophecy of Lamech concerning the removal of the curse on the ground (Gen. 5:29), he took occasion to utter one more protest against the old doctrine of universal decay:

Another Prejudice will arise from the common Notion of the present and past State of the Earth. Instead of seeing any Alteration for the better according to the Prophecy of *Lamech*, Men think they see an Alteration for the worse in every Age: Nature seems to them to be almost spent and worn out, and less able to provide for her Children now than formerly. These are the Sentiments of the present Age, and they were so of those past: We meet with many Reflexions of this Kind in grave and serious Authors: *St. Cyprian*, I remember, complains that Things were sensibly grown worse even in the Compass of his own Time; That the Seasons of the Year were not so pleasant, nor the Fruits of the Earth so delightful and refreshing as he remembered them. I wonder not at his Judgment; for I find myself every Day growing into the same Opinion. The best and the choicest Fruits served up at the Tables of the Great, have no such Relish as those, which they once provided for themselves when they were young: And many there are who can now find but few Days good enough to be abroad, who yet can remember when there were few bad enough to keep them at home. Such Observations therefore as these shew how much Men alter themselves; but they shew nothing else.⁷

Another work of much the same tendency, in which the influence of Sherlock is plainly to be seen, was William Berriman's *The gradual revelation of the Gospel; from the time of man's apostacy* (1733).⁸ For

⁵ P. 119. ⁶ P. 113.

⁷ Pp. 94-95. In the year following the publication of Sherlock's lectures the theory of degeneration was again attacked in Benjamin Ibbot's *Thirty discourses on practical subjects* (London, 1726), II, 18-20. Ibbot, however, like Hakewill, did not believe in progress; the world, he contended, has been much the same in all ages (*ibid.*, pp. 24-26.)

⁸ This work was made up of twenty-four sermons originally delivered as the Boyle lectures for 1730-32. My references are to the reprint in *A defence of natural and revealed religion: being a collection of sermons preached at the lecture founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle, Esq.* (London, 1739), II, 581-784.

Berriman, as for Sherlock, the true meaning of the religious experiences recorded in the Old Testament lay in the fact that they represented a unified but progressively graded series of divine communications culminating after many ages in the Christian Gospel.

At the Time when I had first Notice to prepare for these Lectures [he wrote in his Preface], the most noted Books on the Infidel Side were, *The Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*, and *The Scheme of Literal Prophecy considered*. As the Author of these Pieces aim'd to destroy and ridicule the Christian Interpretation of the ancient Scriptures, this naturally turn'd my Thoughts to state the Evidences of our Religion from the Old Testament; which, I thought, could not be done to more Advantage, than by shewing, . . . that there has been one uniform View of Reveal'd Religion kept up through all Ages and Periods of Time; and this involv'd in greater Obscurity, whilst the Facts to which it related were at greater Distance, but gradually unfolded and explained as the Time drew on for the Accomplishment.⁹

But Berriman, though he reiterated this thesis in several later passages,¹⁰ did not develop its implications. Like Sherlock, he was less interested in expounding a theory of man's religious development than in obviating the objections of freethinkers to use of the Old Testament prophecies as evidence of the truth of Christianity; and though his book was perhaps symptomatic of a growing disposition among theologians to apply progressivist assumptions to biblical history,¹¹ it was not itself a contribution of any great moment to the elaboration of the theme.

The case was far different with two publications which appeared, in close succession, in the middle of the next decade.

The first of these was *An essay on the scheme and conduct, procedure and extent of man's redemption, wherein is shewn from the Holy Scriptures, that this great work is to be accomplished gradually* (1743), by William Worthington, vicar of Blodwel in Shropshire.¹²

Worthington's purpose was twofold. He wished—and here his aims resembled those of Edwards—to contribute to the defense of Christianity against the objections of deists by showing that many of these

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 584.

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, pp. 609, 611, 642, 690, 727, 782.

¹¹ That he shared the anti-primitivism of Sherlock is suggested by the following passage regarding the curse on the ground (*ibid.*, p. 621): "The Curse upon the Ground, that it should bring forth Thorns and Thistles, and yield no Bread to Man without his Sweat and Labour, was doubtless more considerable in the first Ages of the World, before Men had observed the Course and Influences of the Heavens, or found out the best Ways of cultivating and manuring the Earth. But by the gradual Improvements that were made in Husbandry and Tillage, and the Provision of proper Tools and Implements for that purpose, this Toil and Fatigue was greatly mitigated in a natural Way. . . ."

¹² 1703-78. See the notice in the *DNB*.

objections lose their force when Christianity is considered as "in its Nature *progressive* towards a State of greater Perfection, both with Respect to Knowledge, and in all other Respects, as it is presumed it will, from the following Essay, appear to be." For surely no fair-minded person, realizing this, would "look for that from an *imperfect*, which belongs to a *perfect* State, and tho' he does not see all his Scruples removed at present, yet he will not from hence peremptorily conclude that they are unsurmountable, and that they may not possibly be all cleared up hereafter."¹³ But his main concern was not so much with the problem of revealed religion as with that of the natural and moral evils introduced into the world as a result of the Fall; and what he hoped to do was to silence objections to the ways of Providence based on the permission of such evils by demonstrating that it is God's design that they shall be progressively eliminated in the course of the centuries, so that mankind "shall at length arrive at such a Pitch of Proficiency under the Gospel Dispensation, that there shall be no Remains left of Sin or Evil of any kind."

To argue for such a thesis was, he clearly saw, to fly in the face of two still deeply rooted convictions: the belief in universal decay—"the Prejudice which Men in all Ages have against their own Times, and the vulgar Opinion, that the World grows worse and worse, Mankind more degenerate, and the Seasons more unfavourable"—and, among orthodox Christians, the belief in original sin. "I am apprehensive," he declared, "the Supposition will be looked on as such a strange and extravagant Paradox, that to offer any Thing in support of it, will seem like the Preaching of a new Gospel."¹⁴

And yet, for one important class of evils attributable to the Fall, the supposition was already—it seemed obvious to Worthington—in the way of being confirmed. There could be little question, as he attempted to show in a chapter on "the Improvement of the World in its Civil Capacity," that as a result merely of men's own efforts, exerted cumulatively in the course of time, the effects of the curse pronounced by God upon the ground, whereby its original fertility was greatly reduced and the whole face of nature much altered for the worse, had already been mitigated to a considerable extent, at any rate in the more civilized parts of the world, and would in the future be mitigated still

¹³ P. II.¹⁴ Pp. 2-4.

further.¹⁵ Let anyone who doubted this compare the present condition of civilized nations with what we know of the way of living that prevailed in the infancy of the world:

In the first State of Nature, Men differ'd but little from brute Beasts. Roots, Herbs, and Acorns, were their only Dainties: Cloathing they had none, unless, peradventure, it were the Skins of wild Beasts, slain by them in Defence of their Lives; which were daily exposed a Prey, not only to Wolves and Tygers, but to the worser Savages of their own Kind; as they lived without Law, or any other Restraint or Security, but what was placed in each Man's own Strength, or Cunning.¹⁶

Or let him contemplate the vast differences between the lives of his own contemporaries and those led by the first inhabitants of Britain:

Should we be willing to change Conditions with our uncultivated Ancestors of this Island, and live in those Days when Men scarce knew the Use of Cloaths, or of any thing else?—Had nothing to pride themselves in, but the Paint of their Bodies—lived promiscuously in little. . . . Huts—and were confined in their Diet to Milk, and what Animals they could kill in Hunting?

What vast Improvements must have been made in this Country, since the Time it was first conquer'd and civilized by the *Romans*, to bring it to its present State; abounding with all the Necessaries, Conveniences, and Superfluities of Life, cultivated and fertilized in its Soil, . . . adorned with stately Palaces, large Towns, and flourishing Cities; flowing with Wealth; furnish'd with the most valuable Commodities of all the known Parts of the World, and polish'd with every Art that improves, or adorns Life!¹⁷

A striking amelioration, in short, had taken place in the material conditions of men's existence since the Fall—and necessarily so since every succeeding generation "has the Advantage of the fore-going, added to its own Experience; and . . . when the Sons get upon the Fathers Shoulders, they must necessarily see farther. . . ." ¹⁸ To this general betterment various things had contributed—the rise of commerce and regular communication between different peoples;¹⁹ the slow but certain improvement of government;²⁰ the growing refinement in laws;²¹ the spread of the alphabetical writing taught by God to Moses;²² above all, the gradual perfecting of the arts and sciences. Of

¹⁵ Worthington was familiar with Sherlock's discussion of this theme (see above, pp. 293-94), and though he could not agree in all details, he conceded that "his Lordship . . . seems to have the justest Notions of Man's Recovery from the Fall of any Author I have met with" (p. 83).

¹⁶ P. 163.

¹⁷ P. 168.

¹⁸ Pp. 171-73.

¹⁹ Pp. 179-97.

¹⁷ Pp. 169-70.

¹⁹ Pp. 170-71.

²¹ P. 173.

all the means by which men had succeeded in overcoming, at least in part, the physical disabilities resulting from the Fall, this last, Worthington was persuaded, had been by far the most efficacious.

. . . the Curse of the Ground [he wrote] will not be removed for the Sake of Piety and Virtue alone, without the natural Means of Labour and Industry in cultivating the Earth. The Invention of Arts and Implements of Husbandry, and the Improvements which one Age hath made upon another in manuring and tilling the Ground, have undoubtedly render'd the Toil and Work of Men's Hands, less and less burthensome to them. . . .

By the Improvements likewise, which in these latter Ages especially, have been made in *Mechanicks*, a great Part of the Labour of Life, hath been thrown back upon inanimate Matter itself; and by the happy Investigation of the *Laws of Motion*, and a dextrous Application of the *Mechanical Powers*, one Man can now perform with Ease, what hath otherwise surmounted the united Force of many; whereby Nature is in a great Measure made to do her own Work.

And as Nature hath been thus brought in to the Assistance of Men; so Man, by the late Discoveries in natural and experimental Philosophy, and other Sciences, hath learn'd greatly to assist Nature in its Productions; in meliorating the Fruits of the Earth, and improving them to far greater Perfection than in its wild uncultivated State it was capable of bringing them.²³

That progress in acquiring command over nature had been continuous in the past Worthington did not of course assert. Ups and downs there had doubtless been: it was sufficient for his purpose to show that mankind on the whole had made headway against the natural evils which came into the world with the expulsion from Eden; and that, in view of the unprecedented improvements which had taken place of late and which rendered the present age "enlighten'd beyond the Hopes and Imaginations of former Times,"²⁴ there was room for hope of still greater progress in the future.²⁵ And this was enough, he thought, to demonstrate the falsity of the old opinion that the world since the Fall has been in a condition of progressive decay. It is not true that nature grows worse and worse; nor is it true, as others have held, that the generations of men have always remained the same, "still trudging on after another, in the same dull beaten Road, without once attempting to strike out either to the right Hand or left."²⁶ The truth is rather that, by a kind of natural necessity, "one Generation has refined upon another, and every Age has generally added something to the forego-

²³ Pp. 93-94. Cf. pp. 178-79.

²⁴ P. 202.

²⁵ See pp. 231-32.

²⁶ P. 167.

ing, in useful Inventions or Improvements, in order to procure the Necessaries and Conveniencies of Life; to advance or adorn it; and to render it comfortable, easy, and happy."²⁷

In spite of Worthington's apparent belief that he was embarked upon a somewhat daring enterprise, there was nothing particularly new or startling in this part of his argument: he was merely applying to his special purpose views of history which, if not universally accepted in 1743, nevertheless had behind them, as he did not neglect to point out, the authority of many excellent divines and laymen of the preceding century and a half. His conception of the state of nature he justified by a reference to Pufendorf;²⁸ in support of his thesis that the world has not declined he appealed to the testimonies, among others, of Hooker, of Hakewill, of Rampalle, of Bayle, of Sherlock;²⁹ on the theme of the superiority of the moderns to the ancients "especially in Points of natural Discovery and Experience" he was pleased to find Sir Henry Wotton expressing an opinion identical with his own.³⁰

It was not, however, to this aspect of his main problem that Worthington chiefly addressed himself in his *Essay*. What he was interested primarily in demonstrating was a far more novel contention than that of the progressive conquest by man of the material evils and discomforts caused by the Fall; it was the contention that a gradual improvement had also taken place in man's moral and spiritual condition and that the time would come when, even on this earth, all traces of the wickedness and corruption induced by Adam's original disobedience in Eden would disappear from human nature. To put forward such a thesis in a book addressed to the orthodox public of the middle eighteenth century was indeed, as he realized, to preach "a new Gospel."

Yet there were certain general considerations, he thought, which made even this hypothesis seem not altogether absurd. If we observe nature, we learn that all parts of it "are endued with a Principle not only to preserve their State, but to advance it," that, in other words, "every Thing has a Tendency to its own Perfection."³¹ This is a universal law which in the end must be fulfilled in man as in other natures or else we must suppose, what is highly unreasonable, that God does some things in vain. "In a Word, either this World, as it is at present,

²⁷ P. 166. ²⁸ See p. 172. ²⁹ See pp. 94-96, 176-77. ³⁰ See p. 200. ³¹ P. 223.

is capable of being alter'd for the better, and restored to its original Beauty, Order, and Harmony, in all and every Part, or it is not: If not, why is it continued so long in Being? If it be, we have all the Reason in the World to expect, that a good and gracious God will in his good Time bring it to pass."³² Such an expectation, moreover, springs naturally from a consideration of the divine attributes of wisdom and goodness. Is it reasonable to imagine that the Great Contriver could design a drama the conclusion of which should fall short of the beginning? "It must end with universal Applause; but how can it end so, if it ends worse than it began?" Or is it likely that he could exert his power and benevolence to the extent of continuing things in their present state without affording an even greater display of these qualities by effecting a "Melioration"? Surely "he who is Goodness itself will . . . heal all the Maladies and Evils of the World, and convert every Thing into Good."³³ Let men, therefore—Worthington concluded—cease to despair of an eventual recovery from the moral evil which has infected their natures since Adam's sin. Their doubts have no warrant in the reason of things or in the nature of God, and they are, indeed, in a phrase which he quoted from Bacon, so many "fatal Pillars" which have "bounded the Progress" of morals as they have of learning.

As it is more for the Honour of our Nature to think the best of it, so this Principle alone carried into Practice would go a great Way towards proving itself. For many there are who, with a moderate share of Abilities, have by Dint of Resolution and Application, made themselves Masters of Attainments, which at first exceeded their utmost Hopes and Expectations, and which greater Genius's never had the Courage to attempt. And if Men would use the same Diligence in correcting the Depravity and Viciousness of their Natures, as they do in mastering other Difficulties, it would appear how far human Nature were able to go towards Perfection. Discoveries and Improvements have been made in these latter Ages in several Arts and Sciences, which to former Times seem'd as impossible, and as far beyond the Powers of Man, as what I am arguing for can seem to any one now: And no doubt but there are Discoveries reserved for future Ages, of which we at this Time never dream.³⁴

But by what means was this progressive redemption of man to be accomplished? Worthington's explanation was in part a sort of theological equivalent of the theories of "perfectibility" which were to play

³² *Ibid.* ³³ Pp. 226, 228. ³⁴ P. 231.

so conspicuous a rôle in the historical and sociological speculation of the second half of the century. There are in man, he held, certain potentialities of moral improvement which, when aided by divine grace and directed by revelation, may be expected to issue in an ultimate perfecting of human nature. It is a serious error to suppose that even in the beginning man was endowed with all the qualities he was capable of attaining. Great as were the excellencies of Adam before the Fall, he was still a man and therefore not without faults; and had there been no Fall it is certain that he would have continued to improve.³⁵ And the same thing is true of his descendants: deplorable as is their condition, it is not invincibly corrupt, though the difficulties in the path of their advancement are immeasurably greater than before the departure from Eden. For it is also a serious error to think that the doctrine of original sin implies a fixed degree of depravity transmitted through the ages; on the contrary, "this is a State which never actually subsisted any otherwise than as Men by their own Fault relapsed into it, converting, if I may so say, original, into actual Sin. . . ." ³⁶ But it is equally within their power, Worthington insists, to choose good courses rather than evil. Their destiny, indeed, is in their own hands. In proportion as they "improve their Liberty to Good" by exercise, their disposition to evil is diminished, and God's grace in the same proportion is extended to help them; and vice versa. It is of course possible that "all free Agents may suffer their Liberty to Evil, to gain such a Head as to destroy Grace and Liberty to Good; and in infinite Numbers of them, it is not at all strange if many of them will." Worthington, however, prefers to take a melioristic view:

On the other Hand there is a Possibility, that they may all improve their Liberty to Good, and the Grace given them in Aid of it, to that Degree, as to destroy their Liberty to Evil; and there is the highest Degree of Probability, that the Bulk of them at length will. Because it is most reasonable to suppose, that reasonable Creatures, after the continued Experience of the Benefits of Good, and Inconveniencies of Evil, will at last perceive their true Interest, and act accordingly—that after Vibrating for a Time from one Extreme to the other, the Centre of moral Oscillation will at length be fix'd.³⁷

The supernatural revelations of the divine will which have been made throughout history have had as their ruling purpose, Worthington implies, the stimulation of this latent capacity for improvement in

³⁵ See pp. 14-16, 32.

³⁶ P. 50.

³⁷ Pp. 57-59.

fallen men. For that reason, though they have constituted a scheme of redemption "one and the same from the beginning," they have taken different forms in different ages.³⁸ God has ever been impartial in his dispensations; but he has adapted his instructions to the size of men's understandings, "giving them Light and Aid in their Duty, in such Measure and Proportion, as their several Necessities required, and Capacities would admit." In other words, the "Scheme planned out for the Recovery of lapsed Man, consists of a Series of Dispensations, each of which tallied exactly with the Circumstances of the World, at the Time it was made; to every Period of which it was wisely accommodated, and was the best fitted to promote its End, that the Nature of Things would admit. . . ."³⁹ And the order of these dispensations has been a progressive one; the scheme has been "opened and unfolded by Degrees," beginning in obscure hints and "general Intimations given to particular Persons" and gradually becoming clearer and more explicit as time went on.⁴⁰

Guided by these ideas—some of them by no means new in 1743—Worthington undertook to trace the main steps in man's gradual redemption from the antediluvian age to the end of the world. That there had been a general moral improvement up to the present, and especially since the coming of Christianity, he thought certain. Not that the world "the older it grows, grows daily wiser and better"; for various reasons—he mentions specifically man's possession of free will and the continued activity of the devil—progress has been slow and intermittent.⁴¹ During the period which ended in the Flood, indeed, the general movement was a downward one; and even for some time after that event the morals and religion of men remained very imperfect.

Nature was then, as it were, in its Infancy, its Powers weak, its own Stock of Notions low in Kind, and small in Quantity, and its Helps from abroad few and inconsiderable. Little was to be learn'd from former Ages; and supposing *Noah* to have convey'd down all that was worth preserving in the old World, it could not be very considerable, whether we regard the Character or Continuance of it. Revelation likewise was then but beginning to dawn, the Advantages of which, tho' we are now blessed with its Light, we can yet never be fully sensible of, unless we first, with them, had experienced the Want of it.⁴²

³⁸ P. 108. ³⁹ P. 102.

⁴⁰ P. 108. In a footnote Worthington refers his reader to the books by Sherlock and Berriman discussed above (pp. 293-95).

⁴¹ Pp. 108-10. ⁴² P. 102. Cf. pp. 68-70.

It is not surprising that the religion of those times should have been extremely simple, or that God should have enforced his laws "by the Sanctions of temporal Rewards and Punishments only," these being "more suitable to that Age and Season of the World, and more likely to operate upon them, than any Motives fetched from another Life."⁴³ This lack of explicit insistence upon the idea of immortality also characterized the religion promulgated by Moses; it, too, was "an imperfect Dispensation suiting an imperfect State. . . ."⁴⁴ But it was less imperfect than the dispensations that had gone before; and it was followed, in later centuries, by other and more effective efforts at improvement until at length men were prepared for the culminating revelation of Christ.⁴⁵

Progress since then, Worthington admitted, has been far from continuous. "The Way to Perfection," he wrote, "is steep and arduous, and Man ascends it with Difficulty: When he has advanced a little Way he makes a false Step, and is borne down again, and it costs him much Pains and Labour to regain the Ground he has lost. We are as yet got but a little way up the Hill. . . ."⁴⁶ Nevertheless it seemed clear to him that a remarkable advance had taken place both in understanding of Christian doctrines and in practice of Christian precepts. In the apprehension of religious truth as in the attainment of other forms of knowledge later generations necessarily have the advantage of earlier; and so it is not strange that modern divines should be superior in many respects to those of the first ages of the church.

The Fathers of the Church were great Men for the Times they lived in; but they had their Defects and Disadvantages; nor ought it to be thought any Disparagement to them, that they have taught our modern Divines a more judicious Knowledge of the Doctrines of Christianity, than they had themselves. On the contrary, it were strange if the latter, as they have got the Advantage of Ground, could not see a little farther than the former.⁴⁷

But not merely is Christianity more fully understood now than ever before; the world in general, because of its influence, has grown much wiser and better. Even the Roman church, Worthington remarked, is beginning to be ashamed of "some of its grosser Errors." The old per-

⁴³ P. 104.

⁴⁴ P. 119. This of course has been one of the principal contentions of William Warburton's *Divine legation of Moses* (Vol. I [1738]; Vol. II [1741]). Worthington, however, thought that Warburton had set forth his hypothesis in an unnecessarily offensive manner. See p. 116 n.

⁴⁵ See pp. 120-38.

⁴⁶ P. 146.

⁴⁷ Pp. 154-55.

secuting spirit has to a considerable extent moderated among its members, who are also noticeably less ignorant and immoral than in former times. Learning flourishes among them no less than among Protestants. "Many good and pious Books are published by their Clergy; nor are they so scandalous in their Lives as in the Ages preceding the Reformation, but they in general are exemplary in their Behaviour, and afford us Patterns in some Things which we might profit by." Protestants, too, have improved: their religious controversies are now conducted with less acrimony and violence than in the early days of the Reformation; a general spirit of charity and moderation is perceptible among them; and the flourishing of charity schools and religious societies in recent years testifies to their heightened zeal for the promotion of piety and virtue.⁴⁸

Christianity, and by virtue of it human nature, are, then, Worthington believed, in "a growing, progressive State," destined to advance toward perfection by gradual steps.⁴⁹ In describing the culminating stage of this progress in the future, he adopted a view of the chronological place of the millennium and of its distinguishing characteristics very similar to that of Edwards:

... the millennial State is none other than this: When the Power of Satan shall be restrained from deceiving the Nations, and Antichrist shall be destroyed; so that neither the Idolatries and Impieties of the Church of Rome, nor the Impostures of Mahomet shall any longer obstruct the Reception of Christianity. Then both *Jews* and *Gentiles* shall flow into the Church, and enjoy great Peace, Plenty, and all manner of outward Prosperity; as well as be endued with great Knowledge and Righteousness, and all other spiritual Gifts and Graces; and in this happy State shall reign, during the Time specified, under the special Guidance and Direction; the influential, tho' not personal Presence of Christ, their Head.⁵⁰

In short, the millennium, in which human nature will be at length purified from the disposition to evil which it derived from the Fall, will precede, and not follow, the second coming of Christ. And it will be an era distinguished not only by great piety and moral rectitude but also by superlative ease and security of living. The original compulsion on man to labor in the sweat of his brow in the midst of an exacting nature will at last be entirely abrogated:

... we see many at present exempted from it, who know nothing of Hardship or Want, but live in Ease, Affluence and Plenty, and feel little of any ex-

⁴⁸ Pp. 156-58.

⁴⁹ Pp. 306-7.

⁵⁰ Pp. 336-37. Cf. above, pp. 289-90.

ternal Inconveniences, having Ways and Means to guard and shelter themselves from them: And the Labour of Life becomes in every Age easier to those that are actually engaged in it. . . .

And when Nature shall be entirely delivered from its Bondage, such will its Freedom, Bounty, and Sufficiency of all Things be, that the most laborious Employments of Life will be rather a Pleasure than Toil, neither shall Mankind know what Want, or Hardship of any Kind, means. . . .⁴¹

And this will lead to a feeling of security in the things of the world that is largely unknown at present, and this in turn to a cessation of social strife:

. . . as every one by this Means will have enough to satisfy all the reasonable Demands of Nature, so neither will any one's Desires be so immoderate as to covet more. The Boundaries of Right and Wrong will be better adjusted, Justice better regarded, and Property better distinguished, and a more just Value put upon it; whereby in a Manner all the Contentions that are in the World will be dropt and dye away.⁴²

Worthington's speculations about the future moral and religious state of mankind were not entirely free, it is true, from survivals of a much older type of historical philosophy than that upon which his book as a whole was based. In spite of the fact that he pictured the millennium, not as a wholly new dispensation, supernaturally inaugurated, but simply as the culminating phase of an upward movement that had been going on since the Fall, and in spite of the fact that he conceived of the millennial age itself as, at least in some domains, an epoch of continuing progress,⁴³ he nevertheless persisted in looking upon this final period, in its relation to the whole of human history, as a return to an earlier state, a complete restoration of the world to the "Beauty, Order, and Harmony" which had prevailed for a short time in the beginning. "He who has the Reins of the World's Government in his Hands," he wrote, "will undoubtedly guide it at length into its right Course, and *improve it to the perfect Model after which he at first framed it.*"⁴⁴ And he devoted a chapter to showing that this view was substantially identical with the opinions of the ancients, Jews, heathens, and Christians, with regard to "the future Restoration and Renovation of the World": Virgil, he pointed out, had expressed it when he prophesied the return of the Golden Age;⁴⁵ Plato had had it in mind in

⁴¹ P. 406.

⁴² See, e.g., pp. 408-10.

⁴³ Pp. 214-15.

⁴⁴ P. 407.

⁴⁵ P. 228. The italics are mine.

his theory of the "great Year";⁵⁶ it was clearly foreshadowed in the millennarian doctrines of the early church.⁵⁷

Yet for all this lapse at the end into a conception of the time process that was essentially incongruous with his earlier progressivism, Worthington deserves a prominent place in the history of the conceptions of man's religious and moral development with which we are here concerned. His *Essay* dealt one more blow, and a particularly vigorous one, at the already much-battered theory of universal degeneration; it gave fresh emphasis to the growing belief that later times are bound to be superior on the whole to earlier, not only in knowledge of nature and mechanical skill, but also in spiritual insight and moral excellence; and it brought into new relief the fundamentally anti-deistic doctrine that God's revelations have necessarily—and fortunately—been adapted, in each stage of human progress, to changing circumstances and needs.

The influence of the *Essay* was clearly visible, along with that of Edwards' much earlier *Compleat history*, in a book by another progressivist clergyman—by far the most important in the series—which followed it in 1745.

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[To be concluded]

⁵⁶ Pp. 216-17.

⁵⁷ Pp. 217-18.

BOOK REVIEWS

The drama of the medieval church. By KARL YOUNG. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933. 2 vols. Pp. xxii+708; 611 (24 illus.).

It is very refreshing in these days of hasty publication to meet with a work which is the fruit of years of profound research and unhurried thinking.

Although Mr. Young's previous publications had covered almost every portion of the wide field, the present volumes do not consist of reprints of his former articles. Not only are there significant differences in the modes of presentation—though few changes in fundamental views—there are also in almost every chapter valuable additional information and penetrating comment. Moreover, the earlier articles were composed primarily with a view to the demands of the scholar—indeed, to the demands of the specialist in this particular field—whereas in the new volumes Mr. Young, though in no degree sacrificing the demands of the scholar for full and accurate information, has obviously kept steadily in mind the reader whose interests are primarily in the large movements of human culture rather than the details of such movements. Although he disclaims any intention to provide another general account of the subject, Mr. Young actually gives a survey more intelligible, because better documented, better arranged, and more skilfully expounded than any preceding history of the drama of the Middle Ages. The student of literature who knows little or no Latin—it is a disgrace to American colleges that we have so many with such a handicap—need not fear to enter Mr. Young's treasure-house. Although the Latin is not translated, each text is accompanied by a commentary outlining the action and discussing its significant features. Even such masterly works as those of Creizenach and Chambers suffered somewhat in clearness and intelligibility to the general reader because, owing to limitations of space, they were unaccompanied by the texts under discussion. Mr. Young, while of course not attempting a complete corpus of medieval religious plays—nearly two hundred and fifty texts of the *Visit to the Sepulchre* alone have been brought to light—has neglected no form of significant variant; even those puzzling liturgical pieces which possess dramatic traits but never actually developed into drama receive due consideration. The most interesting of such texts are printed in full with such information about their place in the church services, mode of production, origins, and later history as justify the opinion of competent students of the drama concerning them. To all these bounties Mr. Young has added what many a teacher of advanced courses in the liturgical drama has long desired; namely, an account of the services of the medieval church designed to make

intelligible to the non-Catholic reader the precise relation of these services to the dramatic elements which developed in connection with them. However well informed on this subject a teacher may be, he finds it difficult to explain it to a class of non-Catholics without placing before them at least an outline of the mass and the services of matins and vespers. In recent years this problem has been solved for me by leaflets provided by priests who happened at the time to be members of my class. In his exposition of this subject Mr. Young has done well to exclude discussion of the history and the aesthetic and spiritual significance of the services. Only by omitting these features was the necessary simplification possible, and, as Mr. Young rightly points out, charming expositions of these subjects are easily accessible.

The wealth of these volumes can best be displayed by a general survey of their contents. Volume I is divided into three main sections. The first discusses the liturgy of the Church of Rome, describing and explaining on the basis of chosen texts the services of the mass and the canonical hours. These chapters make clear to the student the general structure of these services, the positions and character of the parts which vary from day to day through the liturgical year, and the reason why certain portions were more suitable to receive permitted but unofficial elaborations. The second section deals more precisely with some of these elaborations and with certain special services having a more or less dramatic quality. In chapter iii, "The dramatic element in the liturgy," Mr. Young demonstrates the correctness of the view long held by well-informed scholars that despite its profound significance as a symbolic action of dramatic quality the mass never developed into the drama, nor, indeed, ever became anything but the mass. Lovers of symbolism have often been misled in this respect by such analogies as the symbolic Thibetan drama and the general structural similarity between the mass and Greek tragedy. The other three chapters of this section deal with the semi-dramatic ceremonies of the Burial of the Cross (*Depositio* and *Elevatio crucis*) and the Harrowing of Hell, and with the nature of the dramatic and non-dramatic excrescences called "tropes," in which the actual origins of the liturgical drama are to be found. The third section (completing Vol. I) is devoted entirely to plays associated with the Resurrection and the Passion, tracing them from their origins in the dramatic trope of the Introit of the Easter mass through the various stages of the Visit to the Sepulchre, and including the plays which cluster around this primitive nucleus—The Journey to Emmaus, The Ascension, the Pentecostal Descent of the Holy Spirit, and The Passion Play, properly so called. Volume II devotes six chapters to the plays associated with the Nativity; dealing with the Visits of the Shepherds and the Magi, The Slaughter of the Innocents, the Procession of the Prophets, and the highly developed Christmas play of Benediktbeuern, in which all of these elements are combined into a unitary theme and action. Five other chapters deal with plays upon other subjects from the Bible and from legends: xxii, plays from the New Testament (The Raising of Lazarus; The Conversion of St. Paul);

xxiv, plays of the Blessed Virgin (Her Presentation in the Temple, The Annunciation, The Purification, The Assumption); xxv, plays on subjects from the Old Testament (Isaac and Rebecca, Joseph and His Brethren, Daniel); xxvi, miracle plays of St. Nicholas; xxvii, plays on subjects from Eschatology (The Wise and Foolish Virgins, Antichrist). Appendixes deal with such interesting subjects as the Easter Sepulchre, The Shrewsbury Fragments (that interesting manuscript giving the speeches and cues of a single actor in plays presented in a church but obviously representing a transitional form, not only between Latin and the vernacular, but between ecclesiastical and secular performances), Extracts from Writings of Reformers, and Miscellaneous Records. Both volumes contain notes, to which Mr. Young has wisely relegated controversial and bibliographical discussions. The second volume closes with an imposing list of authorities consulted (pp. 544-62) and a subject index of forty-nine pages which makes it easy to find not only the main discussion of each subject but related material occurring in the discussion of other topics.

Of the manner in which Mr. Young has conceived and executed the difficult task of editing his texts, it is impossible to speak too highly. He has been minutely accurate, without disfiguring his texts by useless indication of the expansions of contractions which are quite as definite in meaning as if every letter were written out in full. The student of language may perhaps wish that such spellings as *hunice* (*unice*), *magnus*, and *Marija* (which undoubtedly represent actual pronunciations) had been consistently preserved, but even he will find that in such texts as the Daniel and St. Nicholas plays spellings which show the medieval pronunciation of *c*, *sc*, *x*, and *ti* have been duly recorded in footnotes: *cuniuns*, *coniuns* (*coniunx*), 279, 326; *didiscimus* (*didicimus*), 282; *iuxit* (*iussit*), 286; *contio* (*concio*), 290, 292, etc.; *anctius* (*anxius*), *ausilium* (*auxilium*), *ancieta* (*anxietas*), *depocimus* (*deposcimus*), 312; *possis* (*poscis*), 326.

We have always had confidence in the accuracy of Mr. Young's texts, but in reading his discussions of the *Daniel* of Beauvais and the Hildesheim *St. Nicholas* plays I thought it would be interesting to check his text with photographs obtained many years ago for a volume of representative Latin plays which I planned but abandoned upon learning that Mr. Young intended to include these plays in his volume. The *Daniel* manuscript (British Museum, Egerton 2615) is beautifully written and very accurate. The Hildesheim plays, on the other hand, are scribbled in two pages of a cheap notebook.¹ I found no errors in the reproduction of the Beauvais manuscript and, despite the smallness and crabbedness of the writing, no real error in the Hildesheim

¹ The little book is made up, in part at least, of leaves cut down from a larger book written in a fine large hand, traces of which are clearly visible on fols. 1r and 3r. The present contents, in a small current hand with many contractions, filling fols. 1-8, suggest a student's notebook: 1r-3r, medicinal properties of herbs; 3v and 4r, the two St. Nicholas plays, 4v, nearly a whole page on logic (*analectica syllogistica*); 4v, six lines from foot to 8v, fourteen lines from top, a treatise on the Abacus; the rest of 8v (twenty-eight lines) reverts to the medical material. The only evidence of care is in the diagrams for operations with the Abacus.

text. In page 312, line 15, the scribe had written *meiserum*, but the first *e* is underdotted for deletion; in page 314, line 74, the scribe wrote *inopine*, but *n* is underdotted; in page 325, line 16, the scribe had begun to write *fessos*, but after writing *fe* stopped, because a flaw in the manuscript prevented him from writing the long *ss* properly, and then began again and wrote the whole word. These matters are, of course, of no possible value for the establishment of text, and no notice of them would be expected if Mr. Young had not sometimes noticed similar features.

Mr. Young, like earlier editors, is puzzled by the words and letters which come between the two plays in the Hildesheim manuscript (cf. II, 314, n. 3.) In a review one may perhaps be permitted to make the wild suggestion that the first two combinations (*Gror' gpe*) are scribal errors for what was in his original intended to represent *graciarum ergo preconia*, the first words of the stanza of the Daughters after the arrival of the purse of gold in the related play of the Fleury manuscript (II, 316-21). This would certainly give to the Hildesheim play an ending slightly less abrupt than the present one. The remaining words seem, as Professor Young suggests, to belong to the following play (*Tres clerici*). I see no reason why they may not be taken as the greeting of the clerks and part of the response of the innkeeper:

(Clerici:) Hospes, gaudeto pacemque salutis habeto!

Responsio Hospitis: Vobis letisiam Deus eximiam. . . .

At the beginning of the next line, before the letters *oflie*, occurs a space as if for the insertion of a capital. A similar space is left at the beginning of lines 6-7 on folio 5r.

Of the Fleury play of *Tres filie* (which is certainly, as Mr. Young notes, closely related to the Hildesheim play) one may remark that the opening lament is more artistically composed than previous editors have recognized. It is carefully organized in three stanzas of four lines each (1-4, 5-8, 10-13), with single lines between the lament of the father and the daughters and at the end of the lament of the daughters (ll. 9, 14). Lines 9 and 14 appear not to be spoken by the daughters but to be comments by someone else, perhaps the director of the play. It is even possible that the editors are wrong in assigning any of these lines to the father and daughters and that they are all intended as a prologue to be spoken by the director. This suggestion may carry with it a better emendation of line 11, but I am unable to supply it.

In discussing the Fleury play Mr. Young (p. 322, n. 1), remarks that the father addresses to each of the three daughters the same lament, with the reservation in the note that "he repeats at least two or three stanzas and possibly all three." It seems clear that the lament contains three stanzas when addressed to all three daughters, two stanzas when two daughters remain, and one when only one daughter remains.

The careful artifice shown in many of these early plays should not be overlooked, for it indicates the care and in a certain sense the skill of the writers.

That the plays are often lacking in dramatic quality is to be explained, in part at least, by two considerations: one is that the medieval world had not yet developed a sense for drama as distinguished from spectacle and musical entertainment; the other is that however much skill a medieval writer may have had in non-dramatic composition, he had little opportunity to gain the experience necessary for the development of a sense of dramatic effect and the means of securing it. A few writers of the Middle Ages seem to have been born with this dramatic sense and skill, for example, Adam de la Halle and the Wakefield genius, but it was not until the advent of audiences constantly demanding new plays and supporting them by their presence that dramatic authors, even of fine native talents, could obtain the experience necessary for the full development of their powers.

As one considers in a single view certain rudimentary forms of the liturgical drama in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and the elaborate prosodic and musical structures of the *Daniel* plays of Hilarius and the young men of Beauvais and the Tegernsee *Antichrist* and contrasts the *naïveté* of the *St. Nicholas* of Hilarius with the dignity and splendor of his *Daniel*, and especially when one reads the diatribe of Gerhoh von Reichersberg (1093-1164) against the plays of his own time, one cannot fail to be impressed with the fact that the simplicity of a dramatic text is no safe indication of the stage of development that the liturgical drama had reached at that date. Other elements enter into the determination of its character and length: the skill and experience of the individual writer, his conception of what would be appropriate to the occasion, the conservatism of his ecclesiastical superiors and the amount of time and space they are willing to allow for the innovating insertion, etc., etc. To judge from the *Daniel* plays and the *Antichrist*, either plays that were not so closely connected with the liturgy had achieved at this early date a fuller development than the Easter, Christmas, and Epiphany plays or the longer forms of the latter types were not copied into liturgical books and so have failed to come down to us. In any event, it is clear that the brief *officia* stood the best chance of being incorporated into liturgical manuscripts and thus of being preserved; and that a vastly larger number of somewhat elaborate plays were produced in these early centuries than have been preserved to us. And the same observation holds good for vernacular plays of later periods: it is highly improbable that the secular plays of Adam de la Halle were unique phenomena in thirteenth-century France. But interesting and even necessary as such inferences are, Mr. Young's duty was obviously to ignore them and confine his survey to the jetsam that the waters of time have cast on our shores.

There are, as Mr. Young indicates from time to time, many important problems in the history of the drama still awaiting the properly equipped student. The one that appeals to me most is the music of the tropes, the later *officia*, and the less strictly liturgical plays. Many years ago I had a student,

well equipped in both linguistic and musical training, who began this work. With the aid of the late H. M. Bannister (one of Mr. Young's early mentors), he produced a very interesting study of the music of some of the Easter Tropes. But unfortunately that was a time when few traveling fellowships were available, and his own funds enabled him to work in European libraries for only one year. So the promising research had to be abandoned. But it is certain that such a study would show differences of musical affiliations in groups of tropes identical in text, would provide a thread of relationship (slender though it might sometimes be) between developing forms, and by the differences between liturgical and secular music throw additional light upon some of the later plays and scenes.

American scholarship may well be congratulated on Mr. Young's fine work—*monumentum aere perennius*—and the Clarendon Press upon the worthy form in which it has produced it. The twenty-four unsurpassable illustrations add greatly to both the beauty of the volumes and their value to the scholar.

Outside of England the publisher is Humphrey Milford.

JOHN M. MANLY

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Les Vers de Thibaud de Marly. Par HERBERT KING STONE. Paris: Droz, 1932. Pp. 186.

The editor spent many years in Paris in a painstaking attempt to solve the many difficult problems confronting him. His work was received with highest honors as a dissertation for the Doctorat de l'Université and was awarded second prize in the Honoré Chavée competition.¹

The main theme of the *Vers* is an indictment of worldly pursuits and a homily on the Last Judgment, with a detailed account of a *danse macabre*. A lengthy introduction offers a description of the manuscripts, a study of the author's style, a summary of the literature on Thibaud de Marly, the historical facts as to the date of composition (between 1173 and 1189), an analysis of the contents, and an investigation of the sources.

Only in the case of sources does the present reviewer consider the treatment inadequate. It should be noted that Chabaneau's edition of *Le roman de St. Fanuel et de St. Anne et de Nostre Dame et de Nostre Seigneur et de ses apostres* is a composite text.² Paul Meyer contended that *Le roman de St. Fanuel et de St. Anne* (a poem of the same length as the *Vers*) belongs to the thirteenth century, while the rest of the edition (ll. 852-3971) contains a legend composed at the end of the twelfth century.³ Consequently one is sur-

¹ *Journal des savants* (March, 1933), p. 90.

² Chabaneau himself (*Rev. lang. rom.*, XXVIII [1885], 119) suspected that there were two distinct poems, but Stone (page 144) treats the work as a single poem.

³ *Hist. lit. de la France*, XXXIII (1906), 349 and 355.

prised to find them offered as a source for Thibaud de Marly. It is possible that the analogies between *Fanuel* and the *Vers* derive from a common source.

This sermon is preserved in three manuscripts: A (B.N. 25405), B (B.N. 1850), and C (Lambeth Palace 522). Since they are all more or less defective, the paleographical method adopted is somewhat subjective. The text is based on A with constant reference to B, while C is given on the left side of the page in a quasi-diplomatic reproduction. One is willing to concede that the edition of C by Reinsch, published fifty-four years ago, is *presque totalement inintelligible* and that the punctuation is abominable. Dr. Stone's reproduction of C offers no punctuation at all, not even the apostrophe; it capitalizes the initial letter in each line, but not proper names; it fails to distinguish between *c* and *ç*, final *e* and *é*, *i* and *j*, *u* and *v*, etc. Would it have been contrary to paleographical tenets to make such typographical signs as need not be explained in the variants?

On page 34 Dr. Stone enumerates the most flagrant errors of Reinsch, but his corrections are not always evident. Reinsch did not print *le demant* (24) but *le dement*, and not *crestient* (34) but *crestien(t)*. *Seyt e* (126) should be changed to *sey(n)te*. *Le conte Real* (199) is given faultily by both editors. In writing *contredie* (403), Reinsch was influenced by the assonance of the tenth *laisse*. Line 457 is quoted inaccurately from both editions, and *agard* (461) is repeated by Dr. Stone. Reinsch did not print *ciel* (499) for *cel*; both texts have *cil* twice. Perhaps *trocs* (570) is a misreading for *crocs* rather than *crots*. *Leuve de vre* (571) does not indicate that Reinsch's *l'eue de ure* refers to the water of the Eure River. *Muure* (582) was not given for *mutire* but for *mu(t)ure*. Reinsch did not read *suen li fussent* (629) but *li suen fussent*, while *seure* (631) is repeated instead of being emended to *sevré*. Although the version C has been published twice, any attempt to use it without the proper means of control will remain quite ineffectual.

Professor Jeanroy has already pointed out some of the unnecessary emendations in the text.⁴ In four cases the notes given by way of justification are not convincing. *Affolez* (410 of B) had various meanings other than *mutilé* and can remain.⁵ *Qui maint poure mercie* (418) was intended by the scribe of A to denote *à qui maint pauvre rend grâces*. *Avera* (785 of A) need not be modernized; under the idiom *avoir mestier à quelqu'un*, Godefroy cites appositely line 4393 of Ogier de Danemarche:

Fix Namon estes le vaillant consillier,
Qui m'a eu en plusors leus mestier.

Avoier (812 of B), treated by Godefroy as a *hapax legomenon* in the sense of *vider*, should also be preserved.⁶

⁴ *Romania*, LVIII (1932), 446. See Langfors, *Neuph. Mitt.*, XXXIV (1933), 206.

⁵ Cf. E. Gamillscheg, *Ztschr. frs. Spr. und Lit.*, LVII (1933), 256. Modern *affoler* corresponds to *rendre comme fou*.

⁶ The note refers to the 1854 and 1891 editions of the *Mystère d'Adam*. Grass revised it and Studer republished it in 1928; cf. Breuer, *Ztschr. rom. Phil.*, LII (1932), 1-44.

In the notes three terms need further explanation. On *entreprendre* (292), compare *Le jeu de St. Nicolas*, line 1175. In note 507 reference may be made to *l'autre, le reste du*, in *Le bel inconnu*, line 4567, and *La fille du Comte de Pontieu*, II, line 733. Examples of *cuiture* (599) in the sense of *pus* are listed by Brandin, *Romania*, XXX (1901), 131, and Loss, *Modern language notes*, XL (1925), 158.

The present edition, despite certain imperfections, offers a valuable contribution to the literary background of Thibaud de Marly and to the interpretation of the *Vers*. The subject presented numerous problems, which Dr. Stone has usually solved with rare acumen.

RAPHAEL LEVY

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Der Sabbath in England: Wesen und Entwicklung des englischen Sonntags. By MAX LEVY. ("Kölner anglistische Arbeiten," Vol. XVIII.) Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1933. Pp. 297.

It is now over seventy years since J. A. Hessey in his Bampton lectures outlined the history of Sabbatarianism in general and English Sunday observance in particular. A more modern survey of the movement was needed, and Dr. Levy's work supplies this demand. Beginning with a section on the origins of seventh-day observance in the ancient world, he passes to England and devotes a long chapter to the history of the institution in pre-Reformation times. The bulk of the work is devoted to an account of the struggle over the Puritan ideal of Sabbath observance which reached its climax in the Commonwealth period. But the author rightly concludes by pointing out that, in spite of the apparent failure at the Restoration, this feature of the Puritan program survived the party's defeat and in the next century rooted itself so firmly in the popular conscience that its hold has only recently begun to weaken.

The author considers the Jewish Sabbath—which he asserts to be more joyous than is popularly supposed—an institution which should be incorporated in all human society. Recognition of the importance of the principle of rhythm and the observance of a regularly recurring day are suggested as means to enable the modern man to clarify his confused thinking and attain the higher things of life. The Puritan Sabbath was an improvement on the medieval and Continental one because it had in it more of the Jewish element. However, it failed because it grounded itself in Calvinism and primitive tabooism rather than in a popular ideal. Accepting Weber's hypothesis of the Puritans' tendency to glorify the works of one's calling, the author thinks that they practiced Sabbatarian rigorism because it rendered them more fit to perform their week-day work. With the increase of leisure, owing to the

mechanization of industry, such practices are no longer necessary and religion is losing its hold.

The work suffers from a tendency to insert long excerpts from sources and to be content with descriptions rather than analyses of the contents of books noted. It frequently seems, therefore, that the theory advanced and the facts adduced, supposedly to support it, have little connection. The treatment of Weber's hypothesis is a case in point, and this is the more to be regretted inasmuch as the famous theory is a highly controversial one and by no means to be accepted without proof. Similarly, a suggestion which is undoubtedly sound, that the Puritan Sabbatarian attitude was in essence merely an expansion of the medieval Catholic one, could have been better substantiated by an analysis of those Tudor and Stuart works which portray the Sabbath as practically another sacrament. "Days and so likewise bread and wine are not more holy of themselves, one than another, but because they be separated and set apart for holy uses," said the first formulator of the Puritan doctrine on this subject. Had Dr. Levy chanced to discover that this person was the youthful Lancelot Andrewes (see *Church history*, II [1933], 195-204), he would probably not have devoted so much space to Nicholas Bownde, who merely expanded on the ideas of the greater scholar. But for all that he has provided us with a very useful work.

M. M. KNAPPEN

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Goldsmith and his booksellers. By ELIZABETH EATON KENT. ("Cornell Studies in English," Vol. XX.) Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press; London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1933. Pp. xiv+119.

The author establishes the interesting fact that the bookseller, Ralph Griffiths, received his American degree, not from the University of Pennsylvania, as has been asserted, but from Dartmouth College on August 25, 1790, probably in return—as she shows from President Wheelock's "manuscript account of his 'tour in Europe relative to the prosperity of Dartmouth College'"—for Griffiths' courtesies to the president of the college in England. Yet, aside from this, Miss Kent shows little acquaintance with the responsibilities of research. The work consists of five chapters, written in a readable style, the first of which treats briefly and inconclusively of "Goldsmith's Observations on the Trade," and the rest of which are devoted to discursive biographical sketches of six of Goldsmith's booksellers (Griffiths, R. and J. Dodsley, Newbery, Davies, and Griffin). Miss Kent neither attempts a synthesis of the details, which she draws largely from very obvious sources, nor does she subject this secondary material to a sufficiently thorough critical analysis. In this latter respect, as also in the matter of Goldsmith's bibliog-

raphy, she is handicapped from the start by her failure to consult any of the modern learned periodicals, in a number of which, if she had turned only to the annual bibliographies in the *Philological Quarterly*, she would have found studies of Goldsmith which she could not afford to neglect. But she is far too trusting even of the authorities which lay before her.

The consequences of Miss Kent's uncritical use of sources are perhaps most unfortunate in her sketch of Ralph Griffiths, where, having noted that the special severity of the biographers toward the bookseller began with Forster (p. 20), she fails to sift the evidence—she should certainly have analyzed independently all of the reviews of Goldsmith's works in the *Monthly Review*—and she virtually accepts Forster's view of the relationship between Griffiths and Goldsmith. One specific example of her method must suffice. I quote from the paragraphs preceding and following Goldsmith's frantic letter to Griffiths in January, 1759 (taken unaccountably by Miss Kent from Forster rather than from Miss Balderston, to whom she refers in an adjoining paragraph), and which is the nucleus of their final "quarrel." Miss Kent writes:

... during the last of 1757 and 1758 Goldsmith wrote for *The Critical Review*, which had been waging a war of bitter and stinging words with *The Monthly Review*. Archibald Hamilton . . . "realized the value of Griffiths' cast off hack-writer" [reference to Forster] and gave him an advance for reviews of three "school-master translations of Ovid," as Goldsmith called them. This alliance with the enemy may have made Griffiths susceptible to the idea of winning Goldsmith back into his camp, or, at least, his articles into *The Monthly*.¹ At any rate, when Goldsmith, . . . disappointed in the failure of the Coromandel adventure,² applied to Griffiths later in 1758, the latter agreed in return for four articles to appear in the December *Monthly* . . . to become security to a tailor for a new suit [note to the effect that Goldsmith failed his examination for hospital mate on December 21, 1758] to clothe the shabby author. Goldsmith, promising either to return the suit of clothes or to discharge the debt over and above the articles within a certain time, took the four volumes to be reviewed home with him to Green Arbor Court. Griffiths and the tailor fulfilled their part of the transaction, and the reviews appeared, but Goldsmith had evidently lost track of the passage of time. When unfortunately Goldsmith's landlord was put into jail for debt, and his wife appealed to Goldsmith for aid, the fact that it was Christmas Day and that she was weeping was too much for Goldsmith. He pawned the suit, raised a further small loan on Griffiths' four books, and made his landlord's family happy. . . .³

The letter appears to have touched Griffiths sufficiently to induce him to trust

¹ Miss Kent follows Forster into error here. There are no attributions to Goldsmith in the *Critical Review* between November, 1757, and January, 1759. We have, therefore, no evidence that Griffiths was competing with Hamilton for Goldsmith's services in 1758. Incidentally, only two of the reviews attributed to him have to do with translations.

² Goldsmith, as Miss Kent should have noticed in Balderston (*Collected Letters*, pp. xxx-xxxiii, 57), did not give up hopes of going to Coromandel until about March, 1759.

³ Miss Kent should have noticed that the story of the Christmas Day appeal does not appear in Prior, and that Forster gives no authority for it.

Goldsmith again and to save him from the debtors' prison. Griffiths contracted with him to write . . . a *Life of Voltaire*. . . .⁴ Nor did this quite end the dealings between them, as Goldsmith's early biographers assumed. Toward the end of 1760 Goldsmith translated for Griffiths *The Memoirs of My Lady B* . . . [reference to Balderston, *Collected Letters of Oliver Goldsmith* [1928], p. 68 n.]. No account of the financial transaction is available.⁵

The account of the matter should go something like this:

Goldsmith, having secured from the East India Company the post of physician, hoped to earn his passage to India as a hospital mate aboard a man-of-war. Probably with a view to presenting a respectable appearance at his examination, he appealed to Griffiths for credit with a tailor. As far as we know he appealed to his former employer solely on the grounds of friendship, and he may even have explained his plans exactly. Prior (*Life of Oliver Goldsmith*, M.B. [1837], I, 284) writes: ". . . but an intimation was given that he had obtained, or expected to obtain, a situation in the army, which without an appropriate dress to appear in might be withheld." Having received the credit he asked for, and having failed his examination, he indulged in some transactions not wholly orthodox (Goldsmith in his letter admits having been guilty of "meanessess") which prevented him from meeting his obligations. It is not unlikely that Griffiths was annoyed; an English business man can hardly be expected to grasp such an Irish distinction as this. Goldsmith wrote in his letter, "Your books I can assure you are neither pawn'd nor sold, but in the custody of a friend from whom my necessities oblig'd me to borrow some money, . . ." Griffiths is supposed by the biographers not only to have broken off relations with Goldsmith at this time, but, as Miss Kent says, to have pursued him "through the pages of *The Monthly Review* . . . even after Goldsmith's death." Miss Balderston has shown (see above, Miss Kent's text and my n. 5) that even after Kenrick's personal attack (November, 1759) in his review of the *Enquiry* (and surely Kenrick needed no instructions from Griffiths to attack anyone), Goldsmith did a translation from the French for Griffiths.

Quite probably Goldsmith's admirers, and even Goldsmith himself, have been unfair to the bookseller. Miss Kent has missed an excellent chance to review the whole question of the relations between the two men. It should be added that Miss Kent is inaccurate in the matter of Goldsmith's bibliography.

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⁴ As Griffiths had contracted for this work some time before (Balderston, p. 63 n.), it had nothing to do with this transaction.

⁵ The work is attributed to Goldsmith on the basis of a receipt for ten pounds, ten shillings. Miss Kent fails to see the full significance of Miss Balderston's note.

Die Schulkomödien des Paters Franciszek Bohomolec S. J. By AD. STENDER-PETERSEN. Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1923. Pp. xix+430+12.

Tragoediae sacrae: Materialien und Beiträge zur Geschichte der polnisch-lateinischen Jesuitendramatik der Frühzeit. By AD. STENDER-PETERSEN. ("Acta et Commentationes Universitatis Tartuensis [Dorpatensis]," Band XXV, 1.) Tartu (Dorpat), 1931. Pp. x+279.

Franciszek Bohomolec was professor of rhetoric in the Jesuit College in Warsaw from 1752 until the time of the expulsion of his order from Poland. The duties of his position included the annual preparation and supervision of a dramatic performance by the students under his charge. The comedies which Bohomolec wrote for this purpose, twenty-five in number, were published in five volumes between 1755 and 1760. These comedies Professor Stender-Petersen analyzes with meticulous care from the points of view of their relation to the European Jesuit drama, to the Latin, particularly the Plautine comedy, to the Italian, French, and Danish comedy, and finally to the later development of the drama in Poland.

It is only natural that these comedies, written for the moral uplift of the young, the edification of an untutored audience, and *ad maiorem dei gloriam*, should lay but little claim to literary excellence. A conscientious critic might even deplore the expenditure of Professor Stender-Petersen's time, energy, and ability on a writer who produced scarcely an original line, whose products are a grotesque hodgepodge borrowed from Plautus, Molière, Corneille, Goldoni, Holberg, and the *commedia dell' arte*. On the other hand, it must be admitted that Bohomolec by his introduction into Poland of foreign materials became the father of the modern Polish comedy and that the later, more successful dramatists, Zablocki, Krasicki, Niemcewicz, and Czartoryski, followed the trail which he had blazed. Viewed in the light of literary history, Bohomolec therefore becomes an object of interest, worthy of the time, effort, and ability of any scholar.

As research in the field of literature advances it is becoming constantly more evident that no literary or literary-historical subject, no matter what its character, can be considered insignificant when it is viewed as a historical problem and when its treatment will contribute to a clearer understanding of a literary type or movement. It is high time that scholarship should rid itself of the sterile belief that only the truly prominent persons and problems are worthy of investigation and that objects of apparently secondary nature deserve only superficial treatment or none at all. There can be no doubt that investigation of the upper reaches of literature without a previous sounding of the depths and survey of the background is purely illusory. It is axiomatic that only the existence of an extensive body of subliterate writing makes lit-

erary masterpieces possible and that the roots of the latter are firmly imbedded in the former.

In themselves the *Tragoediae sacrae*, the theme of the second of the volumes under discussion, are even less significant than the works of Bohomolec. They are dramas, anonymous for the most part, which were produced in the Jesuit colleges at Posen, Lublin, and Wilna between 1597 and 1624. These have been preserved in manuscript, Codex Upsaliensis R 380, a volume too extensive for reproduction. Professor Stender-Petersen gives us a careful analysis of the content of each of the dramas along with a discussion of the sources and of their literary relations. His work is a valuable contribution to the knowledge of the Jesuit drama, a literary type which flourished in all the countries of Europe over a period of almost three centuries. Bound by the rigid rules of the order, the Jesuit drama followed identical lines of development in all parts of Europe, modified only slightly by national influences. As a result it is one of the stabilizing factors in the development of the European drama since it exerted a similar influence in all countries.

The treatment of the material in both of Professor Stender-Petersen's books is above criticism. It is exhaustive, precise, and clear. Conclusions are drawn only after the presentation of a wealth of evidence. Particularly in the matter of determination of sources the author never permits his judgment to be clouded by the most tempting analogies. In every respect these books are splendid examples of a high type of literary research.

GUSTAVE O. ARLT

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BRIEFER MENTION

William O. Wehrle, in *The macaronic hymn tradition in mediaeval English literature* (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1933; pp. xxxvii + 186), after a brief treatment of the origin of the type seeks to justify the application of the term "macaronic" to a large number of poems containing mixtures of English, French, and Latin. Brief chapters on "The Old English period," "The thirteenth century," and "The fourteenth century" are followed by longer chapters on "The fifteenth century" and "Lydgate and Ryman." The poems are divided into thirteen types according to the placing of the "macaronic" elements. Though the work seems to be satisfactorily done, a few questionable matters and a few bibliographical omissions seem worthy of attention. Did Lactantius write the Latin *Phoenix* (p. 2) and Cynewulf the Anglo-Saxon *Phoenix* (p. 6)? Dr. Wehrle's treatment of the "Anglo-Norman drinking song" (pp. 19-27) would have profited by the use of Eero Ilvonen, *Parodies de thèmes pieux dans la poésie française du Moyen Age* (Helsingfors, 1914) and the critical edition of Gaston Paris (*Romania*, XXI, 262). Carleton Brown, *English lyrics of the XIIIth century*, no doubt, appeared too late to be used. Joseph Bédier, *Les fabliaux*, and Francesco Novati, "La parodia sacra nelle letteratura moderne" (*Studi critici e letterari* [Torino, 1889]), would have been useful. The article on macaronic poetry in Paul Merker and Wolfgang Stammers, *Reallexikon der deutschen Literaturgeschichte*, Band II (Berlin, 1926-28), is valuable for bibliography.—MILLETT HENSHAW.

The first number of a new series, "Methuen's Old English library," edited by A. H. Smith and F. Norman, appeared recently. It is a booklet of sixty-four pages, entitled *Three Northumbrian poems, Cædmon's Hymn, Bede's Death song and the Leiden riddle*, and is edited by Dr. A. H. Smith. Though the editing of these texts is uncompromisingly scholarly, with exact details about manuscripts, variant readings and dialect, a general preface to the series indicates that these small books are intended for undergraduates—an idea that will seem nearly incredible to American readers. The present volume is a miracle of completeness and condensation. Not only are all three texts based on direct study of the main manuscripts (or photographs of them), but that of the Leiden riddle offers new contributions to our knowledge since the editor was able to examine the manuscript with ultra-violet light and thus to determine some hitherto disputed readings. The price of the booklet is two shillings.—J. R. H.

Students of Old English are indebted to Professor Johannes Hoops for his *Kommentar zum Beowulf* published in Heidelberg by Carl Winter late last year. In a volume of 343 pages Professor Hoops is able to give, as he says, a more detailed comment on the textual problems of the poem than any edition could do. As the notes include not only original views of the author but his judgments on the interpretations of other scholars, the reader has the pleasure of seeing the whole mass of *Beowulf* exegesis pass through the mind of an expert whose attitude is unbiased and in the best sense judicial. Of course it would be easy to dispute some judgments, but impertinent to do so because Hoops was under no obligation to present ideas with which he does not agree. The actual carrying-out of the design could not be improved, as the discussion is always clear, exact, and as full as needed, and the bibliographical references are precise. For the study of *Beowulf* we have never had anything comparable to this manual.—J. R. H.

A list of the works of Professor Federico Olivero of Turin, prefixed to his *Beowulf* (Torino: Edizioni dell' "erma"), suggests an extraordinary range of interest and knowledge, as it includes essays on English literature, studies on romanticism, an edition of Shelley and Keats, and volumes on Hardy, Francis Thompson, and Poe as well as translations of *Pearl* and *Andreas and the Fates of the apostles*. The *Beowulf* provides Italian students with a survey of modern scholarship on the poem. In an introduction of 141 pages the author gives an account of the manuscript and surveys the views on its date and origin, the Christian elements, mythical and historical elements, the poem's reflection of the arts of its time, its use of nature, its meter and style. Throughout this discussion one finds none of the old-fashioned views on mythological interpretation or lay origin. The author is perhaps a bit too conservative in accepting the occurrence of the names Beowa and Grendel in ancient deeds as evidence of popular origin of the story of *Beowulf*, but in general he reflects the progressive views of the best English and German scholars. On the other hand, the introduction contains, as far as I have observed, no new views or suggestions. Following the introduction, the book presents the Anglo-Saxon text of Wyatt-Chambers, with a literal translation into Italian on opposite pages, textual and bibliographical notes, and an index. The lack of notes on the interpretation of difficult passages, and of a glossary, seems singular.—J. R. H.

In a recent Hamburg doctoral dissertation August Goedecke discusses the expression of emotion in the Icelandic family sagas (*Die Darstellung der Gemütsbewegungen in der isländischen Familiensaga*, "Nordische Brücke, deutsche Studien zur nordischen Sprach-, Literatur- und Kulturgeschichte," Nr. I [Hamburg: Friedrichsen, de Gruyter & Co., 1933]; pp. 62). In spite of the fact that his study takes its start in the unscholarly characterization of the "Germanic man" now popular in Germany, it is a useful contribution to the

study of saga style. The words *mikilmaðr* and *litilmaðr* (p. 11) do not exist; Goedecke should have written *mikilmenni* and *litilmenni*. His study auspiciously begins a new series of monographs on Scandinavian subjects.—C. N. GOULD.

In a recent monograph (*Sæmund Sigfússon and the Oddaverjar*, "Islandica," Vol. XXII [Ithaca: Cornell University Library]; pp. 52) Halldor Hermannsson discusses the family and particularly the famous Sæmund and his relations to Snorri Sturluson. He tries to determine how the latter acquired his knowledge for his treatises on Old Norse mythology, the name of which, *Edda*, is explained, in accordance with Björn of Skardsá and Eiríkr Magnússon, as derived from the place-name Oddi. He thinks it possible that Snorri during his stay at Oddi in the winter of 1222-23 completed this work by making use of material that was only available there, and that he presented the family of Oddi with a manuscript, possibly even the original manuscript of his *Edda*. Here he may have found likewise a copy of the poetic *Edda* and a collection of skaldic poems (viz., *Ynglingatal*). The prologue to the prose *Edda* is most likely written by Snorri himself. The publication, interesting by several digressions in the domain of Icelandic literature, closes with a short discussion of the part which Sæmund Sigfússon plays in Icelandic folklore. His profound learning, and especially his thorough knowledge of the traditions from heathen times, made him appear, in the eyes of his contemporaries, as a sorcerer who had been during his stay in France the fervent scholar of a Black school.—J. DE VRIES.

By general agreement *Eger and Grime* is one of the best medieval romances in English and therefore the new edition by J. R. Caldwell (*Eger and Grime*, "Harvard Studies in comparative literature," Vol. IX [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933]; pp. viii+353) is altogether welcome. He reprints the text in the Percy folio and parallel to it a new version found in the Huntington Library. This new version, which proves to be the immediate source of the Aberdeen edition of 1711 (reprinted by David Laing; Caldwell records the variants), does not throw much new light on the problems of the romance. Caldwell's introduction discusses the allusions to the romance, the relations of the texts, the ballad parallels, the linguistic evidence in the rhymes, and the sources and analogues in tale and tradition. The last two subjects are new contributions to our knowledge of *Eger and Grime*, while the preceding matter rephrases effectively what was already known. I hope to examine elsewhere the linguistic evidence in the rhymes and consequently stop only to comment on the method of arriving at the conclusion that the romance was written in Central or Northeastern Scotland. Since both texts are more or less altered and re-written—P shows English peculiarities and HL dates from shortly before 1711, by which time the language had changed somewhat—we

dare not draw conclusions from rhymes found in a single text. Only the rhymes common to both texts can give reliable information about the parent-text; e.g., *liwand* (living): *land* (HL, ll. 33-34 = P, ll. 27-28) proves that the parent-text was Scottish. Caldwell's reflections on the sources and analogues are very interesting. He holds (p. 154) that *Eger and Grime* derives from a specifically Scottish variation of the very ancient "Two brothers tale" (Grimm, *Kinder- und Hausmärchen*, No. 60; cf. No. 85; Aarne-Thompson, No. 303). This observation is very ingenious. He discusses at length the structure of the "Two brothers tale," but unfortunately limits himself to comparatively few versions—the Scottish texts and the version in the *Kinder- und Hausmärchen*—and to the critical remarks in Jacob Grimm's notes of 1822, although the literature is very extensive (see Taylor, "Die zwei Brüder," *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Märchens*, I [Berlin, 1930-33], cols. 338-40). The decomposition of the "Two brothers tale" into two independent tales must be supported by arguments too far reaching to be presented in the preface to an edition of a romance or combated in such a notice as this. Consider, for example, whether "The giant killer," the first component of the "Two brothers tale" and a tale of the Andromeda type, should end unhappily (Caldwell, p. 87). If we decompose the "Two brothers tale" into two parts, we can readily suppose that the first part ends with the happy and uneventful marriage (Caldwell's ninth incident), for such an ending accords with what we know of *märchen* style. Caldwell's tenth incident is, as he observes, duplicated by the first incident in the second part. He argues that this similarity led to the combination of two originally distinct stories. It is, furthermore, uncertain whether the Andromeda incident belongs to the "Two brothers tale," but discussion of that point will lead us far afield. The old comparison of the *Vol-sungasaga* (taken from Grimm's notes of 1822) should be studied in the light of recent investigations of the Siegfried story. Caldwell's examination of similarities between *Eger and Grime* and Celtic tradition is interesting and is supplied with useful notes. To the remarks on blood-brotherhood add Jan de Vries, "Der altnordische Rasengang," *Acta philologica Scandinavica*, III (1928-29), 106-35; Beth, "Bruder," *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens*, I, cols. 1665-68. J. Siuts (*Jenseitsmotive im deutschen Volksmärchen* ["Teutonia," XIX (Leipzig, 1911)]) and H. R. Patch ("Some elements in mediaeval descriptions of the Otherworld," *PMLA*, XXXIII [1918], 601-43) add something to the remarks on the topography of the Other World. The Harvard University Press gives us a beautifully prepared edition of an important romance and Caldwell raises questions which need further study. Scholars will thank them both.—A. T.

The importance of medieval French song is obvious. A good study of a characteristic theme of medieval French song is therefore a very welcome addition to our knowledge. Rudolf Dähne (*Die Lieder der Maumariée seit dem*

Mittelalter ["Romanistische Arbeiten," No. 20 (Halle: Niemeyer, 1933); pp. xii+203; 6 pp. music]) compiles an exhaustive list of medieval texts of songs describing an unhappily married woman, examines them briefly, and then discusses at length their relation to the very numerous modern French songs of the same type. He deals with the question of origins and more cursorily with international relations. English parallels are noted (pp. 13-14) as well as Provençal and Italian. German analogues are not mentioned, although the comparison of the "Bettelmannshochzeit" (Böckel, *Psychologie der Volksdichtung* [2d ed.; Leipzig, 1913], p. 324) with the theme of the "Dot ridicule" (Dähne, p. 21) might lead to interesting results. The importance of Dähne's essay lies in the complete characterization of a type of song. He supplies abundant illustrative materials and draws largely on the little-studied French songbooks of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is interesting to observe that the search for origins in classical Latin verse is now yielding place to the search for origins in popular song. W. P. Jones has recently dealt with the *pastourelle* in somewhat the same way as Dähne deals with his subject, and a comparison of the two books would be instructive to the student. A clue which Dähne does not follow far (see the six pages of supplement) is the effort to identify medieval peculiarities in the modern melodies. The point is interesting and difficult. Dähne surveys a large part of the printed texts of French folk song. The later comers will have the task of supplementing his results by examination of the important manuscript collections of French folk song, e.g., the collection in the Bibliothèque Nationale (a copy in Harvard College Library), Rossat's French Swiss songs, and Barbeau's French-Canadian songs. Comparisons with analogous songs in other countries will rise on the firm foundation which Dähne lays.—A. T.

The Huntington Library has now added to its important series of rare books reproduced in facsimile *Mary of Nimmegen* from its unique copy of the only English edition—the translation published at Antwerp about 1518-19 by Jan van Doesborgh (Harvard University Press, 1932). As in the whole series, the utmost care has been taken to secure accurate reproduction, so that the black-letter type and the interesting cuts are, on the whole, uniform in appearance. The short introduction by Professors H. M. Ayres and A. J. Barnouw gives succinctly the known facts in regard to the edition and the story, with references to the more important discussions of the history of the story. The story itself is extant only in this book and in a miracle play in Dutch published at practically the same time. Thus the facsimile is of exceptional interest for the student both of early printing and of storiology.—C.R.B.

Dramatic Documents from the Elizabethan Playhouses: Stage Plots; Actors' Parts; Prompt Books by W. W. Greg (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931) consists of two volumes—one of "Reproductions and Transcripts" and another of

"Commentary" on the documents assembled, with some illustrative reproductions. The first is of ample-enough dimensions to include photographic and type reproductions in the original size (1) of all the extant play plots, (2) of the surviving sheets from Alleyn's title-rôle of *Orlando furioso*, and (3) of select sheets from manuscript prompt books. Tables showing the distribution of parts to the actors in the stage plots are added. As regards the play plots and actors' rôles, the "Commentary" represents a practically exhaustive study. Comments in note form deal fully with characters in the plots, the career of actors, habits of scribes, etc. Constructive essays discuss actors' rôles, characteristics of Elizabethan stage plots, the known facts in regard to the extant specimens, and the evidence furnished by them as to plays and companies. In this work culminate investigations of all the problems concerned which have extended over more than two decades. The chief documents were first published by Dr. Greg in *Henslowe Papers* in 1907, and have since been discussed by him in articles and in the notable *Two Elizabethan Stage Abridgements*. The importance of this final synthesis of his long labors is not likely to be exaggerated. As a result of the detailed evidence massed here and of the careful study given it, logical solutions are furnished for many vexing problems, and the material is skilfully used for its bearing on the history of the different companies of players that had relations with Henslowe at the end of the sixteenth century. With this masterly knowledge of the extant stage documents of the period around 1600, Dr. Greg passes to a survey of the prompt books—nearly all documents of a somewhat later period. As he conceives it, his "task is only to collect and order the material" for a study of "the textual and theatrical characteristics of the prompt copies and other related manuscripts" (p. 195). Hence he reprints in the "Commentary" all the stage directions from each of the manuscript plays that gives any evidence of being a prompt copy of any type. His essay on the "General Characteristics" of these prompt books furnishes a valuable introduction to the subject. In spite of this and other recent essays on prompt books, however, the study is possibly just beginning in earnest. The stage directions of printed plays need to be studied more carefully in the light of these documents, and perhaps new material may become available, like the prompt copy of *A Looking Glass for London and England* described by the reviewer in *Modern Philology* for August, 1932. Nevertheless, Dr. Greg is probably correct in speaking of the documents reprinted in the two volumes as giving "a framework to which must conform all valid conjecture, concerning the textual phenomena and history of the Elizabethan drama" (p. xi).—C.R.B.

A paternal concern for the manners and morals of its American colonists caused the Spanish crown to place an embargo on the export of all works of fiction. The earliest legislation on this subject dates from April 4, 1531. Liter-

ary historians have too lightly assumed that in consequence Latin America suffered a dearth of fiction. Spanish ingenuity in evading the law and the very iteration of royal pragmatics should have suggested the contrary. Irving A. Leonard, in *Romances of chivalry in the Spanish Indies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1933), has made an interesting investigation of this matter. The records of the *Casa de contratación* have been for the most part preserved at Seville in the Archives of the Indies. The ship manifests and bills of lading were itemized to such an extent that the title of each book, the author's name, and the price are all carefully listed.

The conclusion reached is that "almost every outbound vessel, if we may judge by the records of nearly two centuries, bore its cargo of 'libros de entretenimiento' as well as the more serious literature to while away the ample leisure of the privileged classes of colonial society." The New World was reading and importing in large quantities precisely the same books which were popular in the home country. The publication of many itemized bills of lading makes this statement assured.

The Mexican scholar Icaza has objected that the shipment of books does not prove that they reached their destination. On the contrary, he thinks that these shipments were confiscated and destroyed by the port authorities. Mr. Leonard has no such touching faith in the incorruptibility of political appointees. He very reasonably objects that Spanish booksellers would have discontinued exports if their consignments were failing to get through. Why, then, is South America such an ungrateful field for the collector of old books? The answer seems to be that books of entertainment were rapidly read to pieces while theological disquisitions and doctoral dissertations better withstood the ravages of time. Mr. Leonard's study contains much detailed information of value to the historian of literature.—G. T. N.

Port Royal is a subject of inexhaustible interest. Miss Ruth Clark, in her *Strangers & sojourners at Port Royal, being an account of the connections between the British Isles and the Jansenists of France and Holland* (Cambridge: At the University Press; New York: Macmillan Co., 1932; pp. xix+360), has added to the extensive literature on it an admirable account of the connections between Jansenism and the British Isles, which have heretofore been so little known as to have been thought negligible. By unremitting industry and skillful research she has brought to light a surprising amount of precise information, very largely from manuscript sources. She modestly calls her volume "honest spadework." It is a great deal more than that; it is really an intimate picture of Jansenism from a novel point of view. It is a procession of personalities of all degrees of obscurity and greatness. One may read here an amusing and strange tale—pathetic in its close—of the mysterious English gardener at Port Royal. One may also catch glimpses of the life at the St. Germaines

court of the exiled James II, who read Jansenist books by special dispensation of the Archbishop of Paris, although his queen, Mary of Modena, ever close to Mme de Maintenon in these matters, felt an orthodox horror of the heresy. One may see how in the last sad years of the great Arnauld his misfortunes were multiplied because of the unfortunate destinies of the exiled James II. But it is impossible to suggest by allusion the wealth of information packed into this volume. The excellent index runs to fifty-six pages.

As the title indicates, Miss Clark has limited her study largely to the biographical and anecdotal aspects of history. She has touched only casually on such subjects as the extent of Jansenist influence on English religious thought and feeling in the eighteenth century, or the reception of Pascal's *Pensées* in England. Nevertheless this volume has placed all future students of such subjects heavily in her debt.—LOUIS I. BREDVOLD.

Professor W. D. MacClintock in *Joseph Warton's Essay on Pope: A History of the Five Editions* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1933) gives us a very concise, plain, and useful account of the facts surrounding one of the more interesting pieces of eighteenth-century criticism. This *Essay*, as the facts here assembled show, was certainly about the best received and probably (apart from editions) the most widely diffused comment on Pope's work printed before 1800. It is, however, in its relation to the theory of poetry rather than in its relation to Pope that it continues to excite interest. In the pre-romantic period there were naturally various types of writers dissatisfied with the procedure of neo-classical criticism. Some (like the early church reformers) wished to reform neo-classicism from within the cult; a very few possibly wished to destroy the cult; still others, uninterested in dogmas that they regarded as outworn, passed more or less consciously into new and essentially, though not always obviously, hostile traditions. Clearly Joseph Warton is one of the first type—the reformer who remains within the cult. His essential theoretic function is to remind rash laudators of Pope's work of the difference (a commonplace in neo-classicism) between the "higher" poetry (epic, tragedy, the great ode) and the "lesser" poetry (elegiac, didactic, satiric, pastoral, etc.). In his essay on Vergil's *Georgics* Warton shows no inherent opposition to didactic poetry; and in his comment on Pope he is simply putting didacticism in its proper subordinate place among poetic values, and is reaffirming the neo-classic faith in the invention, sublimity, and pathos of the greater genres. The origin of the theoretic side of the *Essay* seems to come fully as much from the desire to make such reaffirmations as from Warton's conviction (alleged by MacClintock, p. 5) that "Pope was not one of the greatest English poets." After all, at the end of his work Warton (*Essay* [ed. 1806], II, 404) placed Pope fourth in his ranking of the English poets, below only Spenser, Shakespeare, and Milton. There is no reason to think this placing insincere: in the genres Pope affected he was in Warton's opinion superlative; but the genres

themselves were second rate. The primitivism of *The Enthusiast*, the critical judgments favoring particularity in descriptions, and possibly a few observations on the imagination make Warton seem hardly neo-classic; for the most part, however, he certainly aims to reform the cult from within.

While Professor MacClintock, like most writers on Warton, tends to exaggerate his author's importance in romantic tendency, Warton's interest is undoubted, and this assemblage of the discoverable facts about the history of the *Essay* is most welcome.—G. S.

O. W. Long, in his *Thomas Jefferson and George Ticknor, a chapter in American scholarship* (Williamstown, Mass.: Privately printed, 1933), has consulted manuscript material relating to both Ticknor and Jefferson and adds not a little to the material available in print. Ticknor first visited Jefferson at Monticello in 1815 and maintained an active correspondence with the aged statesman for a decade. Jefferson, always devoted to scholarship, was delighted to know an American youth with scholarly ideals, a *rara avis* in 1815. Ticknor sailed for Europe armed with many letters of introduction to notables of the time. In return for these favors rendered by Jefferson, Ticknor aided him in the purchase of texts of the classics. Textual criticism was a new science, and the eagerness which Jefferson expresses to obtain the latest editions by Voss, Heyne, Wolf, and others is a singular testimony to his intellectual curiosity.

One would like to quote in full Ticknor's enthusiastic comments on the free atmosphere of a German university. At present, when the old *Lehrfreiheit* is threatened, such testimonies of the past are valuable. Ticknor's dream was to bring free learning to free America. In a letter to Jefferson preserved in the Congressional Library he writes: "I am exceedingly anxious to have this spirit of pursuing all literary studies philosophically—of making scholarship as little of drudgery and mechanism as possible transplanted into the United States, in whose free and liberal soil I think it would, at once, find congenial nourishment."

This dream was rudely shattered when Ticknor endeavored to change a provincial college into a continental university, fifty years in advance of the times. The later correspondence between the two friends deals chiefly with educational matters relating to the proposed reformation of Harvard and the foundation of the University of Virginia. Perhaps Jefferson never expressed more forcibly his faith in the eighteenth-century doctrine of human perfectibility than in a letter of sympathy addressed to Ticknor: "I am sorry to hear of the schism within the walls of Harvard, yet I do not wonder at it. You have a good deal among you of ecclesiastical leaven. The spirit of that order is to fear and oppose all change stigmatizing it under the name of innovation, and not considering that all improvement is innovation, and that without innovation we should still have been inhabitants of the forest, brutes among brutes.

Patience, pressure, as unremitting as gravity itself can alone urge man on to the happiness of which he is capable."

The original faculty of the University of Virginia was largely of Ticknor's choosing. Both friends believed that in the lack of American scholars specialists should be imported from Europe. John Adams, who feared the "ecclesiastical heaven" even more than Jefferson, writes in protest: "Your University is a noble experiment in your old age, and your ardor for its success does you honour. But I do not approve of your sending to Europe for Tutors and Professors. I do believe there are sufficient scholars in America to fill your Professorships and Tutorships with more active ingenuity and independent minds than you can bring from Europe. The Europeans are all deeply tainted with prejudices, both Ecclesiastical and Temporal, which they can never get rid of. They are infected with Episcopal and Presbyterian creeds, and confession of faith. They all believe that great principle, which has produced this boundless Universe, Newton's Universe, and Hershell's Universe, came down to this little Ball to be spit upon by Jews; and until this awful blasphemy is got rid of, there never will be any liberal science in the world."

Temptation to quote further must be resisted. Mr. Long, besides evidencing industrious research, possesses the skill to present his material attractively. His study should be read by all interested in the history of American scholarship and education.—G. T. N.

Marcel Moraud's *Le romantisme français en Angleterre de 1814 à 1848* (Paris: Librairie ancienne Honoré Champion, 1933; pp. 475) is the biography of a national attitude through its years of infancy, adolescence, and early maturity. Professor Moraud, while obviously utilizing all previous literature of any importance upon the subject, has based his study principally upon the accounts, descriptions, treatises, diaries, and correspondence of English visitors to France during the period in question. One acquires the conviction, while reading the book, that nothing has been overlooked which an eager seeker could find. It is done throughout with an unflagging patience, and the explanations of certain vicissitudes which overtook this attitude in the course of its development are presented with the utmost candor and impartiality.

The work consists of four principal sections whose titles suggest the stages of the evolution which the author has traced so painstakingly:

I. *L'Angleterre et les débuts du romantisme français (1814-1820)*. It is the period during which English curiosity is directed toward political and moral rather than literary conditions. For this section see also Professor Moraud's *Thèse supplémentaire: La France de la Restauration d'après les visiteurs anglais* (Paris: Librairie ancienne Honoré Champion, 1933; pp. 196).

II. *La découverte du romantisme (1820-1832)*. Traces the rise of a more sympathetic disposition, hampered, however, by the difficulty of reconciling

the new French romanticism with the prevalent conception of French classicism.

III. *Résistances que notre littérature romantique soulève en Angleterre (1832-1839)*. The motives for these *résistances* are shown to have been due largely to political and moral considerations.

IV. *Réhabilitation et influence (1836-1848)*. English critics adopt a more favorable attitude toward French poets and novelists. The French romantic drama makes its influence felt—notably in the work of Bulwer Lytton. Balzac is “utilized” and George Sand makes a profound impression upon George Eliot and arouses the enthusiasm of Matthew Arnold.

One leaves the book with the comforting feeling that it is, as far as such a work can be, definitive. A great mass of documentary evidence has been digested and presented with such skill that the thing to be demonstrated seems to rise inevitably before the reader's eyes. The only thing to be deplored is the printing and proofreading, which is carelessly done and quite unworthy of such a book.—COLBERT SEARLES.

Another German study of Carlyle's relation to Romantic Germany now appears in Karl Lotter's *Carlyle und die deutsche Romantik* (Nürnberg, 1931; pp. 78). It presents in a brief but graceful and intelligent way the general nature and extent of Carlyle's indebtedness to Kant, Goethe, Fichte, and Novalis. Making no pretension to exhaustiveness, it thus omits the minor German contributions to Carlyle's thought, e.g., Schelling's doctrine of organism; Schiller's concept of nature as hieroglyphic, and of history and great men as revelations of spirit; and Richter's theory of history as *die dritte Bibel*. Jacobi and the Schlegels receive adequate consideration within the dimensions of the study as a whole. The customary German exaggeration of Teutonic influences is conspicuously absent, except for the statement that “nicht bloss wegen der metaphysischen Spekulationen, sondern vor allem weil er Bildungsroman, ist der Sartor ein deutscher Roman in englischer Sprache” (pp. 19-20). Debatable points are handled deftly, and only one factual error creeps into the discussion, namely, that Carlyle read *Faust* at the age of nineteen (p. 14), instead of at twenty-five, or in 1820, as we learn in the Carlyle-Goethe correspondence. Dr. Lotter's main thesis is that the one great informing doctrine which Carlyle drew from the Germans was the doctrine of *Offenbarung*. Novalis' contribution from the standpoint of his own *magischer Idealismus* is neatly and shrewdly stated. Moreover, following Hensel, to whose memory the study is dedicated, the author emphasizes Carlyle's essentially *pantheistic* point of view, in which the pantheism of Goethe is reconciled with Carlyle's ingrained love of the transcendent (pp. 49-50). Whether Novalis played as great a part in this fusion as Dr. Lotter maintains may be open to question. On the whole, however, the study is an admirable short survey of a difficult field, and contains frequent penetrating observations in plain phrasing, such

as the following on Carlyle's misunderstanding of Kant: "Carlyle hält die Kritik der reinen Vernunft für eine psychologische . . . Untersuchung" (p. 26). In the end, the subject is left properly balanced, with Carlyle fundamentally indebted to Goethe not only for his Weltanschauung but also for his reverence for great men, and for his exaltation of action, or work ("Im Anfang war die Tat," quotes Dr. Lotter from *Faust I*). The study terminates with the quotation of Goethe's *Symbolum*, and with the recognition of Goethe's general significance for Carlyle: "Gerade dadurch, dass sich der Ewigkeitstrieb mit dem Symbol bescheidet, wird das Leben Goethes und von ihm aus auch das Carlyles ein Leben in Ehrfurcht, werden die unscheinbarsten Beziehungen und Tätigkeiten in Ewigkeitsglanz getaucht, wird Endlichkeitsdienst Gottesdienst."—C. F. HARROLD.

The specific project in Henry Ladd's *The Victorian Morality of Art* (New York: Ray Long & Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1932; pp. xii+418) is named in its subtitle, *An Analysis of Ruskin's Esthetic*. As such it is, surprisingly, the first complete and intelligent outline to appear, antedated only by M. Joseph Mil-sand's pioneer and tentative study of 1864, *L'Esthétique anglaise*, and by slight digests in Edward T. Cook's *Studies in Ruskin* (1895) and in Mrs. Meynell's *John Ruskin* (1900). Although it may disappoint those who hope for a full justification of its more pretentious label, Ladd's book is not wholly mistitled. He employs the word "Victorian" throughout in a sense more accurate than recent parody of the age permits. Ruskin's writings on art are provided the setting without which they would appear even more than the "monster" which Mr. Ladd at the outset admits them to be, and are not forced into an unwarranted representativeness for their period. They are temperately related to such general principles of nineteenth-century criticism as "naturalist sentiment," "sanctions," "esthetic responsibility," "piety," and "high seriousness." However, the attention paid to these standards, as well as to the eighteenth-century and Romantic traditions, is suggestive rather than consistent, and descriptive rather than critical. It is as a long-needed guide to Ruskin's histories and criticisms themselves, from *Modern Painters* and *The Stones of Venice* to *Praeterita*, that this volume will find a deserved popularity.

Comment on its shortcomings must be qualified by admitting the two obstacles that have discouraged Mr. Ladd's predecessors: the heated luxuriance and moral dogmatism of Ruskin's work itself, and the fragmentary state of scholarship on English aesthetic ideas and systems. These Mr. Ladd has not entirely overcome. His recognition of the first difficulty (together with his mingled contempt and enthusiasm for his subject) has not always enabled him to clarify his issues. Ruskin is described as opposing both the "classical formalism" and the "empirical tendencies" of the eighteenth century with

an aesthetic dogma that derives from the entire ethical and social temper of his age. The scale of his work is appalling, but Mr. Ladd, in facing its religious, economic, and moral implications, has barely defined his limitations and purposes as an analyst. His work might have profited by greater concision, even if it meant sacrificing the larger historical significance of Ruskin's theories. (His handling of poetic ideas is well proportioned; the influence of popular movements in art is largely—and even unduly—ruled out.) Moreover, in supplying a background for his discussion, Mr. Ladd has simplified the aesthetic doctrines of men like Kames, Burke, Blake, Coleridge, and Hazlitt in a way applicable only to writers of less intellectual ballast, like Alison, Guilpin, Price, Knight, and Lauder. And he has needlessly complicated his task by entering still a third field—the aesthetic controversies of the twentieth century, especially in the last chapter where “Ruskin's contributions” and “unsettled questions” are debated. The philosophical enthusiasm of the twentieth century, with its multiplicity of aesthetic creeds, has outstripped the investigation of historical (particularly English) traditions. Mr. Ladd's ambition to correct both the excess and the negligence has invited confusions which touch the complex central analysis to which he has committed himself.

It is doubtless foolish to wish that he had made his task easier by ignoring its dangers, and thus perpetuating the meager scholarship on his subject. His wide and thoughtful reading is everywhere apparent, and in spurring the exploration of the backgrounds of his volume, he performs a service beyond that with which readers of Ruskin are now, for the first time, provided. He has made a notable addition to the work of students like Neff, Brown, Everett, and Peterson in defining the ideas of the major Victorian writers, and has written one of the most important of recent studies of this period.—MORTON DAUWEN ZABEL.

The period covered by Dillwyn F. Ratcliff in his *Venezuelan prose fiction* (New York: Instituto de las Españas, 1933) is from the middle of the nineteenth century to 1928. At the outset of the epoch studied Romanticism seems to be giving way to Costumbrismo, a movement which had preceded Romanticism in the mother-country. Next the influence of the Peruvian Ricardo Palma becomes very evident. Palma had set the fashion of basing short stories on the traditions and legends of the national past. A group of Venezuelan writers arose to do for their country what Palma had done for Peru, though with far less talent. Out of Costumbrismo next developed Criollismo, with its greater fidelity to local color, character, and dialect. Most of these Creole novels interest the foreign reader by the novelty of their matter. The best of them are highly artistic.

More recent writers are rather loosely lumped together as belonging to the Modernismo movement. Modernism is of course chiefly associated with poet-

ry; but the prestige of Rubén Darío and his school inevitably influenced novelists in South America as it did Valle-Inclán and others in Spain. Prose becomes more colorful and harmonious. Style is all-important. Special chapters are devoted to such outstanding writers as José Rafael Pocaterra, Rufino Blanco-Fombona, and Teresa de la Parra. Blanco-Fombona's Balzacian novel, *El hombre de hierro*, easily ranks as the greatest of all South American novels.

Mr. Ratcliff's method is to analyze in detail each of the short stories and novels studied, telling the plot and citing significant passages. This method, while making his book valuable for reference, makes it also difficult reading. He has most disarmingly met this criticism in his preface, assuring his reader that if he had been discussing *Hamlet* or "The three little bears" he would not have paused to tell the story. He is dealing throughout with a group of writers whose very names are unfamiliar to most cultured readers. Nothing can be taken for granted. For that reason gratitude is due Mr. Ratcliff for his pioneering zeal. He has written a most useful guidebook to a region unfamiliar to many of us.—G. T. N.

Our knowledge of the French proverb is enlarged by Walter Gottschalk's *Die sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der französischen Sprache; ein Beitrag zur französischen Stilistik, Kultur- und Wesenskunde* ("Sammlung romanischer elementar- und Handbücher," IV. Reihe: "Kulturgeschichte," Nr. 2 [Heidelberg, 1930]); 2 vols.; pp. x+548). This admirable work will serve as a historical dictionary of French proverbs comparable to K. F. W. Wander's *Deutsches Sprichwörterlexikon* (Leipzig, 1867-80) and G. L. Apperson's *English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases* (London, 1929). Such a collection of French proverbs has long been much desired, since nothing at all comparable has ever been compiled. So far as casual tests of the contents and accuracy go, Gottschalk has done his task well. In arrangement his collection differs from the English and German collections: the one is according to subject, the others according to the significant catchword. Gottschalk provides, however, a satisfactory index of catchwords and thus makes reference easy.

Gottschalk's collection derives from two sources: earlier collections of proverbs, notably those by Leroux de Lincy and Quitard, and excerpts from literary monuments, particularly the comedies of Molière. Of course the gathering of proverbs directly from works of literature is an extremely laborious undertaking and one, moreover, which has been neglected in French philological studies. Fortunately, he has included that seventeenth-century farrago of proverbs, A. de Montluc's *La Comédie des proverbes*. By way of criticism of his sources one might say that he has not utilized early collections of proverbs as fully as he should; I note that he cites only two collections older than 1750. There is no difficulty in discovering the titles of such collections,

for good bibliographical aids exist and the lists of French collections are particularly complete and accurate (see the indications of such materials in Taylor, "An Introductory Bibliography for the Study of Proverbs," *Mod. Phil.*, XXX [1932], 195-210). I note, furthermore, that Gottschalk makes no use of the many excellent dissertations which assemble the proverbs in Old French. By using them he could have extended his horizon with little trouble. He is, I think, quite right in excluding any comparisons with medieval Latin, other Romance languages, or the Germanic languages. The temptation to include references to the medieval Latin proverbs is, of course, a strong one.—
A. T.